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Abstract	
 
Our objective is to try to understand the rationale for and the effectiveness of different economic 
policies in a transition -- Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) -
- country setting: macroeconomic policy, international trade, international capital markets, human 
capital and, institutional structure.  
We provide consistent, comprehensive analysis covering the interlinked questions of: i) how to 
achieve sustained, balanced / diversified economic growth; by means of growth accounting 
framework (case studies Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) and using growth diagnostics methodology 
(case study Azerbaijan) we find that the main constraints can be summarised as: government 
(institutional) failure, human capital limitation, and corruption -- these factors may not be invariable 
for such range of countries but we aim to offer a general methodology; ii) “what break-ups do to 
countries”, concluding that breakup countries experience, in general, deeper and shorter economic 
crisis, tending to grow afterwards predominantly faster; iii) is there a prospect for (swift) economic 
convergence in the “club” of the 28 former (CEE and CCA) centrally planned economies; we 
explore for a first time the issue in such setting and report that these countries are expected to reach 
half the distance to their (unconditional) non-growth steady state in around 50 years, though this 
may not guarantee catch-up with the industrialised countries; iv) what is the quality of governance 
relationship with the resource “curse” or “blessing” and find that some form of resource “curse” is 
expected to be observed in any country that extracts natural resource rent; however, a net negative 
effect would obtain only in countries with poor institutional structures; v) what insights to the Dutch 
disease transmission mechanism can be provided by utilising a version of the Salter-Swan model; 
vi) is the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis (B-S) valid for the relevant setting (case study of 
Azerbaijan); by examining carefully this matter, both theoretically and practically, we confirm its 
validity; and, vii)  what are the most important sovereign yield spreads determinants, and propose 
that the levels of spreads are likely to be subject to significant alteration by the impact from 
  
 
 
financial market volatility and could potentially be pushed up or down at levels having little to do 
with their respective macroeconomic fundamentals; and,  
Our empirical approach takes account of recent advances in econometric analysis of time series – 
fractional cointegration. 
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Introduction	
Our objective is to try to understand the rationale for and the effectiveness of different economic 
policies in a transition -- Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Caucasus and Central Asia 
(CCA) -- country setting: macroeconomic policy, international trade, international capital 
markets, human capital and, institutional structure. All members of the latter group share the 
political, social and economic legacies of the Soviet Union era, while the former group of 
countries were former Soviet satellites. 
If economic policies are inadequate or fail completely, this inflicts vast economic and social 
costs on the entire population and penalizes the incompetent policy-makers. When the outcome 
is different (in a democratic political system?) this reveals key problems for research and 
analysis. Utilising a consistent theoretical framework we inspect the economic systems under 
consideration to inform our analysis of direct and indirect economic effects and their broad 
consequences. There are various interlinked unresolved questions. 
What is the key to successful integration (“skodalisation1”) rather than marginalisation of 
transition economies? The common obstructions specifically characteristic of the transition 
economies include: i) missing markets and institutions; ii) rapidly embedded monopolies; iii) 
deficiency in implementation of adopted legislation; and, iv) inadequacies in the general 
institutional structure, both formal and informal. 
                                            
1 A term coined by Prof. Peter Sinclair (after the Czech automobile manufacture Skoda) symbol of the fast transition 
from central planning and sub-quality products to producing highly competitive ones and successful integration in the 
world economy. 
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What do break-ups do to countries? This necessitates empirical analysis of how economic cost 
and benefits of secession in CEE and CCA countries translate into subsequent patterns of 
economic growth. 
Do we observe economic convergence and to what extent? If sigma shows divergence and beta 
is too slow can we help reverse the former and speed up the latter? 
Why (transition) countries might suffer “resource curse”? We identify four different channels or 
transmission mechanisms (with various combinations and variations) which endeavour to 
account for the inverse statistical relationship between resource abundance and economic 
growth. 
How does the transmission mechanism of the Dutch Disease operate within the framework of 
the Salter-Swan model? The model facilitates the understanding of the functions and relations of 
the key factors bringing about macro-economic imbalances; and, it makes available a structure 
within which the underlying principles and the expected outcomes of policy interventions can 
be analysed. 
Is the Balassa-Samuelson effect valid for this setting?  
What factors narrow or widen the sovereign bonds spreads? 
Our aim is to help clarify and possibly resolve some controversies, as well as, to try to envisage 
the future tendencies. 
Core characteristics of the structural reforms are similar in all the Caucasus and Central Asia 
countries (CCA). Macroeconomic conditions, resources, institutional structures, and 
management capacities are different. This differentiation resulted in streams of different speeds 
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and different outcomes within the common course of similar macroeconomic trends. All of 
these countries have been / are supported by comparable World Bank / IMF reform programs. 
Still their developmental potential -- defined as capacity across a set of political structures, 
market institutions and human capital essential for long-term economic development -- 
diverges; signifying path dependence and fundamental importance of these countries internal 
factors. 
Table 1: Main macroeconomic aggregates – CCA and CIS countries, per cent 
 
Data sources: World Development Indicators and CISSTAT (downloaded 28 March 2014) 
The data in the table above illustrates that the GDP volume index for the entire CIS is bigger 
than the volume index of the output of industrial and agricultural activities as well as investment 
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(in fact, the agricultural component has decreased) for the 1990 - 2008 period. In view of that, 
this rate of GDP growth must have resulted (to a great extent) from increases in services output, 
including trade, transportation, financial services, and general administration services. 
There are considerable differences in the rates of economic growth amongst the CIS countries 
during the period 1990-2008. These range from 207 per cent for Azerbaijan to 58 per cent in 
Moldova. The ranks are quite persistent – extending the sample until 2012 we observe that 
Azerbaijan has the highest rate of economic growth (242 per cent) and Moldova has 
experienced the smallest, i.e., 62 per cent.  Various factors may explicate these differences, 
including availability of natural resources, the commencing level of economic development, and 
the effectiveness and efficiency of economic and social policy implemented by the government. 
Observing the annual average rates of growth in GDP, industry and agriculture value added and 
the gross capital formation show that, if anything, the period from the beginning of the 
transition period (the fall of the “iron curtain”, 1990) until 2008 was characterised by slower 
growth even in comparison to the extended period up to 2012, notably including the period of 
the (still ongoing) Great Depression Mark II.   
Nonetheless, the CIS countries generally succeeded in bringing their government finances closer 
to balance. Deficits were low, sometimes there were surpluses (see Figure 1, below). The 
majority of CIS countries also maintained their Sovereign debt (as a percentage of GDP) at 
acceptable levels, but external indebtedness has been rather high. Using GNI as denominator we 
observe a picture, of external debt increasing notably in the mid-90s, then enlarged growing 
even more in early 2000s, and eventually declining; only to be moved up again by the events of 
the economic and financial crises from 2008 (see, Figure 2, below).  
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Figure 1: Government Budgets Stance -- CCA/CIS countries 
 
Data sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Figure 2: External Debt Stock 
 
Data sources: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
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There are a number of indicators of certain accomplishments in the integration of the CIS 
countries into the world economy, including the sizeable expansion of external trade and 
increasing foreign investment. Thus, exports of goods by the CIS countries in 2008 increased 
about seven times compared with 1995. 
 Figure 3: Balance on Current Account CCA and CIS Countries, per cent of GDP 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, October 2010. 
Note: For annual data (various sources) please see Annex 1. 
However, the commodity structure of exports is changing very slowly, and exports of natural 
resources (predominantly oil) continued to take up a large share of exports over the last decade, 
especially in countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia (about 85, 52, and 65%, 
respectively). Conversely, the share of exports of machinery for the same year (2008) was less 
than 10% for the CIS as a whole, varying between 0.5% in Tajikistan and 10% in Ukraine. 
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Table 2: Net-oil Exports as a Share of Total Export and GDP, selected countries 
 
Source: Author's calculations based on WB and EIA (Energy Information Administration USA) data 
 
At present, after more than twenty years of transition, the CCA countries – despite displaying 
high (though varied) average real GDP growth -- still have to establish themselves as 
competently, industrialized, economic systems. This is to say that the development has been 
driven essentially by the export of primary commodities (mainly oil) and export of labour 
(mainly low qualified). This implies that the most important reforms intended to facilitate the 
transition to market economy are yet to be accomplished, or perhaps the implemented changes 
so far are lacking in coherence (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). The quality of governance in 
general, and the efficiency of the financial systems in particular lagged behind such developed 
structures in market economies. 
One common problem of the CCA / CIS countries at that period (from 1996 to the year 2008) 
was the high rate of inflation. However, while there was a marked slowdown in the rate of CPI 
UNIT 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Azerbaijan % 41.9 68.4 77.1 72.2 70.1 73.9 67.6 74.5 89.8 86.1 84.7
 Iran, Islamic Rep. % 82.7 70.4 114.5 94.9 64.2 68.7 77.0 84.2 82.0 66.8 68.1
 Iraq % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
 Kazakhstan % 22.9 39.6 53.6 54.9 59.1 60.3 63.5 72.2 66.2 61.9 52.5
 Malaysia % 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.4 2.8 2.7 2.0 ..
 Norway % 23.9 30.5 42.0 36.6 36.1 35.4 38.3 40.9 38.8 34.8 ..
 Saudi Arabia % 86.0 86.6 101.0 92.4 83.8 88.3 91.2 94.7 90.7 85.3 91.8
 Turkmenistan % 37.1 47.7 35.6 29.1 33.8 32.0 39.5 38.2 24.5 25.2 31.4
Net Oil Exports as a share of GDP, %
Azerbaijan % 9.5 19.1 30.1 29.6 30.0 31.0 33.0 46.9 59.7 58.6 57.3
 Iran, Islamic Rep. % 11.3 15.1 26.0 19.4 17.0 18.7 22.4 27.8 26.6 21.5 22.2
 Iraq % 76.3 75.3 85.8 90.5 74.2 71.9 .. .. .. .. ..
 Kazakhstan % 6.9 16.8 30.4 25.2 27.8 29.2 33.2 38.6 33.9 30.6 31.9
 Malaysia % 2.4 2.8 3.4 2.7 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.3 3.2 2.2 3.3
 Norway % 9.0 12.0 19.5 16.7 14.9 14.2 16.1 18.2 18.0 15.9 17.7
 Saudi Arabia % 25.7 30.2 44.1 36.8 34.5 40.7 48.0 57.6 57.3 55.4 64.2
 Turkmenistan % 12.1 26.8 34.0 23.7 23.3 19.9 24.4 24.8 18.1 15.8 14.9
  
8 
 
growth since 2001, inflation remained high until 2008. Between 2006 and 2008 the period 
average of inflation for the entire CIS was 12 per cent (Cf. Table 3, below).  
Table 3: Consumer price Indices and Inflation, CIS Countries, per cent 
1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008 2012
Annual average 
inflation
Annual average 
inflation
Annual average 
inflation
Jan-Apr 2012 as 
per cent of Jan-
Apr 2011
Armenia 8 3 5 2.1
Azerbaijan 3 5 15 0.1
Belarus 115 31 10 6.8
Georgia 14 6 9
Kazakhstan 17 7 12 1.7
Kyrgyzstan 24 4 13 0.6
Moldova 22 10 13 1.2
Russia 37 15 11 1.8
Tajikistan 70 15 18 1.9
Turkmenistan … … … -0.8
Uzbekistan … … … 2.7
Ukraine 29 8 16 0.7
Total CIS 39 13 12 1.7
 
Source: CISSTAT (downloaded April 2009 and updated in February 2015) 
Another universal socio-economic problem for all CIS countries is the growing inequalities in 
the distribution of income. The differences between the shares of income received by the richest 
and poorest groups of population in the CIS countries are larger than in many developed market 
economies, and in some CIS countries income inequality has tended to worsen for several years.  
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Considering the entire period following the beginning of the market liberalization and reforms, a 
high degree of volatility in the main macroeconomic aggregates is apparent, reflecting the 
highly non-linear behaviour of these variables. The literature on transition offers three,  in 
general complementary, interpretations, outlined as follows: i) volatility is a consequence of a 
Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, i.e., new efficient firms and sectors take over the 
old inefficient government structures. Hence, according to this analysis, observed volatility is an 
efficient, normal phenomenon; Campos and Coricelli (2002); ii) the second relates volatility to 
the underdevelopment of markets, especially financial markets; Calvo and Coricelli (1993). The 
lack of developed credit markets magnifies credit cycles, frequently ensuing  large inter-
enterprise arrears and destabilising the economy; and, iii) the third account asserts that volatility 
builds up from the failure to establish appropriate institutions that should facilitate transition and 
support the new market system (Acemoglu et al., 2005). 
The rushed change in the CCA / CIS countries from the old centralized state plans, where all the 
information in the economy was completely integrated, to the excessively "free" and 
underdeveloped market system, appears to have been ill-advised. Nevertheless, the outlook for 
the economic future (despite the recent (2008) and still ongoing economic and financial crisis) is 
much more benign. The CCA countries (and Russia) form together a large market with high 
potential effective demand. These countries should be able to stabilize their economies. The 
question is how to achieve the change with minimal cost in human and financial terms, and 
select the optimum time paths for policy instruments to be applied and structural changes 
enacted. 
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Given appropriate measures, the different views and explanations of the causes of the initial 
output collapse see the main problem as a lack of efficiency and competitiveness. Confusing 
and misleading comments regarding value creation and destruction in the real economy follow 
them. Those comments present an oversimplified paradigm and leave the issue unexplained. 
The meaning of the term "value-subtraction ", i.e., negative value, which was used extensively 
in the early years of transition to describe the state of loss making government-owned 
companies, is only relative; it is valid only for exchange purpose. This is to say that certain 
productive activities do not yield a profit. However, goods that seem to have lost value during 
the process of production have their utility (user value) intact for consumers. No doubt these 
products were not up to the then modern standards of quality and efficiency in use, but they 
were actually demanded at that stage of economic development. The majority of the population 
could not afford the better imported brands, no matter what their preferences were. In this 
inspection, it is essential to tell again that consumer choice effect is exaggerated under normal 
economic conditions and it is irrelevant for all practical purposes at the time of crisis. Better 
policy and management could certainly have helped to avoid much of the loss of output and 
employment. When people's lives are at stake, every fraction of a percentage point reduction in 
output is significant. What, then, should the authorities in charge have done, and even more 
importantly, what they should do in the future? 
Revitalizing the economy under the burden of debt, capital flight and the world economy not yet 
out of the Depression (Great Depression Mark II) is a difficult task. However, rebuilding has to 
start by using all available capital, not by "creatively" destroying it. Of course, on this issue two 
camps (both containing vast numbers of proponents) were fast to be established -- one 
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supporting the "big-bang" or "shock-therapy" approach, e.g., Berg and Sachs (1992) and another 
(less radical) suggesting that reform should be less chaotic and more gradually implemented, 
e.g., Portes (1991). A strong regulatory system appears to be a precondition for privatization, 
trade liberalisation, and setting up a proper financial system. Simultaneously, governments have 
to decide on an appropriate for the countries’ framework industries2 for industrial policy3. The 
strategy must be sufficiently broad to allow for technological changes and gradual renewal of 
capital stock; stabilising investment demand initially and then increasing investment spending. 
While the development of CCA’s financial markets did not come to a halt; if the capital markets 
are to achieve depth and volume, regulation has to be tightened and the rights and 
responsibilities of the participants clarified and duly reinforced. After these measures are 
applied, it will be much easier for economic agents to work efficiently and for the economy to 
start growing. 
The next section provides analyses of the macroeconomic situation for several selected 
countries and then turns its focus to the natural resources abundance feature of these economies 
as a potentially essential factor in determining the patterns of their development. 
 
 
 
                                            
2 “No country in the world has been able to move from low- to middle- and high-income status without undergoing the 
process of industrialization. [...] There is a need for some guiding principles on how “best” any society should move its 
human, capital and financial resources from low- to high-productivity sectors. For the process to be efficient, 
coordination issues and externality issues must be addressed. Markets typically do not manage such structural 
transformations on their own well (Stigltz, Lin and Monga, 2013).” 
3 “Recent years have seen resurgence in the development of industrial policies by governments in the UK and overseas. 
In the UK, industrial policies have been developed in 11 sectors, led in most cases by groups from the public and 
private sectors, with many of these encompassing manufacturing industries. [...] In summary, manufacturing is too 
important to leave to its own devices (Sir Richard Lapthorne, Foresight, 2013).” 
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Chapter	 I:	 Macroeconomic	 developments	 in	 selected	 CCA	
countries	after	the	fall	of	the	"Iron	curtain"4		
 
Azerbaijan 
Oil and gas made Azerbaijan the fastest-growing economy in the world, over the last decade, 
posting its seventh consecutive year of double-digit growth in 2008 (with real GDP expending 
by a record 34.5 per cent in 2006 and 9.3 per cent in 2009). Industry estimates provide evidence 
that the Caspian Sea holds some of the world's largest unexploited deposits of oil and gas. 
Azerbaijan is, as well, a resource-abundant country in transition which needs to make important 
decisions on how to wisely spend its vast windfall revenues, how possibly to circumvent the 
Dutch disease and move from resource dependence to build a diversified modern economy.  
Figure 4: GDP real growth, by main components 
 
                                            
4 Most of the historic data used in this chapter is until 2008. This is due to three reasons: i) the chapter was written in 
2010 – hence, general data availability; ii) the data used particularly in growth accounting and the regressions was 
obtained directly from the relevant authorities (macroeconomic departments) during author’s tenure there as an adviser; 
and, iii) the beginning of the economic and financial crises of 2008 (the Great Depression Mark II) would obscure such 
kind of analysis. 
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The way Azerbaijan is managing its huge oil revenues is determining the current and future 
development path of the country. Oil wealth can be an immense blessing or a severe curse. 
Extraction and export of natural resources tend to generate large streams of revenue. In the 
endeavour to receive this revenue as quickly as possible, often there is reliance on resource 
revenues without related development; economic diversification is neglected given the high 
(and impossible to match) profitability of extracting and exporting the non renewable natural 
resources. Even if diversification is attempted, it proves extremely difficult to implement as oil 
extraction appears so profitable and no other sector could possibly compete with it for capital 
investments and human capital. This adds force to further increasing the dependence on 
resource revenues. However while the oil sector provides large revenue, conversely it provides 
very few jobs. Due to its nature it operates in isolation with few connections to the rest of 
economy. The oil industry accounts for only about two per cent of the total employment in the 
country. While the private sector of the economy is formally established and becoming more 
important, the Azerbaijan’s future economic development would depend on the ability of its 
companies to operate successfully in a competitive global environment. Implementing economic 
reforms at the most appropriate speed for the specific conditions of the country and applying 
sound macroeconomic policy is indispensable for achieving sustainable growth. Non-oil sectors 
in Azerbaijan, with the exception of some agricultural products and some processing of oil, are 
at present typically uncompetitive or largely non-existent. The lack of balance and 
diversification in the national economy of Azerbaijan pose a serious problem for employment 
and for long term economic sustainability. Diversifying economic growth is of paramount 
importance, research and support in this area should form the foundation of the Government’s 
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activities. It may be prudent to allocate a substantial proportion of the oil and gas revenues to 
domestic manufacturing capacity development and to stimulate employment directly. The 
difficulties are related to the competent decision making and even more importantly to the 
willingness and the capacity to implement them. 
Macroeconomic	Developments	and	Problems	
The trend towards an overvaluation of the currency, the Manat, which renders the non-oil sector 
increasingly non-competitive and attracts relatively cheap imports of consumption goods -- a 
typical symptom for the “Dutch disease” -- will lead to de-industrialization and cancel out any 
attempts to implement successful “export-led” or (the rather unappealing, though apparently 
favoured by the Government) “import-substitution” strategies. 
Figure 5: Nominal and Real Exchange Rates Development in Azerbaijan 
 
 Source: Azerbaijan authorities and author’s estimates 
 Note: RER -- Azeri Manat per US Dollar adjusted by relative prices -- US (CPI) towards Azeri (CPI). 
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strong indications that the Balassa-Samuelson mechanism is at work, implying a divergence of 
wage rates between the oil and the non-oil sectors.  Another problem is that the government 
budget financing is highly unbalanced. Only about a third of the budget is financed from non-oil 
taxes, the largest part coming from taxes on oil and transfers from the Oil Fund. Budget 
expenditure is focused on investment (almost half of the budget); a positive trend though has to 
be re-examined in light of our supplementary analysis. The government is under-taxing non-oil 
economic activities in general. The current account of the state budget exhibits a significant 
deficit (a surplus would be normally expected), which is regularly covered by oil revenues. A 
simple (though difficult to implement) design would be to establish a rule, which limits the use 
of oil revenue to investment expenditure5 in the government budget; as a corollary a non-oil 
taxation would have to increase6 to match an excessive government current spending. 
In this regard, growth accounting methodology is particularly helpful in formulating scenarios 
about the future development of the economy. It can be made highly structured and detailed 
taking into account demographic, labour market development and investment decision by firms 
and individuals. Such scenarios can provide policy makers with quantitative information on 
policy options7. Our study is one of the first to conduct independently growth accounting for 
concrete Azeri data (at 2009), calculating contributions to GDP growth by factor inputs and 
their shares directly rather than estimating and/or respectively assuming them. Our findings tend 
                                            
5 This approach is aimed at avoiding the resource “curse”. We illustrate the macroeconomic consequences from the 
high resource income disbursements when this rule is not followed trough a version of the Salter-Swan Model in 
Chapter II. 
6 This would tend to put political pressure on government to implement a sustainable macroeconomic policy. 
7 E.g., Giorno et al. 1995, Musso and Westermann (2005), and Henriot (ed.) 2008  
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to agree with the conclusions of Iradian (2007)8 and differ from those of Izyumov and Vahaly 
(2008)9 
Table 4: Growth Accounting -- Azerbaijan, 1996-2008 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on national authorities’ data, 2009.  
                                            
8 For the period 2001-2006 the average values of real growth factor contributions compare as follows: 
 Capital Labour TFP 
Iradian, 2007 6.8 0.2 8.1 
Petkov, 2009 5.4 0.4 11.4 
 
9 For the period 1998-2005 the average values of real growth factor contributions compare (implied) as follows: 
 Capital Labour TFP 
Izyumov and Vahaly, 2008 2.1 1.5 8.7 
Petkov, 2009 4 -0.3 8.3 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Quantity of Capital, thousand (manat) 18 074 001 17 989 001 18 415 000 19 401 000 20 414 000 23 560 001 26 035 000 29 764 001 34 251 001 40 763 001 46 041 001 56 284 000 60 623 000
Consumption of fixed capital 304 001 444 000 575 001 587 001 590 000 655 001 768 000 785 001 910 001 1 244 000 1 515 001 1 730 001 2 424 920
     Per cent of capital 2.9 2.5 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.4 4.1
Gross fixed capital formation 795 000 1 168 000 1 221 001 1 076 000 1 091 001 1 216 000 2 066 000 3 779 000 4 922 001 5 172 001 5 567 001 6 069 000 6 675 900
     Per cent of capital 7.5 6.5 6.7 5.7 5.5 5.5 8.3 13.5 15.4 13.8 12.8 11.9 11.4
Investment, net 491 000 724 000 646 000 489 000 501 001 560 999 1 298 000 2 993 999 4 012 000 3 928 001 4 052 000 4 338 999 4 250 980
Real net investment -- real growth of 
capital, % 4.0 3.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 5.2 10.7 12.5 10.5 9.3 8.5 7.3
Employed, thousands 3686.7 3694.1 2920 3202.1 3059.1 2989.3 3000.4 3022.4 3075.1 3163 3276.5 3316.8 3341.2
Self-employed 601.4 601.4 781.5 500.7 645.4 725.7 726.1 724.6 734 687.2 696.5 697.3 714.8
Total employment 4288.1 4295.5 3701.5 3702.8 3704.5 3715.0 3726.5 3747.0 3809.1 3850.2 3973.0 4014.1 4056.0
Employment, growth % 18.7 0.2 -13.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.7 1.1 3.2 1.0 1.0
Unemployment* 31.9 38.3 42.3 45.2 43.7 48.4 51.0 400.9 348.7 317.8 291.2 281.1 262.2
Unemployment rate % 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 9.7 8.4 7.6 6.8 6.5 6.1
Unemployment rate, change 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 8.4 -1.3 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 -0.4
Gross Value Added, million 2 457 2 924 3 298 3 625 4 426 4 897 5 576 6 596 7 914 11 576 17 721 26 490 35 325
Gross Domestic product 2 732 3 158 3 440 3 775 4 718 5 315 6 062 7 146 8 530 12 522 18 746 28 360 38 005
RGDP 1 942 2 678 3 328 3 547 3 934 4 778 5 408 6 223 7 301 9 971 15 922 21 893 29 218
GDP Implicit Deflator 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2
RGVA Growth rate, % -1.3 9.0 13.8 7.5 8.5 7.9 10.4 11.6 10.7 26.0 37.5 23.5 10.3
RGDP Growth rate, % 1.3 5.9 9.9 7.4 11.1 9.9 10.6 11.2 10.1 26.4 34.5 25.0 10.8
Real growth contributions, % 1.2 5.8 9.9 7.4 11.1 9.9 10.6 11.2 10.1 26.4 34.5 25.0 10.8
Capital percentage 3.0 2.6 1.9 1.8 1.9 3.3 6.5 7.1 6.9 6.6 6.2 5.4
Labour percentage 0.0 -3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.3
TFP percentage 2.8 10.8 5.4 9.3 8.0 7.2 4.5 2.3 19.2 27.0 18.6 5.2
1-α (capital share), % 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Capital-output ratio (in real terms) 6.7 5.5 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.1 2.9 2.6 2.1
Compensation of employees 513 000 621 000 663 001 791 000 1 021 000 1 067 001 1 620 000 2 122 000 2 820 001 3 211 000 4 308 001 5 934 000 7 677 587
Labour share 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Labour share adjusted for the imputed 
labour income of the self employed 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Growth of productivity 37.6 44.2 6.5 10.9 21.1 12.9 14.4 15.4 35.1 54.8 36.1 32.1
* Figures for 1995-2002 show the number of officially registered unemployed
** The same as GDP implicit deflator
*** Note: As statistics on deflators is not available we deflate with the average of the value of capital
at the beginning and end of respective year.
****Labour share of value added = Compensation of employees / TVA
Growth Accounting -- Azerbaijan, 1996 - 2008
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Labour inputs are typically measured in total hours worked / employment and capital inputs in 
terms of the stock of physical capital (assuming the latter to be proportional to the flow of 
services that derive from it). These data are observable and generally available from the State 
Statistics Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
Aggregate production function in combination with competitive factor markets constitutes the 
growth accounting framework. Growth accounting is a method used in economics to calculate 
contributions of different factors of production to economic growth and to derive the rate of 
total factor productivity (TFP), measured as a residual, in an economy. The approach is credited 
to Robert Solow (1957). 
ܻሺݐሻ ൌ ܣሺݐሻܭሺݐሻଵିఈܪሺݐሻఈ 
The parameter α, is representing the elasticity of output with respect to labour and can be 
described as the labour share in national income. This is valid in conditions of perfect 
competition, when in equilibrium the marginal product of each factor is equal to its price. The 
effect of capital (K) and labour (H) components on growth is proportional to the respective 
shares of factors. National accounts of Azerbaijan allocate to the compensation of employees 20 
to 30 per cent of the GVA in the period from 1996 to 2008. Adjusted for the imputed labour 
income of the self-employed, the labour share is on average slightly above 30 per cent. These 
findings appear counterintuitive, but taking into consideration the specificity of the Azeri labour 
market (in particularly the interaction of formal and informal remuneration) and that the annual 
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average growth rate of capital10 is very high at about 11 per cent over the period of 1996 to 
200811  may render them informative. 
These calculations (above) manifest important developments in the observed macroeconomic 
indicators: TFP (A); capital; and, labour contribution to economic growth. It is clear that 
economic growth12 is largely driven by increase in TFP13. 
 
Figure 6: Contribution to Economic Growth 
 
 
 
                                            
10 In calculating the capital stock we apply the Perpetual Inventory Method. We calculate the existing capital stock on 
the basis of the available time series of investment data; information on the initial capital stock at the beginning of the 
investment time series; and time series of the consumption of fixed capital stock. 
11 Berlemann and Wesselhoft (2014), estimate Azerbaijan’s annual capital stock growth rate throughout the period 
1991 -2010 at record high – 19 per cent. However, taking into consideration that the data for Azerbaijan before1995 is 
most impausible would rather make it conssitnt with our estimate. 
12 “Accounting is not explaining the underlying causes of growth. Growth accounting and productivity measurement 
identifies the relative importance of different proximate sources of growth. At the same time, it has to be complemented 
by institutional, historical and case studies if one wants to explore the underlying causes of growth, innovation and 
productivity change (OECD Manual, 2001)” 
13 This finding is supported by other studies, e.g., Izyumov and Vahaly (2008) 
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Figure 7: Contribution to Economic Growth in Relation to Net Oil Export 
 
While non-oil GDP growth appears rapid, at about 16 per cent in 2008, it is based mostly on strong 
expansion in the non-tradable sectors -- construction, services and, to some extent, communications. 
The total GDP growth, based on increased oil extraction and high oil prices, contributed to a major 
rise in the per capita GDP, reducing poverty and unemployment. Still, the productivity of the sector 
employing the largest share of Azerbaijan’s labour force – agriculture – remains very low. Although 
the oil sector accounts for more than half GDP and more than 90 per cent of industry, this sector 
employs less than 2 per cent of the workforce. Despite the considerable government investments, 
the country suffers from unbalanced regional development, growing inequality, high unemployment 
and underemployment, and inadequate social services and infrastructure. 
 
 
 
  
20 
 
Figure 8: Interrelation between the Oil and Non-oil Sectors of the National Economy 
 
 
Supplementary analysis suggests that the link between the oil and the non-oil economy is weak 
on the production side, though it is important as far as inflation, wage levels, and particularly 
budget financing are concerned. Based on an input-output table analysis14 (simulation) for 2006, 
a 10-percent increase in the volume of oil exports would generate only half a percent increase in 
the gross production of the non-oil sector, and an increase of about 0.7 percent for value added. 
 
The Macroeconomic Impact of Oil (the oil fund) through the Government Budget  
One generally accepted principle in the area of the public expenditure management is that robust 
budget systems facilitate efficient public expenditure management (PEM)15. PEM has three 
overarching and interrelated objectives: i) to make certain that the government operates within 
                                            
14 We use 25 sectors Input-Output Table for 2006; the core of the model is the Leontief inverse matrix, i.e., set of 
multipliers. The procedure shows how an increase in final demand – 10% increase in the volume of oil export -- 
transforms into increased output via the I-O model. This leads to an increase of 0.5 per cent of the non-oil GDP and 0.7 
per cent of its value added. 
15 World Bank (1998) 
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resources plausibly available; ii) to allocate resources across national priorities in a clear and 
consistent way; and iii) to guarantee that once the resources are allocated, the selected activities 
are financed in the most effective and efficient way. Government budget procedures – and the 
budgets as such – are basically the relevant apparatus for attaining of the goal of public 
expenditure management.  
 To promote market-oriented and efficient development, changes would have to occur in how 
the Government of Azerbaijan is organized and operates. In terms of generalisations for 
economic development prospects – it is clear that there is no genuine development strategy, nor 
set of efficient institutions that might have been able to implement such a strategy and cultivate 
economic development16. Rather than copy pro forma the “best practice” used elsewhere, it 
would be more productive to conduct a realistic analysis of the current resources and 
capabilities in the particular circumstances of Azerbaijan and study how these relate to the 
prevailing constraints and opportunities in the global economy. Improving capacities in 
macroeconomic and fiscal management and enhancing the procedures for budget preparation, 
will help in moving forward and improving the budget system in the long term, and increasing 
the speed and quality of execution. Timely formation of the processes and rules of the budget 
preparation (drafting) helps to produce high quality budget estimates and assessments. 
 
 
                                            
16 “Azerbaijan has reached a critical stage in its development. With oil output set to decline from 2017 and the 
economy’s dependence on accumulated hydrocarbon revenues very high, diversification of the economy will be critical 
to ensure that Azerbaijan enters the post-oil period with a modern and vibrant private sector. Although the authorities 
have adopted ambitious targets for diversification under the Vision 2020 strategy and have made some progress in 
modernising the economy, structural reforms needed to support self-sustaining growth in the non-oil sectors should be 
accelerated (Strategy for Azerbaijan, EBRD, 2014, p.2).” 
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Figure 9: Azerbaijan’s Oil and Gas Revenue in Relation to the State Budget 
 
The Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy 
The policy reaction of the Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA) to the beginning of (October, 
2008) world economic and financial crisis has been rapid and idiosyncratic. The CBA has 
relaxed monetary policy considerably, reducing the refinancing rate by 13 percentage points in 
less than a year; still this interest-rate reduction did not prove to be very effective. This is due, at 
least partly, to the fact that during times of extreme financial and economic turbulence 
conventional channels of monetary-policy transmission are undermined or simply blocked17. As 
an essential illustration we estimate the following equation in the tradition of the monetary 
paradigm of price level and inflation18: 
eq. 1 LOG(CPI_AZ) = C(1) + C(2)*LOG(M2_GDP_AZ_K) + C(3)*CBR_AZ 
 where,  
 CPI_AZ – Consumer Price Index (Azerbaijan) 
                                            
17 Keynes (1936), Krugman (1998), and Craig (2011) 
18 Friedman (1994), and Bernanke  (2003) 
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  M2_GDP_AZ_K – Monetary Aggregate M2 as a Ratio to GDP at Constant Prices 
 (Azerbaijan) 
 CBR_AZ – Central Bank Interest Rate (Azerbaijan) 
 C(1) – Intercept 
 C(2) and C(3) -- Parameters 
 
We begin by applying the (ADF) unit root test to all of the above variables, based on the 
following regression: 
eq. 2  

 
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i
tititi uXXTX
1
110   
The lagged first difference terms are added to remove any serial correlation in the error term and 
Ti is a time tend. The values reported in Annex 1, Table 43 suggest that the correct order of the 
ADF regression is three and that all variables are not trend stationary at the one per cent 
confidence interval level. Given the small sample size (for now) we tentatively assume that the 
variables under investigation are first difference stationary and move on and apply the two step 
Engel- Granger approach to cointegration. 
"In most cases, if we combine two variables which are I(1), then the combination will also be 
I(1). More generally, if we combine variables with differing orders of integration, the 
combination will have an order of integration equal to the largest. i.e., if Xi,t  I(di) for i = 
1,2,3,...,k. So we would have k variables each integrated of order di.  
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, , then zt I(max di). Many time series are non-stationary but “move together” 
over time – that is, there exist some influences on the series (for example, market forces), which 
imply that the two series are bound by some relationship in the long run. A cointegrating 
relationship may also be seen as a long-term or equilibrium phenomenon, since it is possible 
that cointegrating variables may deviate from their relationship in the short run, but their 
association would return in the long run (Brooks, 2002)." 
In step one (of the Engle-Granger two step method) we already made sure that all the individual 
variables are I(1), then we estimate the cointegrating regression using OLS, save the residuals of 
the cointegrating regression, and test these residuals to verify that they are I(0). 
The cointegrating regression (eq.3, below) hypothetically expresses the behavioural relationship 
between the dependent variable “logarithm of consumer price index of Azerbaijan” and the 
independent variables “logarithm of the ratio of money supply (M2) to real GDP” and the 
“central bank interest rate”. It seems that the model has very high explanatory power; the 
coefficient of mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom equals 0.9379 and the 
Durbin-Watson statistics is equal to 2.5298. The signs of the coefficients are correct. The 
relationship between “logarithm of the ratio of money supply (M2) to real GDP” and “logarithm 
of consumer price index of Azerbaijan” expressed by the regression coefficient in front of the 
former is of average strength and highly significant (t-statistics in square brackets, see equation 
3, below) suggesting that for every one per cent increase in money supply/real GDP ratio, 
consumer price index moves in the same direction by about 0.33 per cent. The central bank real 
interest rate influence on the dependent variables is low -0.12 (regression coefficient -
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0.0012*100, i.e. we are multiplying the regression coefficient by 100 to account for the semi-log 
form) and just on the border of significance, resembling probably correctly the passive role of 
interest rates in Azerbaijan’s economy. 
 
eq. 3 LOG(CPI_AZ) = 4.5155 + 0.3257*LOG(M2_GDP_AZ_K) - 0.0012*CBR_AZ 
       [123.184]                  [12.9742]                                           [-1.9781]  
 
Next, we apply two tests -- Augmented Dicker-Fuller Test and Phillips-Perron Test -- to the 
residuals of this regression, which strongly reject the existence of unit root (at one per cent level 
of significance) in the residuals. Hence, we establish that there is a long-run relationship among 
the variables of equation 3, above. As a step two in the Engle-Granger Approach to 
Cointegration we use (the obtained in step one) residuals in an error correction model (See 
Table 5, below). The error correction term turns out to have the expected (negative) sign, being 
both sizable (regression coefficient equal to -0.4512) and strongly significant (t-statistic equal to 
-3.7800). This is to say that according to the usual interpretation the consumer price index in 
Azerbaijan would approach its equilibrium level in about two years’ time. 
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Table 5: Inflation Estimation Equation Azerbaijan, Two-step Engle-Granger, Error       
               Correction Representation 
 
 
To check whether these results are robust as to the choice of the estimation technique we re-
estimate the relationship between the same variables by applying the simultaneous Johansen 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)19 approach. From the estimated co-integration vector 
(detailed results are presented in Table 6, below) the following long-run relationship is derived: 
 
eq. 4 LCPI_AZ = 0.4554*LM2_GDPK +0.0014*CBR_AZ 
            [6.233]                              [-1.2364] 
 
 
 
                                            
19 Vector autoregression (VAR) was pioneered by Sims (1980) as a method that could be used to characterize the 
mutual dynamic behaviour of a collection of variables without requiring strong restrictions to identify underlying 
structural parameters. It has become a widespread method of time-series modelling. When the variables of a VAR are 
cointegrated, we can apply vector error-correction model (VECM) model. 
Dependent Variable: D(LCPI_AZ) 
Method: Least Squares
Date: 10/30/10   Time: 20:22 
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2008   
Included observations: 12 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.186937 0.043271 -4.320194 0.0035
RESID_AZ(-1) -0.451167 0.119354 -3.780080 0.0069
D(LCPI_AZ(-1)) 0.222183 0.101810 2.182331 0.0654
CBR_AZ(-1) 0.006819 0.002509 2.718028 0.0299
@TREND 0.019879 0.002821 7.047970 0.0002
R-squared 0.964790    Mean dependent var 0.050077
Adjusted R-squared 0.944670    S.D. dependent var 0.073581
S.E. of regression 0.017308    Akaike info criterion -4.980967
Sum squared resid 0.002097    Schwarz criterion -4.778922
Log likelihood 34.88580    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.055771
F-statistic 47.95134    Durbin-Watson stat 1.998588
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000036 
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Table 6: Inflation Estimation Equation Azerbaijan, Johansen VECM Approach 
 
 
The results in respect to the regression coefficient in front of the “logarithm of the ratio of 
money supply (M2) to real GDP” variable are of the same order of magnitude, with the same 
sign and strongly significant. In respect to the regression coefficient in front of the “central bank 
interest rate", it is of the same magnitude, statistically insignificant (as in the initially estimated 
co-integrating equation) and with the “wrong” sign. The CBA is directly accountable to the 
President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, while it has some restricted operational autonomy20. In 
                                            
20“Article 6: Independence of the Central Bank 
6.1. The Central Bank shall be independent in discharge of its responsibilities and exercise of its 
authorities prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and no state authority 
or self administration body, physical person or legal entity may directly or indirectly by any reason, 
illegally influence or interfere with its activities. In case of any restrictions of the CBA’s activity, 
interference with the affairs of the National Bank or any influence on the CBA senior management, the 
Chairman shall inform the President of the Azerbaijan Republic. 
      Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR        
          Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix          
******************************************************************************* 
 13 observations from 1996 to 2008. Order of VAR = 1.                           
 List of variables included in the cointegrating vector:                        
 LCPI_AZ         LM2_GDPK        CBR_AZ                                         
List of I(1) exogenous variables included in the VAR:                          
 CBR_AZ                                                                         
 List of eigenvalues in descending order:                                       
.85928     .43029      .0000                                                    
******************************************************************************* 
 Null    Alternative    Statistic     95% Critical Value     90%Critical Value   
 r = 0      r>= 1        32.8067           23.3200                20.7500        
 r<= 1      r = 2         7.3142           11.4700                 9.5300        
******************************************************************************* 
ECM for variable LCPI_AZ estimated by OLS based on cointegrating VAR(1)     
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is dLCPI_AZ                                                 
 13 observations used for estimation from 1996 to 2008                          
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob]  
 Intercept                  2.9590             .58160             5.0877[.000]  
 ecm1(-1)        -.67050            .13449            -4.9855[.000] 
******************************************************************************* 
 List of additional temporary variables created:                                
 dLCPI_AZ = LCPI_AZ-LCPI_AZ(-1)                                                 
 ecm1 =    1.0000*LCPI_AZ   -.45539*LM2_GDPK -.0014339*CBR_AZ                   
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared                     .69321   R-Bar-Squared                   .66532  
 S.E. of Regression           .045849   F-stat.    F(  1,  11)   24.8557[.000]  
 Mean of Dependent Variable   .060089   S.D. of Dependent Variable     .079254  
 Residual Sum of Squares      .023124   Equation Log-likelihood        22.7108  
 Akaike Info. Criterion       20.7108   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion     20.1459  
 DW-statistic                  .89718   System Log-likelihood          29.2443  
******************************************************************************* 
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principle, the Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA) has followed an accommodating monetary 
policy. In Sept. 2009 CBA embarked on direct financing of the economy under state guarantees. 
One such example is the disbursement of one billion dollars (for seven years) to the State Oil 
Company (SOCAR) with an annual interest rate of three per cent “at least for the first couple of 
years”. These types of actions contribute potentially, via the inflation channel, to keeping the 
CBA’s policy interest rates negative in real terms over the last five years or so.  
Figure 10: Central Bank of Azerbaijan Nominal and Real Policy Rate, 1997-2009 
 
 
While the Central Bank of Azerbaijan is intervening extensively on the foreign exchange market 
to diminish the nominal appreciation of the manat it should be clear that the real exchange rate 
determination significantly depends on the interrelation of the traded and non-traded goods 
prices. There is a strong positive relation between government spending and the real exchange 
rate. A rise in government spending on non-traded goods can lead to a rise in relative prices of 
                                                                                                                                                 
6.2. The Central Bank shall report only to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” 
 (Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Central Bank of Azerbaijan, 2004) 
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non-traded goods and to a sharp appreciation of the currency’s real value, even if its nominal 
value is relatively unchanged. This would suggest undervaluation21. 
The commercial banking system is underdeveloped, small and concentrated. Despite the large 
number of banks, 46 at the end of December 2008, one bank – International Bank of Azerbaijan 
– which is government owned has a prevailing position with 43 per cent of total bank assets, 
whereas the respective shares of all other banks are no higher than six per cent (see Table 7, 
below).  
Table 7: Azerbaijan’s Banking System -- Market Share by Total Assets, millions of manats 
 
Source: Central Bank of Azerbaijan. 
Note: Assets are measured in million manat 
                                            
21 A currency is considered undervalued when its nominal foreign exchange value is less than its “real” exchange rate 
value based on economic conditions and accepted theory. In terms of Figure 5 this is to say that in 2009 one would be 
paying about 0.8 manats for $1, whereas the “real” exchange rate should have been around 0.5 manats per $1, i.e., the 
manat is undervalued as we are paying more that is justified by the presented analysis. The Balassa -- Samuelson 
hypothesis offers in general a theoretical justification of the long run trends in real exchange rates in relation to 
productivities and prices (see Chapter II). 
 
 December 2008  December 2007 
Assets Market Share
(%) 
Assets Market Share
(%) 
International 
Bank of 
Azerbaijan 
4,370 43 2,601 39 
Bank Standard 619 6 620 9 
Kapital Bank 578 6 249 4
TexnikaBank 450 4 354 5 
Unibank 418 4 390 6 
Xalq Bank 404 4 212 3 
Bank Respublika 388 4 253 4
Nikoil Bank 295 3 117 2 
Azerdemiryolbank 229 2 150 2 
AGBank 211 2 160 2 
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Booming oil exports strengthen the balance of payments of Azerbaijan and despite the world 
economic and financial crises it is projected to remain (strongly) positive for the year 2010 and 
beyond. 
  Figure 11: Current Account Balance, Azerbaijan 
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Source: Central Bank of Azerbaijan and author’s calculation 
 
Figure 11, above, reveals that Azerbaijan, in common with most of the other oil and gas exporters 
of the region, has built-up substantial foreign reserve positions (over the last few years) owing to 
the soaring gas and oil prices and increased extraction rates. The country could utilize some 
reserves to sustain its economic activity and make available some social safety net to those most at 
risk.  
 
Economic Growth, Degree of Openness of the Economy and Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory of international trade, the process of trade 
integration (if such is to come about) will likely lead Azerbaijan (and the group of Caucasus and 
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Central Asia countries) -- characterized by underdeveloped capital stock and low-cost labour -- 
to a decline in the relative prices of capital intensive goods (factor price equalisation) and 
increasing export of labour-intensive goods. Furthermore, theories of economic growth appear 
to determine a positive impact from the modernization of the basket of exports of a given 
country in achieving faster growth and convergence22. Empirical studies have tested the 
correlation between the dynamics of exports and growth processes. Overall, exporting tends to 
lead growth and economic convergence23. Some studies argue that this depends on the level of 
economic development of the country24. Economies that have a very low or a very high level of 
economic development may not show evidence of a significant relationship between the 
increase in exports and economic growth.  
It appears that only for countries with a medium level of economic progress is there a significant 
correlation between the extent of economic openness and the rate of economic growth. Dritsakis 
et al. (2005) analysed the relationship between economic growth, investments and exports for 
the former Soviet Union Country -- Ukraine. The end results give support for the existence of a 
cointegration relationship between these variables, and for a positive impact of exports and 
investment on real GDP growth. As far as the investments are concerned, the H-O theory 
supports the importance of the capital stock augmentation for the countries that are at a low 
level of economic development, though the impact on economic growth is expected to be 
significant only until a steady state of income growth is accomplished. The sources of 
                                            
22 Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2005) 
23 Lin and Li (2001) 
24 Dodaro (1993) 
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investment would be based on the foreign direct investment inflows and enhancement of the 
domestic savings rate.  
Hence, as an empirical illustration for Azerbaijan, we estimate the (potential long-term) 
relationship between real GDP, gross capital formation, and the degree of openness of its 
economy over the period 1995-2008. 
eq. 5 LOG(RGDP_AZ) = C(1) + C(2)*LOG(TRADE_SH_AZ) + C(3)*LOG(GFCF_AZ) 
 Where, 
 LOG(RGDP_AZ) -- logarithm of real GDP 
 LOG(TRADE_SH_AZ) – logarithm of the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP 
 LOG(GFCF_AZ) – logarithm of gross fixed capital formation 
eq. 6 LOG(RGDP_AZ) = 3.5447 - 0.4588*LOG(TRADE_SH_AZ) + 0.56*LOG(GFCF_AZ) 
            [5.5896]                 [-0.4448]           [2.9934]  
This equation has very reasonable explanatory power; the coefficient of mutual determination 
corrected for degrees of freedom equals 0.60613 and Durbin-Watson statistic equals 1.0663. The 
relationship between log real GDP and the log of GFCF of Azerbaijan expressed by the regression 
coefficient in front of the latter is relatively strong and highly significant (t-statistics in square 
brackets) signifying that for one per cent increase in GFCF, real GDP increases by about 0.56 per 
cent. The regression coefficient in front of the log trade-share is negative, equalling 0.4588. The 
interpretation of the effect of this variable suggests that one per cent increase in the trade-share of 
Azerbaijan would lead to a 0.4588 per cent reduction in real GDP. Could it be that expanding 
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export (mainly oil), together with the induced import has a negative impact on real GDP growth? 
However, this coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
Growth	Diagnostics	
Next we use Hausmann, R., Rodrik, D., and Velasko A., 2008, (HRV) growth diagnostics 
methodology in an attempt to identify the potential binding constraints to growth in Azerbaijan. 
As explained by HRV, any analysis of economic growth in a given country should start "anew", 
not taking any assumptions for granted. This is to say that if one variable has been "proven" not 
to have explanatory power for the "average country", then it will not be mechanically decided 
that it should not be associated with the growth process in Azerbaijan. 
Therefore, we look into the links between growth and trade openness without bias. Importantly, 
export composition is useful in providing a basis for Azerbaijan in helping the country to 
identify and develop new activities and goods and to put into operation the process of "self-
discovery". Self-discovery refers to the efforts of entrepreneurs to find profitable opportunities 
through the production of goods or services innovative for the respective country, though they 
may be produced in other parts of the world (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). 
Is it possible for Azerbaijan to move away from the heavy export concentration in primary 
commodities (oil) towards a more diversified export of sophisticated goods? The 
underperformance in growth in the non-oil sector relative to the oil one and the rest of the world 
is due not to lower investment rates but what is more to differences in the efficiency of 
transforming factors of production into final output, i.e., growth in total factor productivity 
(TFP). Productivity is also affected by market efficiency considerations and the quality of 
provision of public services. 
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The accumulation of factors and productivity growth are interlinked in a complex way making it 
difficult to disentangle their distinct effects on economic growth. For example, any 
misallocation of investment due to policy distortions or lack of policies supporting socially 
productive investments entails low aggregate output and therefore low TFP. Moreover, new 
technology in the form of new capital vintages is the key for TFP growth; hence it justifies the 
efforts to concentrate attention on the process of investment even when low TFP growth is 
clearly signalled out as problem. On the other hand, low aggregate productivity leads to low 
returns on investing in physical capital and lower private investment. Hence, the origin of the 
problem may be more easily recognized by examining the relevant implications for private 
investment.  
 Figure 12: Growth Diagnostics Methodology (GDM) 
  Possible causes 
Low return to 
economic activity 
High cost of 
finance Low social returns 
Low 
appropriability 
Poor 
geography 
Bad 
infrastructure 
Low 
domestic 
saving 
Government 
failures 
Market 
failures 
Bad 
international 
finance 
Bad 
local 
finance 
Micro risks: 
property rights, 
corruption, taxes 
Macro risks: 
financial, 
monetary, fiscal 
instability 
Information 
externalities: 
“self discovery” 
Coordination 
externalities 
Poor inter‐
mediation 
Low 
human 
capital 
Source: Hausmann R., Rodrik D., Velasco A. (HRV) 2008, p. 326. 
 
Following the HRV (2008) approach systematically, first we enquire: 
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A. Does the Azeri economy face low returns to domestic economic activity (investment)? 
Our answer is a clear "yes", which leads us to the inspection of social returns 
(investment potential) and of the extent of their possible appropriation as private returns. 
- Is the problem one of low social returns?  Yes -- Export baskets subject to Dutch 
disease. They do not support structural transformation towards higher development. 
- Is the problem one of low private appropriability of investment returns?  Yes -- Both, 
government failures obstructing sufficient appropriability; and, market failures – lack of 
private motivation to initiate investments with high social returns. 
- Are there important government failures? Yes -- Lack of law enforcement (large 
informal economy and risk of expropriation) and macroeconomic risks (financial, 
monetary, and fiscal instability). 
- Are there substantial market failures? Yes -- Monopolistic structures discouraging 
potentially interested entrepreneurs from any attempt at pioneering self-discovery. 
B. Does Azerbaijan face a high cost of financing domestic investment?  The answer is, as 
well, a firm "yes". Then the positive response to this question is further decomposed into 
replies to the sub-questions: 
- Does the country have a low domestic propensity to save and/or problems accessing 
international finance -- Yes -- unattractive conditions for foreign direct investment. 
- Does the country have problems with the domestic financial system -- Yes -- inefficient 
financial intermediation, poor bank regulation, and prevalence of related-party lending. 
Are there useful indicators of binding constraints in one or more of these areas? 
  
36 
 
In the case of Azerbaijan, the growth diagnostic methodology suggests the conclusion that the 
main obstruction to growth is explained by low returns to economic activity, resulting in low 
private investment rates. The important question then is how to identify the weakest links in the 
investment process illustrated in the tree: that is to say, binding constrains, which could be 
potentially relaxed. 
There is no simple way to distinguish between possible constraints and binding constraints -- in 
essence, conclusions are generally derived based on the predominance of the evidence 
discovered.  
HRV promoted the idea that the central part to distinguishing binding constraints consist in 
examining relative prices and establishing if they appear to be out of line with those in 
“undistorted” economies. E.g., if the cost of capital (interest rates) is high relative to the 
international interest rate, this may indicate that capital is relatively scarce (a binding constraint) 
in that country. If it is not, then it can be inferred that the private returns of available investment 
opportunities are low. It is possible to add other barriers into the price space, for instance the 
incidence of risks and taxes.  
In addition stock estimates may be essential to supplement flow data to reveal quantity 
imbalances. Growth accounting, based on stock data of factor inputs is very useful and may 
help, as well, to uncover constraints.  
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Table 8: Azerbaijan, Growth Accounting Non-Oil GDP, 2001-2008 
 
 Source: Author’s own calculations based on national authorities’ data, 2009. 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Quantity of Capital, million 
(manat)1 19092.1 20420.6 21969.8 23706.9 26339.9 29052.5 33605.3   
Gross fixed capital 
formation2 484.3 658.6 1015.3 1214.6 2013.7 2826.0 3941.3 7021.7 
     Per cent of capital 2.5 3.2 4.6 5.1 7.6 9.7 11.7   
Investment, net  
484.268
9 
658.584
3 
1015.27
5 
1214.61
8 
2013.70
9 
2825.97
1 
3941.32
5   
Real net investment 479.7 645.7 985.2 1166.5 1913.5 2655.5 3658.0   
Real growth of capital, % 2.5 3.2 4.5 4.9 7.3 9.1 10.9   
Employment, million3 3666.7 3678.0 3698.3 3760.4 3801.3 3921.5 3962.7 4004.7 
Employment, growth % 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.7 1.1 3.2 1.1 1.1 
Unemployment4 48.4 51.0 400.9 348.7 317.8 291.2 281.1 262.2 
Unemployment rate, 
change 0.1 0.1 8.4 -1.3 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 -0.4 
Gross Value Added, 
million7 3195.9 3693.9 4447.6 5242.5 6055.1 7630.0 10576.1 
14750.
7 
Gross Domestic product 3195.9 3693.9 4447.6 5242.5 6055.1 7630.0 10576.1 
14750.
7 
RGDP 3322.1 3635.7 4243.9 5050.6 5680.2 6776.2 8501.7 
12241.
2 
GDP Implicit Deflator5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
RGVA Growth rate, % 8.7 13.8 14.9 13.6 8.3 11.9 11.4 15.7 
RGDP Growth rate, % 8.7 13.8 14.9 13.6 8.3 11.9 11.4 15.7 
Real growth 
contributions, % 13.6 9.7 9.3 9.6 9.7 10.7 8.9 15.7 
Capital percentage 1.7 2.1 2.9 2.9 3.7 5.1 6.3   
                  
Labour percentage 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 1.4 0.4   
                  
TFP percentage 11.8 7.5 6.3 6.0 5.4 4.2 2.2   
                  
1-α (capital share), % 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6   
Capital-output ratio 5.7 5.6 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.3 4.0   
Compensation of 
employees8 1067.7 1262.1 1620.4 2122.3 2954.8 3364.5 4474.8 5934.3 
Labour share 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4   
Labour share adjusted for 
the the self employed 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4   
1 = quantity of capital minus fixed assets in mining 
2 Investment to fixed capital 
3 Employment from 1995 to 1999 covers the whole economy 
4 Figures for 1995-2002 show the number of officially registered unemployed 
5 Deflators for 1995-2000 are for the whole economy 
6 The same as GDP implicit deflator 
7 The same as GDP 
8 For the whole economy 
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Apparently, the growth of the non-oil economy over the recent past suggests that there is 
nothing to worry about with regard to competitiveness. Yet that strong growth rate is primarily 
due to the contribution stemming from non-tradables like construction, that is largely unaffected 
by the appreciation of the exchange rate. In contrast the tradables of Azerbaijan economy are by 
now showing signs of strain. Industrial and agricultural outputs as shares of non-oil GDP are 
steadily contracting over the last three years (see Figure 13, below).  
Figure 13: Azerbaijan’s Non-oil GDP Breakdown by Sector of Economic Activity, per cent 
 
 
Another approach to look at constraints to growth in the decision tree framework is to shift the 
matter to the sector level and enquire about the reason why certain products expected to be 
produced and exported are not in the relevant country basket of goods and export. One can start 
by examining the progress of the collection of inventions in each country’s exports over time 
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and observe the extent of consistency of their revealed comparative advantage with their per 
capita income. The concept in this test is that an export basket related to the demand of less 
developed countries indicates growth problems as “[t]he type of goods in which a country 
specializes has important implications for subsequent economic performance. Everything else 
being the same, an economy is better off producing goods that richer countries export 
(Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2005).” 
A modification to this approach is to examine the potential for the export basket to transform 
itself into a better basket -- the value of its “open forest”25, (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006). This 
notion suggests that transformation in exports is not accidental, but is rather guided by an 
endogenous blueprint based on the process of development. When a country becomes 
competitive in a given product or product group, a higher probability exists that it will turn out 
to be competitive in specific products but not in others. For example, “Oil exporters seem to 
have an export basket that provides few opportunities for future structural transformation, 
whereas many eastern European countries, as well as China, India, and Indonesia, seem to be in 
a denser part of the forest. (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006)” 
Based on the GDM we arrive at some reliable insights about the structure of the Azeri economy. 
While investments are rather high, they appear generally misallocated, caused by public policy 
subsidising private investment in arbitrarily chosen sectors -- with low spillovers -- with an 
                                            
25 “We develop for each country a measure of the value of the unoccupied product space where 
we take account of the distance between the country’s current areas of comparative advantage 
and each potential product. We call this variable ‘open forest’”. Hausmann and Klinger, 2006, 
p.3  
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intention to produce imaginary industrialisation26. The following factors constitute the effective 
binding constraints: 
 Government failure and Dutch disease 
The main problem in Azerbaijan seems to be loss of competitiveness -- the Dutch disease -- in 
combination with government failure. Businesses do not invest and even existing ones leave the 
country due to excessively risky investment owing to poor contract enforcement, insecure rule 
of law, government ineffectiveness, and corruption. There is no obvious way to remove/reduce 
the weak government constraint. While there may be areas for possible improvement – 
democratic institutions, wages in the public sector, quality of education, etc. -- the fundamental 
reason for this state of affairs is deeply rooted and practically beyond reach. 
 Low Levels of Human Capital Development 
Although it may not be an evident binding constraint today for Azerbaijan, if the country is to 
succeed in accelerating balanced growth of its economy it is just a question of a short period of 
time to come up against a human capital constraint. Therefore, investment in education would 
be a must for the country. 
 Corruption and Poor Domestic Finance  
The World Bank’s Investment Climate Surveys (ICS), provides interesting information. The 
findings based on the ICS largely support our view. Tellingly finance does not get highest score 
as an obstacle to investment; more immediate obstacles are the main concern -- in fact 
                                            
26 This is to say that the established enterprises / sectors of industry are not subject to the market 
economy driving forces, e.g., competition, effective demand, profitability, innovation and 
effectiveness. 
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corruption turns out to be the single most important constraint on businesses; and with the 
passage of time (2002 to 2009) the measure has worsened (Figure 14 below). 
Figure 14: Azerbaijan, investment climate survey 
 
 
Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan is a huge country (ninth in the world) with a land area almost equal to the whole of 
Western Europe. Since its independence in 1991 from, the then dissolving, Soviet Union, 
Kazakhstan’s economic system has experienced extreme fluctuations. The 1990s were an especially 
complex, and demanding period of transition for Kazakhstan. The country experienced extreme 
inflation of 3000 per cent in 1992, which stood above 1000 per cent for each one of the subsequent 
two years. Afterwards hyperinflation was brought under control after the introduction of a new 
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currency (the Tenge); meanwhile, partly as a consequence of the interruption of the established 
industrial relations that accompanied the break-up of the Soviet Union, real GDP fell to a low point 
of 61.4 per cent of its 1990 level in 1995. By 2008, the country’s real GDP had reached 141 per 
cent of its pre-transition level of 1990 (CISSTAT, 2008). 
Figure 15: Kazakhstan, consumer prices, annual increase, per cent 
 
 
Figure 16: GDP real growth, by main components 
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Kazakhstan’s growth performance in the past several years has been robust. A number of years of 
deep contraction in the early 1990s and slow expansion in the late 1990s, were followed by 
economic growth, which averaged above ten per cent over the period 2000 to 2007. Rising world 
prices and increased production of oil led to this high growth. Oil extraction has risen for the period 
2000 and 2004, based on substantial foreign investment, by fifteen per cent on average. High 
growth rates are characteristic for resource abundant (former Soviet republics) countries; during the 
2000-2009 period Azerbaijan expanded at even higher velocity, as well exporting mainly oil. Still, 
Kazakhstan is facing significant challenges -- unemployment, poverty, food security, corruption, 
mismanagement, decline of manufacturing, to mention but a few. 
Manufacturing sector value added as per cent of GDP has declined by almost 6 percentage points 
over the period 2000 to 2012. 
 
Figure 17: Manufacturing value added as per cent of GDP -- Kazakhstan and its peer group 
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Figure 18: Manufacturing value added -- Kazakhstan and its peer group 
 
 
 
Exchange rates developments in Kazakhstan  
 
Figure 19: Nominal and Real Exchange Rates Development in Kazakhstan 
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Table 9: Growth accounting Kazakhstan, 1997-2007 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on national authorities’ data, 2009. 
 
Here we utilise again the growth accounting framework (see p. 17). 
National accounts of Kazakhstan allocate to the compensation of employees 40 to 50 per cent of the 
GVA in the period from 1997 to 2007. These findings appear less counterintuitive than in case of 
Azerbaijan. The annual average growth rate of capital in Kazakhstan is significant (at 7.7 per cent), 
but not as high at the one in Azerbaijan. These calculations (above) manifest important 
developments in the observed macroeconomic indicators: TFP; capital; and, labour contribution to 
economic growth. It is clear that economic growth is again mainly driven by increase in the TFP. 
 
Applying GDM we arrive at the conclusion that the following factors constitute the effective 
binding constraints: i) Government failure and Dutch disease; ii) Low Levels of Human Capital 
Development; and iii) Corruption and Poor Domestic Finance.  
Table 1: Growth Accounting Kazakhstan
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Quantity of Capital, million (tenge) 2 508 214 2 541 898 2 581 207 2 610 946 2 884 171 3 214 420 3 611 063 4 260 974 5 334 507 6 996 534 5 252 480
Consumption of fixed capital 253 957 238 760 286 949 420 520 498 159 576 877 666 015 822 513 1 049 146 1 422 361 1 744 054
     Per cent of capital 10.1 9.39 11.12 16.11 17.27 17.95 18.44 19.30 19.67 20.33 33.20
Gross fixed capital formation 271 765 272 445 326 259 450 258 771 385 907 126 1 062 658 1 472 424 2 122 679 3 084 388 0
     Per cent of capital 10.84 10.72 12.64 17.25 26.75 28.22 29.43 34.56 39.79 44.08 0.00
Real growth of capital, % 7.18 7.35 7.31 8.97 10.50 11.08 -14.52
Employment, growth % -2.32 4.54 0.46 7.16 -1.54 3.76 1.57 -0.12 1.51 2.58
Gross Value Added, million 1 595 257 1 629 593 1 902 928 2 427 219 3 025 967 3 504 496 4 298 953 5 516 811 7 122 744 9 547 897 12 544 164
RGVA 1 595 257 1 541 715 1 588 977 1 726 378 1 954 807 2 137 811 2 347 757 2 595 054 2 841 789 3 135 277 3 566 383
Real growth contributions, % -1.9 2.7 9.8 13.6 9.7 9.3 9.6 9.7 10.7 8.9
Capital percentage 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.6 3.7 4.7 -6.3
Labour percentage -1.9 4.1 0.4 5.8 -1.2 2.6 1.1 -0.1 0.9 1.5
TFP percentage 6.4 9.1 4.5 5.9 6.1 5.2 13.8
1-α (capital share), % 0.28 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.31 0.29 0.35 0.42 0.44
Capital-output ratio (in real terms) 1.50 1.55 1.53 1.41 1.37 1.40 1.43 1.54 1.76 2.09 1.44
Compensation of employees 854 100 968 300 1 186 400 1 437 400 1 730 300 1	901	750 2	123	900 2 832 900 3 406 000 4 079 000 5 247 943
Labour share 0.54 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.43 0.42
Labour share adjusted for the imputed 
labour income of the self employed 0.72 0.82 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.76 0.69 0.71 0.65 0.58 0.56
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Kyrgyzstan 
During the initial stages of its independence Kyrgyzstan has made more progress in reform 
ratification and implementation (EBRD, 1997) and less progress in economic development than any 
of the other Central Asian states. This may be largely due -- some may well claim -- to the fact that 
unlike its neighbours Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and the more distant fellows Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan has no significant reserves of oil and gas. However, Kyrgyzstan is in 
third place by gold production within the CIS countries and 22nd in the world. Hence, an 
explanation better founded in reality appears to be the hectic privatisation, the eruption of 
corruption, severe mismanagement, and deficiency of markets. Still, strong and sustainable 
economic growth and secure political environment are yet to emerge. 
Now we turn towards the EBRD transition indicators. The transition indicator marks – from 1 to 4 – 
are based on the result of the EBRD’s Office of the Chief Economist informed judgement on the 
subject of the definite progress by country in transition. The scores are based on classification 
system initially developed in the 1994 Transition Report and refined and amended in subsequent 
reports. 
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Table 10: Progress in transition in Central Asia 
 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 1997 
Note: “+” and “-” ratings are treated by adding 0.33 and subtracting 0.33 from the full value. Averages are obtained 
by rounding down, for example. a score of 2.6 is treated as 2+, but a score of 2.8 is treated as 3- (www.EBRD.com). 
 
Figure 20: Kyrgyzstan, GDP and value added from gold production 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Economic 
Regulation and author's estimations 
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Figure 21: Kyrgyzstan potential output growth, GDP real growth and GDP deflator 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Economic 
Regulation and author's estimations 
Figure 22: Kyrgyzstan, exchange rates developments 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Economic 
Regulation and author's estimations 
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Balance of Payments of Kyrgyzstan -- Implications of Errors and Omissions 
Here, we examine the size of potentially unreported income in Kyrgyzstan possibly underlying 
the persistently large net errors and omissions term of the balance of payments, which is 
generally with the same sign.  
All economic transactions of a given economy with the rest of the world are summarised in the 
balance of payments. It consists of two major components: current account and capital and 
financial account. A residual, of the two is called net errors and omissions. By definition, the 
current account balance should be identical to the capital and financial account balance -- with 
the opposite sign -- equilibrating the balance of payments. However, various statistical problems 
and imperfections in the data collection lead to deviations from this theoretical rule. These 
deviations are contained in the error term. The size of this term is not an indicator of the relative 
precision of the data, since it represents a net amount whereby errors and omissions with 
opposite sign should mutually offset. 
However, there is a reason for concern if the error term is persistently large and with the same 
sign. In general -- if this term is positive, it suggests that the sum of current and capital account 
balance is understated, and conversely for a negative error term. In Kyrgyzstan, there has been 
observed a persistently negative current account balance and a positive capital and financial 
account balance, with the absolute value of the current account deficit being commonly smaller 
than the capital and financial account surplus. The result is a positive annual amount of the net 
error term over the period 2003 to 2008 (with the exception of 2004).  
The data reveal that the absolute value of the error term is around 700 million USD for the year 
2008 -- the highest absolute value on record. Effectively, a consistently negative value is a sign 
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of a potential capital outflow; abroad or perhaps into the grey economy. For instance, positive 
current account balances signify the net inflow of funds into the economy. If, simultaneously the 
capital and financial account balance is zero, then we observe net capital inflow. In this case, the 
net error term will turn negative -- keeping the balance.  
Figure 31, below, illustrates the very high correlation between the variables, relative change in 
export and relative change in the error term; correlation coefficient 0.76. 
 
Figure 23: Kyrgyzstan BOP, relative change in export and net errors and omissions 
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unreported – and therefore untaxed – income from foreign re-export. Though potentially some 
part of this unrecorded foreign cash accumulation ends up in the legal sector of the economy, 
these funds are not subject to direct but only to indirect taxes.  
For comparison a chart with the same structure, for the neighbouring country of Kazakhstan is 
presented below. In this case the coefficient of correlation turns out to be much less important, 
just 0.25, which is consistent with the analysis for Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Figure 24: Kazakhstan BOP, relative change in export and net errors and omissions 
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What Break-ups do to Countries? 
 
Here we try to provide an answer to the interesting and important (to economics and beyond) 
question of what break-ups do to countries? 
Hence, we concentrate our analysis on the Former Yugoslavia, the Former Soviet Union and 
their ex-republics and the respective successor’s independent states; we look as well into the 
state of affairs in the former Czechoslovakia. As controls we employ Bulgaria, Poland, 
Hungary, and Romania. 
The data -- GDP per Capita Estimates -- are obtained from James et al. (2012). The dataset 
covers the period 1950 to 2015, providing GDP per capita estimates expressed in either constant 
US dollar terms or international dollar terms from seven different sources.  
Endeavouring to track the “geometry” of the process of decommunisation we use a set of 
dummies, splitting the period from 1950 to 2012 onto three parts: i) socialist stage -- 1950 to 
1988; ii) transition phase – 1989 to 1993; and, iii) 1994 to present (2012) -- building the 
structure of the new states. Initial, preliminary estimates are provided below. 
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Figure 25: GDP per Capita, 1990 Geary-Khamis (GK) USD: a) Former Yugoslavia and its 
Republics; and, b) Former USSR and its Republics 
a) 
 
b) 
 
Note: The Geary-Khamis is an aggregation method in which category "international prices" (reflecting relative 
category values) and country purchasing power parities (PPPs), (depicting relative country price levels) are 
estimated simultaneously from a system of linear equations. Has the property of base-country invariance, matrix 
consistency and transitivity (https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail).  
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We use the following notation: 
YUGO: GDP per capita, Former Yugoslavia, 
BOSNIA: GDP per capita, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
CROAT: GDP per capita, Croatia, 
MACE: GDP per capita, Macedonia, 
SLOV: GDP per capita, Slovenia, 
MONT: GDP per capita, Montenegro 
SERBIA: GDP per capita Serbia 
INPT:  Constant 
T1:  Dummy = 1 for 1950 to 1988; 0 otherwise 
T2:  Dummy = 1 for 1989 to 1993; 0 otherwise 
T3:  Dummy = 1 for 1994 to 2012; 0 otherwise 
PI:  Percentage rate of change 
 
In what follows we use GDP per capita, 1990 Int. GK USD, Maddison, A. (one of the 7 data 
sources available), the exercise could be repeated applying the other datasets. 
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Table 11: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates Former Yugoslavia – in levels 
 
 
It is important to note that: 1) One dummy is omitted; given that a constant term is present, we 
need to avoid perfect collinearity (the dummy variable trap); 2) T-ratios in parentheses. (Kosovo 
is omitted on two grounds as it declared independence in 2008 and there is not sufficient data 
for the intended comparisons. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) regressions may need to be re-
estimated with differently structured dummies as BiH gained independence later in 1995. For 
consistency we use uniformly T1, T2, and T3); 3) Most coefficients are statistically significant – 
their interpretation is: the average GDP per capita over the 1950 to 1989 period is accounted for 
by the constant (INPT). It equals 7402.5 for Slovenia for this period, we need to add the 2495.7 
(T2 coefficient) to get the average GDP per capita figure for the second (T2) period. Similarly, 
adding the T3 coefficient to the INPT will produce the average GDP per capita for the last (T3) 
period, e.g., 14389.0 
Dependent variable INPT T2 T3
YUGO
3985.9 
(15.4010)
497.6 
(.57970)
1352 
(2.8530) 0,092997
BOSNIA
1443.3 
(7.4224)
1391.2 
(2.1572)
4282.7 
(12.4984) 0,71324
CROAT
5909.6 
(31.5754)
-164.3503 
(0.2747)
1344.3 
(4.0761) 0,20071
MACE
3394.1 
(42.1693)
165,6392 
0.62196)
111.9155 
(0.79093) -0,018572
SLOV
7402.5 
(20.1470)
2495.7 
(2.0480)
6986.8 
(10.7910) 0,6487
MONT
6584.3 
(53.2718)
-1443.6 
('-3.5215)
-1487.7 
('-6.8303) 0,44818
SERBIA
6713.6 
(49.1865)
-1216.0 
('-2.6861)
-1667.2 
(-6.9317) 0.43824
2
R
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Table 12: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates Former Yugoslavia – growth rates 
 
 
The results suggest that after a significant, though relatively short lived decline (about 5 years 
on average) in the GDP per Capita growth rate during the transition period (T2, in our notation) 
all the constituent countries have experienced noteworthy advancement in their GDP growth per 
Capita rates during the last most recent period (1994 to 2012). It should be noted that due to the 
unusual effect of the Financial and Economic Crises (Great Depression Mark II) starting in 2008 
the trend growth rates are underestimated. Restricting our sample to the year 2008 produces 
clearly higher post-communist period growth rates, but we stick to our conservative, results. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable T1 T2 T3
PIYUGO
4.0833 
(5.0701)
-13.9624 
(-5.6247)
4.1455 
(3.4428) 0.44702
PIBOSNIA
6.5046 
(4.6306)
-14.3996 
(-3.3259)
8.6426 
(4.3506) 0.26225
PICROAT
1.6068 
(3.6898)
-10.0967 
(7.5222)
3.3698 
(5.4716) 0.57307
PIMACE
1.2739 
(4.0304)
-5.8704 
(6.0259)
1.7674 
(3.9539) 0.45801
PISLOV
2.5552 
(7.4513)
-2.7933 
(2.6428)
3.4286 
(7.0698) 0.30297
PIMONT
0.47232 
(0.63946)
-15.8111 
(6.9451)
3.8545 
(3.6901) 0.49452
PISERBIA
0.72234 
(1.1656)
-15.4668 
(8.0972)
3.5141 
(4.0096) 0.56697
2
R
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Figure 26: Estimated GDP per Capita Trend Growth Rates (Former Yugoslavia) 
 
 
Next we apply the same apporch to the Former USSR ex-republics estimating T1, T2, and T3, both 
in terms of levels and in terms of growth rates. 
We use the following notation: 
AZE: GDP per capita, Azerbaijan, 
BLR: GDP per capita, Belarus, 
EST: GDP per capita, Estonia, 
GEO: GDP per capita, Georgia, 
KAZ: GDP per capita, Kazakhstan, 
KGZ: GDP per capita, Kyrgyzstan, 
LTU: GDP per capita, Lithuania, 
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LVA: GDP per capita, Latvia, 
MDA: GDP per capita, Moldova, 
RUS: GDP per capita, Russia, 
TJK: GDP per capita, Tajikistan, 
TJKM: GDP per capita, Tjurkmenistan, 
UKR: GDP per capita, Ukraine, 
UZB: GDP per capita, Uzbekistan, 
USSRF: GDP per capita, USSRF, and obtain the results depicted at Figure 28, below (for details 
please see Annex 1, Table 43 and Table 44). 
Figure 27: GDP per Capita Trend Growth Rates, Former Soviet Union and Its Republics  
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The severe economic decline depicted by “T2” (the transition recession of 1989-1993) is clerly 
evident ranging from around minus 4% for Belarus to around minus 20% for Georgia. 
It is worth mentioning in passing the case of the of Czechoslovakia’s disintegration where no 
obvious changes were observed and both (new) countries the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
continued their development on a very similar (rather high growth) path. 
Figure 28: Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovakia 
 
Table 13: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates Former Czechoslovakia – in levels 
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Dependent variable INPT T2 T3
CZE
6331.4 
(23.9446)
1917.0 
(2.4439)
4184.3 
(9.0571) 0.56502
SVK
5020.1 
(16.5659)
1904.0 
(2.1180)
4926.8 
(9.3054) 0.57736
FCZECHO
6291.4 
(22.8171)
1559.8 
(1.9290)
3817.9 
(7.6981) 0.49352
2
R
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Table 14: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates Former Czechoslovakia – growth rates 
 
We continue by examining the countries which we have selected to serve as our controls. These 
countries -- Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania –  have beagn and are undergoing very similar 
process of transition, but remained intact, keeping there borders unchanged.  Figure 29 shows the in 
general general signifivntly longer transition recession (rangeing from 1989 to 1997). 
Figure 29: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania 
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Table 15: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates Control Countries – in levels 
 
 
Table 16: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates Control Countries – growth rates 
 
On this basis we canmake a number of preliminary observations: the breakup countries experienced 
deeper and generally shorter economic crisis (initial transition period) in comparison with the 
control countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania). However, they have tended to grow 
afterwards predominantly faster and have managed to add, on average, similar or higher amount (in 
1990 international GK USD per capita) than the control countries. Furthermore, the evidence shows 
that when rich countries leave the former union they grow and develop much faster, e.g., Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
Dependent variable INPT T2 T3
BGR
4385.9 
(16.8832)
978.9891 
(1.2704)
2318.4 
(5.1080) 0.28054
HUN
4877.3 
(21.7470)
1141.0 
(1.7150)
3026.0 
(7.7225) 0.48199
POL
4369.5 
(18.8933)
708.1668 
(1.0322)
3827.1 
(9.4712) 0.58766
ROM
2874.3 
(18.6834)
356.6422 
(0.78148)
911.5308 
(3.3913) 0.13308
2
R
Dependent variable T1 T2 T3
PIBGR
3.7030 
(4.9918)
-4.8047 
('-2.3494)
3.4384 
(3.2776) 0.18259
PIHUN
2.8215 
(5.9669)
-4.6786 
('-3.5891) 
3.0045 
(4.4929) 0.32207
PIPOL
2.3370 
(4.7612)
-2.7037 
('-1.9980)
4.3761 
(6.3043) 0.24861
PIROM
3.3649 
(5.3875)
-6.8514 
('-3.9791)
2.9630 
(3.3545) 0.32716
2
R
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Figure 30: Growth Rate Difference, T3-T1 period; a) Former Yugoslavia versus control 
countire; b) Former USSR versus control countires 
a) 
 
b) 
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Figure 31: Average level of GDP per capita after the period of transition (1994-2012) 
 
The economic and political costs and benefits of secession are strongly debatable and controversial. 
Our contribution consist in taking direct empirical account of the process of economic development 
of the countries that have disintegrated on the brink of the Iron Curtain fall – Yugoslavia, USSR, 
and Czechoslovakia. 
From this perspective the process of secession is apparently leading to a relatively higher level of 
economic growth in a medium-term.  However, the empirical evidence is limited and various other 
factors would need to be taken into account including the adaptation / alteration of the economic 
and political relations of the newly independent countries to the rest of the world. For example 
various countries of our sample become members of EU, CIS, Eastern partnership, etc., hence 
experiencing the effects of greater economic integration and greater factor mobility affecting 
directly the pattern of their economic development 
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Former Centrally Planned Economies Convergence Club? 
Introduction 
Currently there is a strong revival in interest in both the theoretical and the practical aspects of the 
processes of economic growth, and the factors determining countries’ income levels. The fast 
growing literature identifies a range of ways through which convergence or divergence may occur. 
Relatively recently the research has extended to a more comprehensive examination of the potential 
causes determining the growth of income per capita including: cultural; historic; geographical; 
natural endowments; and institutional factors. While there is a lot of research to be done into the 
subtleties of the above mentioned broad factors, various (important, though not unanimously 
accepted) suppositions have been produced by the literature so far. The modern intensive 
development in this area started with Baumol (1986), about 30 years ago, when he apparently found 
evidence of absolute or conditional convergence (in line with the neoclassical economics tradition) -
- depending on the interpretation -- among 16 OECD countries. However, his elucidations were 
very tentative, introducing the idea of “convergence clubs” and emphasizing the importance of the 
“path dependent processes” whereby the final outcome of a process is not just a unique equilibrium, 
but depends on the initial conditions and the random events on the path of development (a rather 
different approach from neoclassical economics). On this basis, Barro (1991), Sala-i-Martin (1994) 
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) went further and are popularly credited with “a mnemonic rule: 
economies converge at a speed of about two percent per year (Sala-i-Martin1994).” On theoretical 
(and empirical) grounds Sala-i-Martin was not able to “distinguish the neoclassical hypothesis of 
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diminishing returns to capital from the hypothesis of positive (but slow) rates of technological 
diffusion”.  
There are important disputes stemming from the empirics of economic convergence to wider 
economics and policy issues. In an influential paper Sachs and Warner (1995) articulate Dutch 
disease features by documenting “[a] statistically significant, inverse and robust association 
between natural resource intensity and growth over the past twenty years.” Conversely, Mehlum et 
al. (2006) claim that they “[h]ave shown that the quality of institutions determines whether 
countries avoid the resource curse or not. The combination of grabber friendly institutions and 
resource abundance leads to low growth. Producer friendly institutions, however, help countries to 
take full advantage of their natural resources.” Beckmann et al (2014) further extend the connection 
between the institutional framework and government activities by arguing that “[t]he institutional 
framework has to be included in any analysis of the impact of government activity on economic 
growth. [...] the impact of overall government activity on growth is conditional on the quality of the 
institutions and differs between clusters of countries characterized by different economic systems.”  
Moreno and Trehan (1997) emphasize the importance of location for economic activity and growth. 
Using a sample of ninety-three countries over the period of 1965 to 1989 they “[c]ould not find 
evidence that the level of income (per worker) in a region matters. In other words, a country’s per-
worker income does not appear to converge to those of other countries in the region. However, 
proximity to large markets does matter, as countries that are near large markets appear to have 
grown faster.” Moving beyond location Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) focus their analysis on 
historic roots, culture and genetic and epigenetic transmission. They provide an excellent review of 
the relevant literature and present several important conclusions and suggestive answers to pertinent 
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questions: i) “[t]echnology and productivity tend to be highly persistent even at very long horizons; 
ii) “[l]ong-term persistence holds at the level of populations rather than locations”; iii) “[l]ong-term 
genealogical links across populations play an important role in explaining the transmission of 
technological and institutional knowledge and the diffusion of economic development; iv) “If 
current development is a function of a very long-term historical factors, are development policies 
hopeless? Not necessarily”  
Desmet et al (2011) are the first to quantitatively analyze what determines the likelihood of 
secessions and unions of nations. Finally, another important contribution questions directly the 
relevance of the apparatus of the and  -- convergence27. Quah (1995) “[c]onclude that, as with
-convergence, the empirics of -convergence cannot deliver, even in theory, a useful convincing 
answer. For convergence one is interested in how one part of the distribution behaves relatively to 
another: that is, after all, what “catch-up” means”. Applying his arguably better suited techniques 
(stochastic kernel) his key finding is that ”[t]he rich are becoming richer; the poor, poorer; with the 
middle-class vanishing.” 
Most of the existing literature is focused on large samples of diverse countries or subsamples 
(clubs) of the rich industrialised economies (OECD). Our study is the first to explore the 
convergence hypothesis in the setting of the 28 (former centrally planned) economies covering the 
CEE and CCA countries. We use both a cross-section and a panel approach in examining evidence 
about convergence. 
 
                                            
27  -- convergence signifies reduction in the dispersion of levels of income across economies;  -- convergence 
means that poor economies grow faster 
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Methodology and econometric estimates 
The scatter diagram below depicts the interrelation between the annual average growth rate per 
capita (1950-2014) and the Ln of the initial income per capita for the former centrally planned 
economies. On observation it is obviously negative. 
 
Figure 32: Annual average GDP growth rate per capita (1950-2014) and Ln of the initial 
income per capita (1950) for CEE and CCA countries 
 
 Source: James et al. Population Health Metrics 2012, Maddison time-series in International 
 GK Dollars  
 
To investigate further, we apply the following general model: 
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This model represents an expansion of Solow's growth equation which relates GDP per capita 
growth rates nonlinearly to Ln of initial level of GDP per capita oiLnY . and also includes the control 
(explanatory) variables term 0,iX , and ti ,  is normally distributed ),0(  . 
 
T – Time period 
Yi,0 –Initial level of GDP per capita 
Yi, T – GDP per capita growth rates 
Xi,0 – Control explanatory variables 
 
We estimate four different models, both in conditional and unconditional forms. 
First we run a cross-section regression on growth -- using 65 year averages (1950-2014) for the 28 
(CEE and CCA) countries; Assuming constant initial state and growth level of the technology 
across countries we estimate the following equation: 
 
 eq. 8 GDPAG =  INPT + LGDP50 +     
   
and obtain the following results: 
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or substituting coefficients: 
 
 eq. 9 GDPAG = 0.0984*INPT - 0.0101*LGDP50   
 
Where, 
GDPAG – Annual average GDP growth rate per capita 1950-2014 
INPT – Intercept (constant) 
LGDP50 – Ln GDP per capita 1950 
The coefficient (    ) in front of the variable Ln of the initial GDP per capita in 1950 is negative and 
significantly different from zero (-0.0101) this provides evidence of absolute convergence; this is to 
say that poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones. 
Using the (re-parameterised) relation between the speed of convergence (decay rate)    28  and the 
estimated coefficient  
                                            
28 Nuclear physics:  “Decay constant, proportionality between the size of a population of radioactive atoms and the rate 
at which the population decreases because of radioactive decay. Suppose N is the size of a population of radioactive 
atoms at a given time t, and dN is the amount by which the population decreases in time dt; then the rate of change is 
Dependent Variable: GDPAG  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 09/08/14   Time: 10:54  
Sample: 1 28    
Included observations: 28  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
INPT 0.098447 0.021392 4.602104 0.0001 
LGDP50 -0.010116 0.002760 -3.665237 0.0011 
R-squared 0.340670    Mean dependent var 0.020291 
Adjusted R-squared 0.315311    S.D. dependent var 0.010912 
S.E. of regression 0.009029    Akaike info criterion -6.507935 
Sum squared resid 0.002120    Schwarz criterion -6.412778 
Log likelihood 93.11109    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.478845 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.118720  
 



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  eq. 10   
  eq. 11 
 
 
we estimate speed of convergence of 0.016 or about 1.6 per cent per year, which would imply a 
half-life of convergence to steady state of about 68 years. This brings us to the issue of statistical 
versus substantive (economic) significance. For instance, our findings are not not-inconsistent with 
the results of a seminal paper by Barro (1991), corroborated by another influential paper by Alesina 
et al (1996). These authors report       coefficients of conditional convergence for 98 countries for 
the period 1960-85, with sizes twice as low as the estimate presented above, though they do not 
dwell too much on the consequential effect on the half-life to their respective steady states. 
But differences across countries must have certain (important) effects on the dependent variable 
GDPAG. Hence, we add control variables on the right-hand side of our model by including distance 
and resource abundance.  
 
eq. 12 GDPAG =  INPT + LGDP50 +  DISTANCE +  RESOURCE +     
 
obtaining the following results: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
given by the equation dN/dt = −λN, where λ is the decay constant. Integration of this equation yields N = N0 e-λt, where 
N0 is the size of an initial population of radioactive atoms at time t = 0. This shows that the population decays 
exponentially at a rate that depends on the decay constant. The time required for half of the original population of 
radioactive atoms to decay is called the half-life. The relationship between the half-life, T1/2, and the decay constant is 
given by T1/ = 0.693/λ (http://www.britannica.com/science/decay-constant).” 

 )1(  Ln

)1(  e
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or substituting coefficients: 
 
eq. 13 GDPAG = 0.2106 - 0.0148*LGDP50 - 0.0106*DISTANCE + 0.01030*RESOURCE     
 
Where, 
GDPAG – Annual average GDP growth rate per capita 1950-2014 
INPT – intercept (constant) 
LGDP50 – Ln GDP per capita 1950 
DISTANCE -- Distance to Berlin or Stockholm, whichever is the nearer 
RESOURCE – Resource abundance dummy 
 
As the coefficient (    ) in front of the variable Ln of the initial GDP per capita in 1950 is negative 
and significantly different from zero (-0.0148) it would imply    – (conditional) convergence; this is 
to say that poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones, ceteris paribus (holding constant the 
Dependent Variable: GDPAG 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 08/30/14   Time: 20:29 
Sample: 1 28    
Included observations: 28
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
INPT 0.210614 0.028902 7.287297 0.0000
LGDP50 -0.014846 0.002317 -6.406497 0.0000
DISTANCE -0.010659 0.002258 -4.720832 0.0001
RESOURCE 0.010310 0.003895 2.647037 0.0141
R-squared 0.658801    Mean dependent var 0.020291
Adjusted R-squared 0.616151    S.D. dependent var 0.010912
S.E. of regression 0.006761    Akaike info criterion -7.023837
Sum squared resid 0.001097    Schwarz criterion -6.833522
Log likelihood 102.3337    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.965656
Durbin-Watson stat 1.014617 
 
 
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proxies for the respective steady states). Furthermore, higher economic growth is associated with a 
shorter distance to Berlin or Stockholm and higher resource abundance. 
The speed of convergence is estimated at 0.051 or 5.1 per cent, which would imply a half-life of 
convergence to steady state of around 46 years.  
 
ii) Next we estimate stacked by date panel for two (13 years averages) periods (1989-2001 and 
2002-2014) 
 
 eq. 14  GDPAG =  +  LGDPI +     
 
and obtain the following results: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Substituting coefficients: 
 
 
 eq. 15 GDPAG = 0.0987 - 0.0101*LGDPI   
Dependent Variable: GDPAG 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 09/09/14   Time: 12:06 
Sample: 2001 2002   
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 28   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 56 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.098765 0.093334 1.058194 0.2947
LGDPI -0.010175 0.010822 -0.940189 0.3513
R-squared 0.016106    Mean dependent var 0.011163
Adjusted R-squared -0.002114    S.D. dependent var 0.040626
S.E. of regression 0.040669    Akaike info criterion -3.531642
Sum squared resid 0.089314    Schwarz criterion -3.459308
Log likelihood 100.8860    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.503599
F-statistic 0.883956    Durbin-Watson stat 3.004797
Prob(F-statistic) 0.351307    
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Where, 
 
GDPAG – Annual average GDP growth rate per capita for the two periods stacked panel data 
C – Constant (intercept) 
LGDPI – Ln of the initial GDP per capita for the first year of the respective periods 
 
The coefficient        is with negative sign (as expected) but turns out to be insignificant. Hence, we 
continue by adding relevant control variables and estimate the respective equation 16: 
 
 eq. 16 GDPAG =   +  LGDPI +  GOVQ +  RES +  DIST +   
 
The estimation results are presented below: 
 
Dependent Variable: GDPAG 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 09/04/14   Time: 12:24 
Sample: (1989-2001) and (2002-2014)   
Periods included: 2 
Cross-sections included: 28 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 56 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.365763 0.177229 2.063790 0.0441 
LGDPI -0.038634 0.012617 -3.062059 0.0035 
GOVQ 0.030377 0.007711 3.939262 0.0002 
RES 0.028888 0.014297 2.020533 0.0486 
DIST -0.012612 0.011443 -1.102112 0.2756 
R-squared 0.363333    Mean dependent var 0.011163 
Adjusted R-squared 0.313398    S.D. dependent var 0.040626 
S.E. of regression 0.033663    Akaike info criterion -3.859771 
Sum squared resid 0.057794    Schwarz criterion -3.678936 
Log likelihood 113.0736    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.789662 
F-statistic 7.276170    Durbin-Watson stat 1.980597 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000103
 
 
Substituting coefficients: 

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 eq. 17 GDPAG = 0.3657 - 0.0386*LGDPI + 0.0303*GOVQ + 0.0288*RES - 0.0126*DIST 
 
Where, 
GDPAG – Annual average GDP growth rate per capita for the two periods stacked panel data 
C – Constant (intercept) 
LGDPI – Ln of the initial GDP per capita for the first year of the respective periods 
GOVQ – Quality of governance (EBRD Governance and Enterprise Restructuring Indicator) 
RES – Resource abundance dummy 
DISTANCE – Distance to Berlin or Stockholm, whichever is nearer 
 
The coefficient   is  negative and strongly significant, providing support for conditional 
convergence; the regression coefficient in front of GOVQ is positive and strongly significant, 
suggesting a strongly positive effect on the rate of economic growth from the quality of 
government; the coefficient on RES is positive and significant (i.e., resource abundance seems to be 
good for growth); and, the regression coefficient on DIST is with the expected sign and with similar 
magnitude of the previous estimate (see eq. 2a), though this time it is insignificant. 
  
Re-calculating the speed of convergence it appears to be around 4 per cent with a half-life of around 
18 years. 
 
iii) We continue by utilising stacked by date panel [wording??] for five (13 years averages) periods 
(1950-2014) 
 

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Figure 33: Annual average GDP growth rate per capita for 5 periods (13 years each) panel 
data set (1950-2014) and Ln of the initial income per capita of the respective initial period for 
CEE and CCA countries 
 
 
Note the location of points plotted to the left of the ordinate signifying the negative growth rate 
experienced by many of the countries under consideration during the period (1989-2001) of the 
initial severe shock of transition from central planning / communism to new economic and political 
structures. 
 
We estimate eq. 18, below 
 
 
 eq. 18 GDPC =  +   LGDPI +       
and get the following results: 
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Substituting coefficients: 
 
 eq. 19 GDPC = 0.1761 - 0.01870*LGDPI     
Where: 
GDPC – Annual average GDP growth rate per capita for the five periods stacked panel data 
C – Constant (intercept) 
LGDPI – Ln of the initial GDP per capita for the first year of the respective periods 
Looking at the coefficient in front of LGDPI (negative, significantly different from zero, and 
strongly significant) we again observe strong support for the unconditional convergence hypothesis. 
We continue by estimating a conditional convergence version of the same model, i.e., (eq. 20) 
 eq. 20 GDPC =   +   LGDPI +   LDIST +  RES +     
 
The results are as follows: 
Dependent Variable: GDPC 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 09/09/14   Time: 12:40 
Sample: 1950 1954   
Periods included: 5 
Cross-sections included: 28 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 140 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.176102 0.031140 5.655227 0.0000 
LGDPI -0.018701 0.003728 -5.016642 0.0000 
R-squared 0.154239    Mean dependent var 0.020322 
Adjusted R-squared 0.148110    S.D. dependent var 0.029823 
S.E. of regression 0.027526    Akaike info criterion -4.333180 
Sum squared resid 0.104561    Schwarz criterion -4.291156 
Log likelihood 305.3226    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.316103 
F-statistic 25.16669    Durbin-Watson stat 2.246975 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
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Dependent Variable: GDPC 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 09/07/14   Time: 15:14 
Sample: 1950 1954   
Periods included: 5 
Cross-sections included: 28 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 140 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.366087 0.053199 6.881533 0.0000 
LGDPI -0.026925 0.004026 -6.688066 0.0000 
LDIST -0.017087 0.003965 -4.309199 0.0000 
RES 0.015116 0.006735 2.244466 0.0264 
R-squared 0.255849    Mean dependent var 0.020322 
Adjusted R-squared 0.239434    S.D. dependent var 0.029823 
S.E. of regression 0.026009    Akaike info criterion -4.432601 
Sum squared resid 0.091999    Schwarz criterion -4.348554 
Log likelihood 314.2821    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.398447 
F-statistic 15.58621    Durbin-Watson stat 2.386704 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
 
 
Substituting coefficients we get: 
 
GDPC = 0.3660 - 0.0269*LGDPI - 0.0170*LDIST + 0.0151*RES (eq. 6a) 
 
Where: 
GDPC – Annual average GDP growth rate per capita for the five periods stacked panel data 
C – Constant (intercept) 
LGDPI – Ln of the initial GDP per capita for the first year of the respective periods 
LDIST – Distance to Berlin or Stockholm, whichever the nearer 
RES – Resource abundance dummy 
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Once again our main results – strong conditional convergence effect (2.9 per cent speed of 
convergence with 25 years half-life to steady state; the nearer to Berlin / Stockholm, the higher the 
rate of economic growth and the more affluent the country on natural resources the higher the rate 
of economic growth -- are confirmed. 
 
Resource abundance – is it good or is it bad for economic growth? 
Before continuing our estimations we’ll make a short digression to discuss the important issue of 
the interrelations between resource abundance and economic growth. So far our analysis has shown 
that, within our -- club of – countries, high resource abundance is associated with high annual 
average real GDP growth. While we cover in detail the intricacies and controversy surrounding the 
hypothetical “blessing” or a “curse” of the natural resource abundance in general (world 
background) in the next section, here we formulate a small empirical exploration by broadening our 
sample (of so far, just CEE and CCA countries) by adding the group of the OECD countries. As six 
of the member countries of both clubs overlap they are included just once as members of the club to 
which they have had longer-lasting membership so far (FCPE). Using the same time period (1950-
2014) we estimate the following equation:  
 
 eq. 21 GDPAG =  INPT + LGDP50 +  RES_P +  RES_H +    
 
obtaining the following results: 
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Substituting coefficients: 
 
 eq. 22 GDPAG = 0.0781 - 0.0067*LGDP50 - 0.0081*RES_P + 0.0004*RES_H 
Where: 
GDPAG – Annual average GDP growth rate per capita 1950-2014 
INPT – intercept (constant) 
LGDP50 – Ln GDP per capita 1950 
RES_P – Resource abundance dummy for countries with underdeveloped / poor institutional 
structure29 
RES_H – Resource abundance dummy only for countries with high quality institutional structure30 
                                            
29 RES_P is dummy variable for a set of countries with poor institutional structure and takes the value of “0” when we 
observe a country with share of its resource value added in GDP of less than 15%, whereas it takes the value of “1” 
when a given country has a share of resource value added in GDP higher than 15%. 
30 RES_H is dummy variable for a set of countries with good institutional structure and takes the value of “0” when we 
observe a country with share of its resource value added in GDP of less than 15%, whereas it takes the value of “1” 
when a given country has a share of resource value added in GDP higher than 15%. 
 
Dependent Variable: GDPAG 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/12/14   Time: 17:32 
Sample: 1 56    
Included observations: 56 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.078100 0.013625 5.731972 0.0000 
LGDP50 -0.006701 0.001675 -3.999827 0.0002 
RES_P -0.008158 0.003628 -2.248883 0.0288 
RES_H 0.000392 0.004556 0.086124 0.9317 
R-squared 0.255899    Mean dependent var 0.023143 
Adjusted R-squared 0.212970    S.D. dependent var 0.009792 
S.E. of regression 0.008687    Akaike info criterion -6.585309 
Sum squared resid 0.003924    Schwarz criterion -6.440641 
Log likelihood 188.3887    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.529222 
F-statistic 5.960986    Durbin-Watson stat 1.212568 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001427    
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We assume that the intuitional structure of the OECD countries is more advanced, characterised 
with high effectiveness and efficiency, while for the CEE and CCA countries it is considered to be 
in general of poor quality. On this basis the results again display conditional convergence, though 
the process is characterised by a lower speed (just about 0.9 per cent) per year and with half-life 
time to a steady state of around 103 years. It is worth noting that the coefficient in front of the 
RES_P is now negative (and significant), suggesting that resource abundance is having a negative 
effect on economic growth under the conditions of poor institutional structure; whereas, the 
regression coefficient in front of RES_H is positive, suggesting the opposite relation, though it turns 
out to be insignificant. 
To investigate further we put into use the (World Bank) data on total natural resource rents as per 
cent of GDP (NRRENT12). We take averages of the time-series (available just for the period 2004-
2012) and estimate the equation below: 
 eq. 23 GDPAG =  C + LGDP50 +  NRENT12 +    
Dependent Variable: GDPAG 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/13/14   Time: 18:24 
Sample: 1 56    
Included observations: 56
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.073420 0.013936 5.268423 0.0000
LGDP50 -0.006166 0.001706 -3.614747 0.0007
NRRENT12 -0.000103 0.000101 -1.023503 0.3107
R-squared 0.198387    Mean dependent var 0.023143
Adjusted R-squared 0.168137    S.D. dependent var 0.009792
S.E. of regression 0.008931    Akaike info criterion -6.546574
Sum squared resid 0.004227    Schwarz criterion -6.438073
Log likelihood 186.3041    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.504509
F-statistic 6.558335    Durbin-Watson stat 0.971921
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002851 
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Our estimate of      is again negative and strongly significant. The negative coefficient    suggests 
that the higher the natural resource rate the lower the growth rate of GDP per capita in all of the 
countries under consideration (CEE, CCA, and OECD), however it’s not significant. 
As a next step, we add a dummy for the OECD member countries in equation 23 and find these 
results: 
 
Dependent Variable: GDPAG 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 09/13/14   Time: 18:34 
Sample: 1 56    
Included observations: 56
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.094595 0.011953 7.914195 0.0000
LGDP50 -0.009605 0.001522 -6.309217 0.0000
NRRENT12 -1.03E-05 8.33E-05 -0.124086 0.9017
OECD 0.011922 0.002220 5.370733 0.0000
R-squared 0.484396    Mean dependent var 0.023143
Adjusted R-squared 0.454650    S.D. dependent var 0.009792
S.E. of regression 0.007231    Akaike info criterion -6.952147
Sum squared resid 0.002719    Schwarz criterion -6.807479
Log likelihood 198.6601    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.896060
F-statistic 16.28419    Durbin-Watson stat 1.281564
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
 
This time both the size and the significance of the coefficient   are strengthened, the regression 
coefficient  (in front of NRRENT12) is again with negative sign and insignificant, while the 
coefficient on the OECD (dummy variable) is positive and strongly significant. The coefficient of 
mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom almost triples in size. 
This is suggestive of an interesting conclusion: some form of the resource “curse” is expected to be 
observed in any country that extracts natural resource rent. However, a substantial net negative 
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effect would obtain with certainty only in (underdeveloped) countries with poor institutional 
structures. 
We are then in a position to suggest a reconciliation between the seminal works of both Mehlum et 
al (2006) and Sachs and Warner (1995).  While their works cover different set of countries and 
different time periods, the nexus is unchanged. 
iv) Finally we base our estimation on a pooled panel data for the period 1989-2014. Here we are 
using a real panel data and this allows us to control in general for individual heterogeneity of the 
countries involved. As we are interested in analysing the effect of the lagged value of the Ln of the 
GDP per capita on the dependent variable we use fixed effects model. 
 
 eq. 24 DLGDPC = i  +  LGDPC(-1) + i     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: DLGDPC 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 09/09/14   Time: 11:31 
Sample (adjusted): 1990 2013   
Periods included: 24 
Cross-sections included: 20 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 480
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.212050 0.114309 1.855058 0.0642 
LGDPC(-1) -0.023172 0.013194 -1.756310 0.0797 
 Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.046560    Mean dependent var 0.011397 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005016    S.D. dependent var 0.082641 
S.E. of regression 0.082434    Akaike info criterion -2.110875 
Sum squared resid 3.119066    Schwarz criterion -1.928272 
Log likelihood 527.6101    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.039098 
F-statistic 1.120737    Durbin-Watson stat 0.841129 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.323910    
 
  
83 
 
Substituting coefficients: 
 
 eq. 25 DLGDPC = 0.2120 - 0.0231*LGDPC(-1) + [CX=F]  
 
Where, 
DGDPAG – Annual GDP growth rate per capita 1989-2013 
C – Intercept (constant) 
LGDPC(-1) – Lagged value of Ln GDP per capita 
 
Here again our coefficient   is negative but at best weakly significant. This may suggest that if we 
take the time-invariant characteristics of the countries under investigation as indeed unalterable, 
convergence may never occur. But if we suppose that one cannot change human nature, but still 
could manage it realistically to some extent, we can add two important control variables, remove 
the fixed effects dummies and estimate the altered equation (eq.26) below 
 
 eq. 26 DLGDPC =   +  LGDPC(-1) +  EDU +  GOVERNANCE +    
 
We estimate this equation using panel least squares, using White cross-section standard errors and 
covariance (d.f. corrected) and obtain the following results: 
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Dependent Variable: DLGDPC 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 09/15/14   Time: 19:09 
Sample (adjusted): 1990 2013   
Periods included: 24 
Cross-sections included: 20
Total panel (balanced) observations: 480 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.044107 0.050778 0.868623 0.3855
LGDPC(-1) -0.027938 0.010166 -2.748285 0.0062
EDU 0.010518 0.004734 2.221778 0.0268
GOVERNANCE 0.041624 0.010800 3.854059 0.0001
R-squared 0.214409    Mean dependent var 0.011397
Adjusted R-squared 0.209457    S.D. dependent var 0.082641
S.E. of regression 0.073479    Akaike info criterion -2.375348
Sum squared resid 2.569970    Schwarz criterion -2.340567
Log likelihood 574.0836    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.361676
F-statistic 43.30429    Durbin-Watson stat 1.039572
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
  
After substitution of the coefficients we attain:  
 
     eq. 27     DLGDPC = 0.0441 - 0.0279*LGDPC(-1) + 0.0105*EDU + 0.0416*GOVERNANCE    
 
Where, 
DGDPC – GDP growth rate per capita for the 1989-2013 period 
C – Constant (intercept) 
LGDPC(-1) – Ln of the level of GDP per capita lagged one period 
EDU – Barro-Lee Average years of total schooling, age 25+, total 
GOVERNANCE – EBRD transition indicator: Governance and enterprise restructuring 
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Now the coefficient   is of the same magnitude (as the previous equation) but strongly significant, 
and EDU and GOVERNANCE have significant positive effects on the GDP growth rate per capita. 
Now we can compose together all our results into the table below: 
Table 17: Convergence of GDP per capita in the CEE and CCA countries (former centrally 
planned economies) 1950-2014, various estimations of both conditional and unconditional 
models 
 
*Hence, for half of the estimates the OLS error can be taken to be normally distributed. 
 
While we obtain broad-spectrum supportive results for unconditional and conditional 
convergence, this is just necessary, but not sufficient condition to detect    convergence. 
Therefore, we directly calculate  convergence for our sample of countries below. 
Unconditional 
Model
Conditional 
Model
Unconditional 
Model
Conditional 
Model
Unconditional 
Model
Conditional 
Model
Unconditional 
Model
Conditional 
Model
-0.010 -0.015 -0.010 -0.0386 -0.0187 -0.0269 -0.0231 -0.0279
     t-statistics [-3.6652] [-6.4064] [-0.9401] [-3.0620] [-5.0166] [-6.6880] [-1.7563] [-2.7482]
Distance to Berlin 
/Stockholm -- -0.0106 -- -0.0126 -- -0.0170 -- --
     t-statistics [-4.7208] [-1.1021] [-4.3091]
Reourse 
abundance -- 0.0103 -- 0.0288 -- 0.0151 -- --
     t-statistics [2.6470] [2.0205] [2.2444]
Quality of 
governence -- -- -- 0.0303 -- -- -- 0.0416
     t-statistics [7.1298] [3.8540]
Educational 
Attainment -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0105
     t-statistics [2.2217]
Adjsted R-squared 0.3153 0.6161 -0.0021 0.3133 0.01481 0.2394 0.005 0.2094
1.6% 5.1% 1.0% 4.0% 2.0% 2.9% 3.4% 4.6%
      half-life 68 46 69 18 37 25 30 24
Jarque-Bera* 1.7916 1.4772 4.1456 0.4137 110.47 61.93 1961.2 1475
(0.4082) (0.4777) (0.1258) (0.8131) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 28 28 56 56 140 140 500 500
1989-2014
1989-2014 1950-2014
1950-2014 2 by 13 years periods 5 by 13 years periods
Cross-section regression Panel stacked by date Panel stacked by date Pooled panel


t
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v)  -- Convergence:  
In fact we calculate the standard deviation of GDP per capita across the former centrally-planned 
economies for the periods of 1950-1962, 1963-1975, 1976-1988, 1989-2001, and 2002-2014. The 
results expressed in per cent are depicted in the chart below. 
Figure 34: Former centrally planned economies dispersion of levels of GDP per capita, 1950-
2014 
 
 
We observe that coefficient of variation started a declining trend from the period 1950-1962, 
displaying a reduction from 46.5 per cent to 41.4 per cent in 1963-1975, and then declining further 
to 35.5 per cent for the 1976-1988 episode. This trend may be associated with the reconstruction 
period after the World War II and continued extensive catch-up growth purposely supported by the 
former Soviet Union. This all changed in the next period (1989 -2001) with the beginning of the 
disintegration of the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, and the entire structure of centrally-
planned (socialist) economies. This shock and the transition process brought about significant 
46.5
41.4
35.5
49.5
55.5
1950-1962 1963-1975 1976-1988 1989-2001 2002-2014
Former centrally planned economies dispersion of levels of 
GDP per capita, 1950-2014
Coefficient of variation
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increase in the coefficient of variation up to 49.5 per cent (from the low point of 35.5); the increase 
in dispersion of the levels of GDP per capita continued during the next (most recent) period (2002-
2014) though with a smaller magnitude (55.5 per cent). 
For comparison purposes we present G 12 coefficients of variation over the same period: 
 
Figure 35: G12 countries dispersion of levels of GDP per capita (1950-2014) 
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
Our analysis provides evidence supporting the following propositions: i) poorer CEE and CCA 
countries are growing faster than relatively richer ones; hence there is absolute   convergence; ii) 
when control variables are included into our model larger (negative)   coefficients are displayed, 
supporting the phenomenon of conditional convergence.; iii) we estimate the speed of unconditional 
convergence to the (club’s) steady state to lie in-between 1.6 to 3.4 per cent, whereas the speed of 
36.1
25.9
17.5
15.4 13.5
1950‐1962 1963‐1975 1976‐1988 1989‐2001 2002‐2014
G 12 countries dispersion of levels of GDP per capita 
(1950-2014)
Coefficient of variation
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conditional convergence stays in the range of 2.9 to 5.1 per cent; iv) there is no evidence of sigma (
 ) convergence, in fact there is a significant increase in the dispersion of the levels of income 
across the economies under consideration; v) high resource abundance (within the setting of this 
club of countries) is associated with high economic growth; vi) high resource abundance within a 
broader background (including the CEE and CCA, plus OECD countries) is associated with an 
overall negative impact  on economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995), however a net negative 
effect obtains only in countries with poor institutional settings (Mehlum et al, 2006); vii) location 
matters for growth – the nearer a country happened to be to Berlin or Stockholm (whichever nearer) 
the higher the rate of economic growth; viii) high quality of governance has a strongly positive 
effect on economic growth, and ix) the higher the educational attainment (proxy for quality of 
human capital), the higher the real GDP growth. 
Still, it is not clear what exactly finding support for   convergence means. Does this support the 
hypothesis for decreasing returns to capital or is it simply to sustain the proposition that poor 
countries have strong propensities to catch up through the appropriation of technology? 
Will these countries (with former centrally planned economic systems) be approaching half the 
distance to their (own club) non-growth steady state around 2064? Even if they do, wouldn’t the 
rich nations of 2064 still be those that are rich at present? 
While we cannot be completely certain about providing a positive answer to the first question; the 
answer to the second one -- after considering the self-reinforcing properties of the growth process -- 
may be somewhat more definite and in accord with the views of Baumol (1986) and Spolaore 
(2013): 
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 “The long run does matter. [...] [i]mportant  current issues are, I believe, the product of path 
 dependent processes whose mathematical expression must take the form of functionals  
 rather  than mere functions, meaning that we cannot understand current phenomena such as 
 the relative productive capacities of different economies without systematic  examination  of 
 earlier  events  which affect the  present and will continue to exercise profound effects 
 tomorrow.” (Baumol, 1986) 
 “[l]ong-term persistence holds at the level of populations rather than locations. A focus on 
 populations rather than locations helps us understand both persistence and the reversal of 
 fortune, and sheds light on the spread of economic development.”(Spolaore and Wacziarg, 
 2013) 
 
What factors may potentially help alleviate this predicament? The most promising (time-variant) 
factors would seem to be quality of governance and educational attainment (quality of human 
capital). The effect from enhancing any of these variables would lead to stronger growth and 
apparently faster convergence to the steady state. The problem of course is that this is much more 
easily said than possibly done. 
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Chapter	II:	Natural	resource	abundance	 ‐‐	 is	 it	a	“blessing”	
or	is	it	a	“curse”	
It is conspicuous that, more often than not, countries with oil or other natural resource wealth have 
experienced inferior economic growth in comparison to those devoid of such gifts of nature. This is 
pragmatically the case for at least the last fifty years or so. Does the poorer performance of the 
former countries signify that their comparative advantage in natural wealth is more apparent than 
real? 
This phenomenon is commonly recognized as the “resource curse”. There exists a vast literature on 
why countries might suffer “resource curse”. We identify four different channels or transmission 
mechanisms (with various combinations and variations) which endeavour to account for the inverse 
statistical relationship between resource abundance and economic growth: i) Decline in terms of 
trade; ii) Volatility of revenues; iii) Quality of Governance; and, iv) Dutch disease. 
Representative empirical works on the impact of natural resources on growth include Sachs and 
Warner (1995 and 2001) and Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby (2005). These authors arrived 
at the conclusion that countries with a high ratio of resource exports to GDP have relatively lower 
rates of GDP growth. The result -- of negative and significant impact -- remains robust after 
introduction of controls for: quality of governance; initial level of per capita income; level of 
investment; inequality; and, trade policies.  Hence, the results cannot be simply attributed to other 
omitted variables, or be explained by alternative ways of measuring resource abundance. In fact 
Isham et al. (2005) clearly demonstrate "[h]ow countries dependent on point source natural 
resources (those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base, such as oil and minerals) 
and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened 
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institutional capacity. This in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks, which 
previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity." A recent 
study based on detailed, disaggregated sectoral data for manufacturing finds: "[t]he cumulative 
impact of permanent oil windfall shocks to be significant, with a 10 percent increase in windfall 
associated with a 3.4 percent reduction in value added across industries and with a 3.6 percent 
reduction in industrial output (Ismail, 201031)." Another current paper providing evidence for 135 
countries for the period 1975-2007, concludes: "[t]hat the response to a dollar of resource revenue 
is, approximately, to save 35 cents, decrease non-resource exports by 50 cents and increase imports 
by 15 cents (Harding and Venables, 2010).” 
 
Other studies finding negative effects of oil wealth on economic performance include Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian (2003). However, the conclusions of Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian are 
qualified: “[s]ome natural resources appear to have a strong, robust and negative effect on growth 
by impairing institutional quality. Once institutions are controlled for, there is either very little 
effect of natural resources on growth or even a positive effect. In other words, owning natural 
resources on balance may still be a blessing rather than a curse [...] it is fuel and minerals -- that 
typically generate rents [...] that have a systematic and robust negative impact on growth [...] This 
effect is quantitatively significant, amounting to lower growth of about 0.36 percent per year.” 
Furthermore their results "suggest that the impact of natural resources is nonlinear; that is, the 
marginal (negative) impact of natural resources on institutions depends positively on the level of 
                                            
31 “The results are not sensitive to whether I use a pooled least-square estimation with country, 
industry and time dummies, or a fixed-effect panel estimation with a fixed effect for each sector in 
each country and time dummies (Ismail, 2010).” 
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natural resources itself. Evidently, oil corrupts and excess oil corrupts more than excessively." 
Kaldor, Karl and Said (2007) extend this nexus plausibly, whereby oil generally tends to weaken 
state institutions turning them eventually to failed states and ultimately causing violence and wars. 
"Even in the best cases, where oil rents appear to be successful in propping up some form of 
centralised authority, rents tend over time to exacerbate state weakness, risking the creation of state 
failure and threat of further 'new oil wars'. Oil wars are rentier wars32.” Finally, in a recent work 
Konte (2012) models the unobserved heterogeneity of the relevant different growth regimes, testing 
if the natural resources turn to a curse or a blessing depending on the regime they belong to. The 
findings of this study "[i]ndicate that for the period 1970–2005 the data are best fitted by a model of 
two regimes. In one regime, an abundance of natural resources has a significant and positive impact 
on growth, while in the other regime; an abundance of natural resources does not enhance growth. 
The analysis of the determinants of whether a country belongs or not to the blessed-resources 
regime indicates that the level of democracy plays a crucial role, while education and economic 
institutions have no effect." 
   
Simultaneously there are statistical studies, e.g., Herb (2005) which "[d]id not find consistent 
support for the thesis that rentierism has a harmful net effect on democracy scores.” “Rent wealth 
does not make countries better governed, but neither is it a curse.” Furthermore, Alexeev and 
Conrad (2009) criticise the conclusions that abundance of resources negatively affect economic 
growth, and that this negative effect works through the structure and quality of political institutions; 
stating: "[w]e believe there is little or no evidence that the large endowments of oil or minerals slow 
                                            
32 “Whatever the motivations of fighters, and whatever religious, ethic or other differences also 
drive conflict, where oil is present these wars tend to involve struggle for control over the 
exceptional gains generated by this valuable resource (Kaldor, Karl and Said, 2007." 
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long-term economic growth. In fact, the data available so far suggest that natural resources enhance 
long-term growth. We have demonstrated this result by focusing on the levels of per capita GDP 
rather than on the rates of growth over any given period of time (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009).” In 
addition, they provide interesting anecdotal evidence (dis)connecting the resource wealth with the 
prevalent political institutional structure. They compare Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine -- countries 
with very similar inheritance as being both, Slavic countries and (for a long period) part of the 
former Soviet Union. Given that Russia is the richest country in terms of natural resources and 
Belarus the poorest (with Ukraine somewhere in between), based on the natural resource curse 
hypothesis one would expect Belarus to have the best institutional structure and the highest GDP 
per capita and Russia the worst institutional structure and lowest GDP growth per capita. Nothing 
could be further from the truth.  
In the same vein Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) affirm: "In the twentieth century, resource abundant 
countries such as Norway and Iceland experienced remarkable and sustained growth rates. Hence, 
natural resource wealth may stimulate growth but only under certain conditions. A natural resource 
economy that suffers from corruption, low investment, protectionist measures, deteriorating terms 
of trade and low educational standards will probably not benefit from its natural wealth due to 
adverse indirect effects. Our empirical analysis indicates that natural resource wealth increases 
growth, if negative indirect effects are excluded." However, it should be pointed out that this 
development (sustained economic growth) did not take place in a vacuum; thus the most probable 
explanation of the success stories of Norway and Iceland is the pre-existence of trustworthy 
institutional and political structures in both countries. Similarly, Polterovich et al. (2010) conclude: 
“Nevertheless, it does not appear that resource rich countries grow less rapidly due to their resource 
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wealth. This is explained by the fact that they pursue good policies in some areas and enjoy the 
advantages of having resource rent. In particular, resource abundant economies have lower budget 
deficits and inflation, higher investment/GDP ratios, higher inflows of FDI as compared to GDP, 
and more equitable distribution of income.” 
 
One possible rationalization of why different studies may have come to different results is the time-
span of the dataset used, and the proxy for natural resource concentration applied (resource reserves 
v. resource exports). “Treating resource dependence as endogenous, we find it to be insignificant in 
growth regressions, with no effect on institutional quality. While we find resource abundance to be 
significantly associated with both growth and institutional quality, the association runs contrary to 
the resource curse hypothesis: greater abundance leads to better institutions and more rapid growth. 
[... ]These concepts are possibly correlated -- countries with large resource stocks may derive high 
incomes from extraction and because of Dutch-disease arguments or otherwise, may specialise in 
primary exports and become dependent on resources. But some resource-abundant countries are not 
dependent on resources, and some relatively resource-scarce countries are. We find countries should 
not turn their back on resources wealth to lower resource dependence (Brunnschweiler, C. and E.H. 
Bulte, 2007).” The argument being that commodity exports are vastly endogenous. Concurrently 
fundamental trade theory readily expects that a country may prove to have a high mineral share in 
exports which does not translates automatically into a higher endowment of resources than other 
countries, i.e., absolute advantage but because it does not have capacity to export manufacturing 
goods, i.e., comparative advantage.  This provides a clear account for the inverse statistical 
correlations between mineral exports and economic development. 
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A simple conclusion, so far, is that there is no straightforward single explanation of what creates a 
“blessing” rather than a “curse”. Nor is there any agreement on a particular set of explanations. 
Hence, this state of affairs provides support for following an individual line of investigation rather 
than aiming to bring about some sort of a universal wrapping up of this theme at the cost of 
oversimplifications. Furthermore, the instances of successful resource-based industrialisation 
throughout modern economic history, e.g., United States, Chile, Malaysia and the clear record of no 
adverse effect on the Norwegian economy from its major oil discoveries and extraction are 
consistent with the view that natural resource abundance should not be taken, without further 
scrutiny, to be a curse. 
The empirical and theoretical works, above, aim in general to establish a statistical relationship 
between large resource revenues and poor economic performance. Another, related, appealing 
question is: what the transmission mechanism is between the two variables. In what follows we 
review the literature on the possible channels through which natural resource abundance may 
impact economic growth. In doing so, we are conscious that many of the ideas and the concepts 
involved have come to imply so much that if not carefully examined and disentangled they would 
lose their content. 
 
Terms of trade divergence 
 
This thesis accepts the claim that in a long-run, there is some tendency for the prices of primary 
products to decline in relation to manufactured products. It has become known as the Prebisch-
Singer thesis (PST) after the names of the two economists who independently developed it -- 
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Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950). Singer (1998) describes the PST as follows: "The PST, taken by 
itself, (and leaving aside the case of rich oil exporters), would create a presumption (although no 
certainty) of divergence within the world economy. Other things being equal, falling terms of trade 
for poorer countries and improving terms of trade for richer countries would mean greater 
international inequality between countries." In short, this is to say that productivity in 
manufacturing is generally higher in comparison to agriculture, oil and mineral extracting 
industries. Hence, in net barter terms of trade (as well as in income terms of trade) expressions, 
manufacturing is exchanging a smaller share of their output for the produce of the latter sectors of 
production. In considering this outcome one needs to bear in mind the assumption that the sectors of 
agriculture, oil and mineral extraction must be rather competitive, whereas manufacturing ought to 
be rather characterised by monopolistic competition. Furthermore, the declining trend of primary 
commodity prices to manufactured goods is supported by the low income elasticity of demand for 
primary goods plus the more efficient (reduced) utilisation of primary goods due to the technical 
progress. 
The practical basis of the argument has been challenged by several writers, including; Viner (1952) 
Haberler, (1959), Cuddington, (1992), Cuddington, Ludema, and Jayasuriya (2002), and Persson 
and Terasvirta (2003). 
There are numerous supporting empirical studies corroborating the existence of a long-term secular 
decline in primary product prices, e.g., Grill and Yang (1988), Brohman, (1996), Leon and Soto 
(1997), Harvey, et al. (2008) and Erten and Ocampo (2012). For example Grill and Yang (1988) 
present evidence “[t]hat the prices of all primary commodities (including fuels) relative to those of 
traded manufactures declined by about 36 percent over the 1900-86 period, at an average annual 
rate of 0.5 percent.” More recently, on the bases of a dataset containing data since 1650 Harvey et 
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al. (2008) show that eleven major commodities exhibit a long-term decline in their relative prices. 
In their opinion “[t]his provides much more robust support that the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis is a 
relevant phenomenon for commodity prices” This finding is supported by Erten and Ocampo 
(2012). They apply super-cycles methodology – identifying the cycles by band-pass filter – and 
report: “Another important finding of the paper is that, for non-oil commodities, the mean of each 
super cycle has a tendency to be lower than that of the previous cycle, suggesting a step-wise 
deterioration over the entire period in support of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis.” Finally a recent 
influential study Baffes and Etienne (2014) maintain that they have been able to reconcile the PST 
with Engel’s law and Kindleberger’s thesis, thus, in fact, strongly supporting the Prebisch-Singer 
thesis. The authors observe: “The paper employed a reduced-form price determination model and 
applied it to 1960-2013 annual data for five commodities...It concluded that income has a negative 
and highly significant effect on real agricultural commodity prices. This finding is consistent with 
the Engel’s Law and Kindleberger’s thesis, the predecessor of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. 
Moreover, it is shown that income’s negative impact on real prices operates through the 
manufacturing price channel (the deflator)...Other key drivers include (in order of importance) the 
role of energy costs, physical stocks, and monetary conditions.” 
 
There is, as well, a very substantial group of researchers which find the evidence limited and remain 
uncertain (or marginally in favour or against the PST), e.g., Pindyck, (1999) observes: “I have 
argued that the theory of depletable resource production and pricing, and the actual behaviour of 
real prices over the past century, both imply that non-structural forecasting models should 
incorporate mean reversion to a stochastically fluctuating trend line. [...] These models seem 
promising as a forecasting tool, even though the results in this paper were mixed.” Also, Kellar and 
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Wohar (2002) find “modest support” for the PST. In the same vein Meng, Lee, and Payne (2012) 
conclude: “The main findings of this study reveal that 21 out of the 24 commodity prices are found 
to be stationary around a broken trend, implying that shocks to these commodities tend to be 
transitory. Only three relative commodity price series are found to be difference stationary. There 
are only 7 series in which the relative commodity prices display negative trend more than 50% of 
the time period examined;...Compared with past studies, our findings provide even weaker evidence 
to support PST." 
 
Given that comparative commodity prices over manufacturing prices change constantly in the world 
markets, for a sluggish decline in primary commodity prices to be able to explain the sort of 
deterioration in economic performance connected to the resource curse, the respective economies 
must not be in a position to apply counteractive measures due to their lack of sophisticated 
technological and macroeconomic policy capacities. In general, this state of affairs would tend to 
bring about not a world of economic convergence but rather one of increased divergence. While it is 
acknowledged that, on occasions, primary goods prices have been falling considerably and over a 
rather short interval of time, still, for oil the view of a declining trend in real prices over time does 
not seem to have empirical support. Thus taking a five-year moving average of oil prices from 1955 
in 2013 US Dollars the price in 1973 was $13.23 per barrel rising steadily to a peak of $89.27 in 
1983, followed by a relentless decline to $25.54 by 1999. Since 2000 the prices rose steadily but 
gradually up to 2003 reaching $32.95 and then ascended sharply again, until attaining $97.13 in 
2012 and remained virtually unchanged during 2013. Certainly, given these rapidly fluctuating oil 
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revenues during the last forty years or so33, where swift ascent in prices is followed by a period of 
fast deterioration, and then again by rising prices would go some way to explain the resulting 
apparent poor or high-quality economic performance (of a given oil exporting country) depending 
on the end point of the respective analysis. 
Figure 36: Crude oil prices 1861 to 2013 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2014 
 
The next figure (Figure 37, below) shows the effect not only of time but also of income on the terms 
of trade of primary commodity prices over manufactures prices. 
 
 
                                            
33 The end point of this study is 2013 as shown at Figure 36, below. 
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Figure 37: a), b), and c): Commodity Prices and Income 
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 Note: MUV (Manufactures Unit Value Index) is a proxy for the price of developing country 
 imports of manufactures in U.S. dollar terms, used to assess cost escalation for imported 
 goods. Updated twice a year, the index is a weighted average of export prices of 
 manufactured goods for the G-5 economies, with local-currency based prices converted into 
 current U.S. dollars using market exchange rates (data.Worldbank.org). 
 
Revenue volatility 
 
Natural resource abundance is, as a rule, accompanied by booms and busts in the prices of primary 
commodities and quantities supplied. In particular the market for oil and gas is ruled not only by 
real-economic business cycles, but perhaps even more notably by investment cycles and financial 
markets speculation. The resulting fluctuations in export earnings cause real exchange rate volatility 
and subsequent uncertainty that tends to impair exports and foreign investment. 
 
The main sources of revenue volatility could be summarised as: i) variation in rates of extraction; ii) 
variability in the timing of payments by oil companies to the respective governments; and, iii) 
fluctuations in the price of the natural resource. 
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Mikesell, (1997), Auty, (1998), Hausmann and Rigobon (2003), Blattman, Hwang and Williamson, 
(2007), and van der Ploeg, (2008) put forward revenue volatility as one of the most important 
explanations of the resource curse. The basic argument is that “[t]he resource curse is foremost a 
problem of volatility. The high volatility of world prices of natural resources causes severe 
volatility of output per capita growth in countries that depend heavily on them. The resulting 
volatility of unanticipated output growth has a robust negative effect on long-run growth itself and 
is a curse. This is not limited to oil-exporters, but also applies to exporters of copper, coffee, foods, 
etc. which include many of the world’s worst performing countries. Also, ethnic tensions, which are 
often fuelled by resource wealth, and current account restrictions increase volatility. The latter 
effect is especially strong in resource-rich countries. Government spending bonanzas after windfall 
resource revenues also increase volatility to the detriment of growth, because revenue drops 
inevitably follow (van der Ploeg, 2008).” Another account of the effect of the volatility on the 
economy is provided by Hausmann and Rigobon (2003). The transmission mechanism works its 
way through the interrelations between non-tradables, in which the oil abundant economy is 
specialising, non-resource tradables and the resource tradebles (oil). Given that the oil economy 
specialisation in the non-tradables sector grows with time, the real exchange rate movements will 
show greater volatility as a response to demand shocks (triggered by revenue volatility), as these 
have to be accommodated by expenditure-switching rather than reallocation of labour and capital. 
Such adjustments would require much more significant changes in relative prices including interest 
rates. Noting that in this setting the volatility of profits in the non-resource tradable sector is higher 
than the volatility in the non-tradables sector, brings one to the conclusion that: "As volatility 
increases, sector-specific interest rates rise causing a decline in the output that is larger for the non-
resource tradable sector. A multiplier process is set in motion where an initial rise in interest rates 
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causes the tradable sector to contract, further raising volatility and interest rates until the sector 
disappears (Hausmann and Rigobon 2003)." 
 
The empirical support for the existence of such volatility is beyond doubt (e.g.,Mikesell, 1997 and 
Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2007)). It creates serious problems by making it almost 
impossible for governments to pursue sound fiscal policy. Equally important, thus generated 
uncertainty produces strong obstructive effect for the long-term investments. Gylfason et al., (1999) 
and Gylfason and Zoega (2006) provide evidence that domestic investments are inversely related to 
the dependence on primary product exports. Following this line of reflection, it would be then 
natural to compare the savings rates across resource abundant countries and see if they have a 
particular association with their respective economic development. However, for making a 
meaningful comparison the savings rates indicator should be taking into consideration the depletion 
of the non-renewable resources. "We therefore need savings rates that take changes in countries’ 
resource wealth into account34. In constructing that, we take as a starting point the traditional 
savings rates from national accounts, and then subtract net extraction of oil, gas, minerals, and 
timber. We term these savings rates ‘resource-adjusted savings rates’ (Torvik 2009)." 
 
Table 20, below, depicts selected countries that have escaped the “resource curse” and those that 
have fallen prey to it, together with their respective resource-adjusted saving rates. On inspection, 
                                            
34 A similar concept is developed and used by the World Bank: “Adjusted net saving (ANS) measures the true rate of 
saving in an economy after taking into account investments in human capital, depletion of natural resources and 
damages caused by pollution. Adjusted net saving, known informally as genuine saving, is an indicator that aims to 
assess an economy’s sustainability based on the concepts of extended national accounts. 
Positive savings allow wealth to grow over time thus ensuring that future generations enjoy at least as many 
opportunities as current generations. In this sense, adjusted net saving seeks to offer policymakers who have committed 
their countries to a “sustainable” development pathway, an indicator to track their progress in this endeavour (Beyond 
GDP, Measuring progress, true wealth, and the well-being of nations, Environment Department, World Bank, 2012).” 
  
104 
 
this table reveals a tendency of the countries who have escaped the resource curse to have higher 
resource-adjusted savings rates than those which have not. The countries listed as success stories, 
have predominantly positive resource-adjusted savings rates. In contrast, the countries that have not 
escaped the curse, have mostly negative resource-adjusted savings over the period. This indicates 
that “blessed” and “cursed” among resource-abundant countries differ in savings. "Note, however, 
that the table says nothing about causality—we cannot know if overspending of resource income 
has resulted in bad economic development, or if bad economic development has resulted in 
overspending of resource income. Thus all we are left with from this is a correlation, albeit an 
interesting one (Torvik 2009)." 
 
Table 18: Resource-adjusted savings rates as percentage of GNI, average 1972–2000 
 
Source: Matsen and Torvik (2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia 18 Algeria 6.11
Botswana 33 Congo -11.9
Canada 15.7 Mexico 10.8
Chile 7.4 Nigeria -22
Ireland 22 Saudi Arabia -21.5
Malaysia 19.9 Sierra Leone 1.8
New Zealand 18.4 Trinidad and Tobago -3.9
Norway 17 Venezuela -1.8
Oman -26.6 Zambia -5.8
Thailand 20 Ecuador NA
USA 15.1
Countries claimed to have 
escaped the resource curse
Countries claimed not to have 
escaped the resource curse
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Quality of Governance 
 
Are resource-abundant countries perhaps “cursed” because their respective institutions are inferior? 
Is it just apparent or is it perhaps real that weak institutions are endogenous to mineral wealth? One 
thing is for sure -- any significant revenue accumulation in the state budget inevitably attracts 
greater government involvement, which is inevitably an important factor in determining the long-
term trend in economic performance. 
 
Many papers on the “resource curse” find the most important part of the explanation of the 
phenomenon as effectively political, determined by the quality of government, e.g., Mikesell, 
(1997) Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001), Isham et.al. (2005), Ulfelder (2007), Ross (2001, 2006, 2014), 
and Wright et al. (2014). Isham et al. (2005), concludes that weak institutions are standard 
(endogenous) in resource abundant countries, terms of trade shocks are unavoidable and 
consequently they are predestined to endure low economic growth. In his words: "[c]ountries 
dependent on point source natural resources (those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic 
base, such as oil and minerals) and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and 
social divisions and weakened institutional capacity." Studies rejecting the resource abundance - 
weak quality of governance connection, e.g., Lederman and Maloney (2003), Wright and Czelusta 
(2004), Mehlun and Torvik (2006), Haber and Menado (2011) tend to maintain that the negative 
outcomes from huge export of primary commodities are not an automatic result from a "natural" 
economic mechanism, but are due to a bad quality of governance. In their view institutions are 
exogenous, rather than endogenous to resource-abundance. "We have shown that the quality of 
institutions determines whether countries avoid the resource curse or not. The combination of 
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grabber friendly institutions and resource abundance leads to low growth.  Producer friendly 
institutions, however, help countries to take full advantage of their natural resources (Mehlum and 
Torvik 2006)." This strand of the literature acknowledges that the foundations of the few success 
stories are competent, strong government structures and sound macroeconomic policies. The best 
example is Botswana (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001, Iimi, 2006, and Lewin, 2010).  
 
Furthermore some studies claim that "At very least we should probably abandon the stylized fact 
that natural resource abundance is somehow bad for growth and even perhaps consider a research 
agenda on the channels through which they may have a positive effect, possibly, through inducing 
higher productivity growth (Lederman and Maloney 2003)." Finally, Acemoglu et al., (2001) 
transcend (in time) the exogenous and endogenous analysis of the quality of institutions finding that 
while important difference in economic development can be attributed to the effectiveness of given 
institutions, these are, per se  a legacy of colonialism and have little to do with any resource 
abundance effect. Overall, there seems to be emerging a broad agreement between both proponents 
and critics of the quality of government explanation of the “resource curse” that institutions in 
resource-abundant states are generally clumsy, slow-moving and inefficient. Consequently, all-
inclusive, sustainable economic development will only be possible in such states where good 
institutions have already been incumbent before the natural resource discovery or where social 
structures and domestic forces are conductive to the emergence of such government. 
 
Based on the various causal mechanisms linking the natural resource abundance “curse” with the 
quality of governance we present the following classification: i) Inappropriate and unsustainable 
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decision making; ii) Unsustainable investment choices; iii) Imaginary industrialistion; iv) Society 
and its collective standards; and v) Bad rent seeking driving good entrepreneurs out. 
 
 
 Inappropriate and unsustainable decision making 
Why are such flawed decision making procedures bound to take place? The most important reasons 
include: i) The huge resource revenue received by the government is intensifying "great" 
expectations among the general public. Hence, to keep the public more or less content government 
disbursements need go up promptly. However, given the characteristically low absorption capacity 
of the resource dependent economy and in the lack of a feasible long-term strategy (by definition 
this is a windfall) the spending is unlikely to be efficient, nothing to say about sustainable (Auty, 
2001); ii) another related factor is that this (spending) response is likely to overrule / ignore normal 
due diligence procedures and disregard prudence (given the immense windfall of money almost any 
mistake "is possible to fix") (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001); and, iii) as the decision-making process is 
concentrated in a very few hands; these few high-ranking officials who constantly and mainly 
engage in the redistribution of huge funds are in a real danger of believing that the windfalls are 
earned by them and they can allocate them as they see fit without any public dialogue. Of course 
this fixation absorbs all government energy away from establishing competitive industries and the 
creation of broad-based wealth. However, these diverse rent beneficiaries develop in time an 
insatiable demand, which surpasses (and simultaneously undermines) the capacity of the resource 
sector. 
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 Unsuitable investment choices 
Following on the previous part it should not come as a surprise that resource-abundant countries 
generally fail to successfully develop the productive base of their economy. It is not easy to find a 
productive outlet for public investments and most of the investments go to the non-tradable sector 
of the economy and for cosmetic infrastructure projects, whereby employment opportunities (for 
reason of social harmony) are provided in an inefficient way. Furthermore, even if more reasonable 
investments were to be attempted in the non-oil tradable sector, they unavoidably meet the 
constraint of the limited absorptive capacity of the reassures dependent economic system. As well, 
there is a strong bias towards new capital investment; building it once and for all without any 
planning for the necessary maintenance of the finished projects. This comes as a result of the nature 
of these investments even if they are put into supposedly manufacturing enterprises; these 
undertakings are by design not expected to be competitive and autonomous, there are just an 
artificial structure providing opportunity for recycling and redistributing oil-revenues (Cherif and 
Hasanov, 2012; Richmond et al., 2013). 
 
Imaginary industrialization 
This area concerns the industrial policies adopted following the resource revenue windfall. 
Resource dependent countries have not been successful in promoting a competitive manufacturing 
sector (Mikesell, 1997). Many such countries have tried to implement industrial policy based upon 
import substitution. Primarily this course of action came into existence as a mechanism to 
supposedly help break out of the circle of underdevelopment (Auty and Kiiski, 2001). Interestingly 
the policy of a closed trade regime (protectionism) initiated by many resource dependent countries' 
governments are seen as a counter-action against one of the familiar Dutch disease symptoms -- 
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declining employment; thus perpetuating the vicious cycle of further increased resource 
dependence, additional economic imbalances, falling productivity, and finally a contraction in non-
oil (tradable) sector output. Such policies typically introduce subsidies and establish strong 
protectionism (trade barriers). The problem with this approach is that is costly and generally 
ineffective, turning out to be an incubator for vested interest groups, proving detrimental to other 
sectors and consumers alike. Though, in some instances temporary subsidies can have positive 
effects; subsidies were important for Malaysia in reinforcing its production base and consequently, 
thriving economic development (Usui, 1998, and Rasiah and Shari, 2001), as well as, for prevention 
of the Dutch disease contagion for Norway (Larsen, 2003). Furthermore, given that manufacturing 
through its specific learning-by-doing and spillover effects is identified as the most important 
dynamic source of technological progress, any source (e.g., an easy resource income) that hinders 
competition, creativity and diversification will considerably deter economic development (Verdoorn 
1949, Kaldor, 1967, Krugman, 1987 and Matsuyama, 1992). Finally, a recent prominent study finds 
that the more advanced are the specific manufacturing knowledge and capabilities of a given 
country, the  more complex and advanced goods it produces, resulting in higher economic growth 
and income (Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2012). Torvik, (2001) disagrees on this important issue 
claiming that “learning by doing” is not peculiar to the manufacturing sector only.  
 
 Society and its collective standards 
It is important to note that all macroeconomic policy decisions, including investment policy, social 
protection, industrialisation strategies, and fiscal redistribution do not come about in a vacuum -- 
these are all a result of a complex interaction among various social groups, endorsing diverse 
strategies, and making important political choices. However, the reality is too often very different 
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from the perceived expectations. Then, different social groups and different individuals would react 
or take on a new initiative in their own way. Depending on their driving motives, whether based on 
potential incentives or on a perception for a mission or on a mixture of both factors, the "best" may 
use their talent and energy and de facto propel the country to a new, higher level of development, 
promoting fairness and reward for high efforts and increased productivity. However, it is quite 
possible that the most influential people in the country have little in common with the most 
enlightened ones; in some cases they may be mediocre or even outright criminals. Such a cohort of 
people will inevitably tend to separate their personal benefits from the responsibilities related to 
their high positions in the structures of government, and concentrate on the former. Being 
incompetent and incapable of creating any new value or even lacking any notion of such a prospect, 
they will automatically concentrate on rent-seeking activities. This behaviour would predictably 
damage the economy, by reducing economic growth, by brain drain (the best leave the country), and 
by endangering the social fabric, i.e., for the privileged there is no need (in the so created primitive 
economic structure) for highly intelligent and capable managers, but for loyal ones, hence such 
individuals are then established as the most influential "leaders". 
 
In theory, one may imagine that the vast rents thus acquired may be used for productive investments 
(rather than finding its way to foreign accounts), hence eventually turning the bad thing (curse) into 
a potentially good one (blessing). Such an event is very unlikely to materialise as by its nature it 
would be the foundation of the demise of the illusory elite. "There is no predictability in the 
behaviour of some princes, no recourse for stolen proposals, no framework for development, and no 
assurance that investors will maintain control over their investments. These conditions are not 
attributable to rent per se, but rather to uncertainty in the investment environment which largely 
  
111 
 
reflects the personal nature of the state. Any preference for trade reflects the political reality of 
insecurity (Okruhlik, 1999)." 
 
Finally, we should note that “Democracy does not insure good government, nor are all oligarchies 
poorly governed” (Mikesell, 1997). The democratic credentials of Malaysia, Indonesia, Oman, and 
(Pinochet’s) Chile are dubious and yet these countries avoided the “curse”.  
 
Bad rent seeking driving good entrepreneurs out 
 
There is a very close relation between poor governance, resource dependency and rent-seeking. 
However, these are different phenomena. While the degree of resource dependence of a given 
country is generally measured by the share of this resource in relation to the relevant GDP or the 
applicable total export, the magnitude of rent-seeking is measured by the fraction of rent in the 
government revenue obtained. The concept of rent is characterised by its autonomy from the efforts 
put in generating it; by its source; and, its role in the process of production. In short, the rent 
emerges as a side-effect of (resource) export, a negligible part of the available labour resources are 
involved in acquiring it, and it is largely a subject of redistribution, Okruhlik, (1999), Herb, (2005), 
Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad, (2008), Svensson (2000) and Auty (2007). 
 
"The emerging theory of rent cycling focuses on the often neglected interaction between politics 
and the economy in developing countries. It grows out of observations about the three principal 
forms of rent: natural resource rents, geopolitical (foreign aid) rents, and rents contrived by 
government intervention to change relative prices (Auty, 2007).”  Such a disruptive process is likely 
to commence when both politicians and entrepreneurs in a given resource-abundant country 
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recognize that the profitability of any potentially viable project is diminutive in comparison to the 
rent (potentially) available from natural resources. The result is an explosion of rent-seeking; the 
substantial proceeds to those who are capable to capture it are coming at the expense of the 
potentially good entrepreneurs and destabilisation of the normal functions of the entire economic 
system. 
Table 19: Total Natural Resources Rent, per cent of GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
In such (resource-abundant) institutional settings, the benefit from unproductive activities prevails 
over the benefit from entrepreneurial and productive activities. According to Larsen (2004), rent-
seeking is based on pecuniary interest cliques that “prey[s] on victimized weaker groups in a non-
transparent way, affecting the countries’ production, labour effort, trust and investment process. 
Such groups may for example be a ruling class or elite of powerful allies. But it could also be larger 
segments of society that come together in large coalitions, such as unions, and threaten major 
strikes, thereby initiating a rush to relatively higher compensation and conflicts of relative 
position.” In the same vein Gylfason (2006) emphasizes that excessive rent-seeking leads to 
concentrating economic and political strength in the hands of privileged groups fostering 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Azerbaijan 48,4 65,1 68,2 62,9 63,8 42,8 46,1 44,0 39,8
Kazakhstan 45,4 50,2 46,5 40,8 48,5 33,1 35,2 37,0 32,1
Kyrgyz Republic 5,1 4,7 5,0 4,4 7,2 8,3 12,0 12,9 15,0
Russian Federation 32,3 38,8 33,9 28,3 31,8 20,1 21,1 21,9 18,7
Norway 16,6 20,5 19,7 17,8 21,9 13,2 13,3 13,6 12,0
Mongolia 17,3 19,6 33,7 31,9 31,7 26,0 41,6 44,9 28,7
Romania 4,6 4,9 4,2 3,1 3,7 2,3 2,5 2,8 2,8
Serbia 2,1 2,2 2,1 1,9 2,6 1,7 3,4 4,4 4,3
Bulgaria 1,6 1,9 3,1 2,6 2,5 1,7 2,6 3,1 2,8
Kuwait 51,7 61,8 60,3 57,1 63,7 44,5 51,7 58,8 55,1
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corruption, thus reducing both economic efficiency and social equity. E.g., in resource-rich 
countries such as Mexico and Nigeria, where competitive rent-seeking is widespread, political and 
economic institutions are weak and lack of transparency and accountability is the norm. Such 
behaviour distracts attention from goals of long-term development towards maximizing rent. Such 
rent-seeking "will lower steady state income and therefore growth along the steady state (Sachs and 
Warner, 1997)." 
 
 
Dutch Disease or Dutch Health, Empirical Investigation 
The term "Dutch disease" has been initially used in 1977 by The Economist35 to articulate the 
decline of manufacturing in the Netherlands following the discovery of gas during the 1960s. The 
consequence of such an infection is that sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing become less 
competitive in world markets. This creates a "vicious circle" of increased reliance on resource 
revenues and manufacturing is hard to restore if the resource sector or its revenues fail.  
 
The most evident symptom of Dutch disease is the rapid appreciation of the real exchange rate that 
is often connected with natural resource booms. When on the base of strongly rising income from 
natural resource exports a country’s total exports and demand for its currency are increasing 
rapidly, its real exchange rate will have a tendency to appreciate. This appreciation will increase 
competitive pressure on domestic exporters in other sectors. The real appreciation of the domestic 
currency will also increase the purchasing power of domestic consumers in terms of foreign goods, 
further increasing the pressure on domestic manufacturers through the channel of import 
competition. Even if factor markets are highly flexible and impediments to adjustment are minimal, 
                                            
35 "The Dutch Disease", 1977. The Economist, pp. 82-83, November 26, 197dfws7 
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the speed of appreciation may be such as to increase the cost of adjustment to the new terms of 
trade. 
 
There are various channels by which conventional tradable sectors may be crowded out by a 
booming resource sector and the non-tradable sector including: i) increased productivity in the 
resource sector drives wages up, bidding labour out of the production of the manufacturing sector. 
Additionally, since natural resource sectors are likely to offer higher returns on investment (by 
exploiting the resource rent), investment and thus economic growth would tend to be biased 
towards the resource sector; ii) amplified incomes shift demand from the lagging tradable sectors to 
non-tradable, where wages will also be pushed up. This spending effect will further drain factors of 
production out of the non-resource tradable sector. Some researchers may argue that these changes 
shouldn't be called a disease. They would claim that as long as the net effect on output and 
employment is positive, this should be seen as an economic adjustment mechanism, adaptation to a 
new economic structure and newly acquired wealth.  
 
In any case, identifying a case of Dutch disease is not straightforward as: i) the reallocation of 
employment from manufacturing to services is a general structural trend. It is particularly well-
defined in transition economies due to the (former) centrally-planned systems propensity to neglect 
services and concentrate on industry; and, ii) some real appreciation is characteristic of the 
catching-up process, as productivity gains in manufacturing are by and large higher in transition 
economies than in developed ones i.e., the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
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Modelling the Dutch Disease: Salter-Swan Model 
 
The term Dutch disease -- proper -- is used to designate the appreciation of the real exchange rate of 
a given (usually resource abundant) country due to inflation arising from resource revenue 
disbursements, followed-on by over-heating of the economy, high demand for the home currency 
and appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. One important consequence of this chain of events is 
a contraction in the non-resource traded sector. Thus “[t]he output of the non-resource traded goods 
sector is lower than it was initially (Fardmanesh, 1991)." 
 
Currently the phrase is not unambiguous -- the meaning has evolved and changed. In some cases it 
has taken on a much wider connotation to include all of the detrimental macroeconomic effects 
associated with the “resource curse”36. In other cases the meaning has become much narrower. For 
example, Sarraf and Jiwanji, (2001) describe it as a “[f]ailure of resource abundant economies to 
promote a competitive manufacturing sector”.  
 
Corden and Neary, (1982) catalogue the different Dutch disease methodological insights, dividing 
the effect of a resource led economic expansion into a “resource movement effect” and a “spending 
effect”. The resource movement effect pulls factors of production out of other productive areas, 
consequently resulting in increased wages and contraction in the other sectors. The “spending 
effect” materialises as the extra spending moves demand up in both sectors of the economy. As the 
prices of tradables are determined at the international market, higher demand results in increased 
                                            
36 In fact this inclusive approach is the one that we believe to be the most appropriate. 
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imports; conversely, the prices of non-tradables have to rise relative to tradables; thus shifting 
resources from the tradable to the non-tradable sector. 
 
We note that the “resource movement effect” as a feature of the Dutch disease is highly relevant for 
the transition economies in general and those which are resource-abundant in particular. As the 
process of transition has effectively destroyed the old productive base and a new and private 
tradable sector is still in a process of establishment. Little empirical work has been done in this 
important area.  
 
Salter-Swan Model 
 
We illustrate the Dutch Disease transmission mechanism by utilising a version of the Salter-Swan 
model (Salter, 1959, and Swan, 1960) of a two-sector economy with resource abundance, 
abstracting from capital accumulation, international investment and financial assets. The model can 
be considered as an expansion of PST and the Rybczynski theorem. 
 
Its function is twofold -- first, it facilitates the understanding of the functions and relations of the 
key factors bringing about macro-economic imbalances; and, second it makes available a structure 
within which the underlying principles and the expected outcomes of policy interventions can be 
analysed. The model draws a distinction between “tradable” and “non-tradable” goods and services. 
Tradables are composed of all goods and services produced in an economy subject to import, 
export, or would-be so. Non-tradables are these goods and services that do not leave the country, 
because of their practically non-tradable nature, e.g. haircuts, public services, construction, highly 
perishable products; or due to prohibitive transport costs.  
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Tradables and non-tradables differ most-importantly by their price formation. The resource / oil 
economy is treated as a small open economy; prices of tradables are assumed to be determined by 
the respective world market price converted by the exchange rate into home market prices. The 
prices of non-tradables are supposed to be created by local forces of demand and supply. 
Practically, a large group of commodities cannot be clearly consigned to one of the divisions but are 
characterised by various levels of “tradability”. The same merchandise, even in the same country, 
may be a tradable at one location and non-tradable at another. Many goods find their position in 
between the precise tradables and non-tradables classification, affecting the process of price 
formation. The resource / oil revenues are integrated in the model as net transfers from abroad and 
the oil sector being an enclave in nature does not feature separately in the model. 
This model provides a framework for analyses of important aspects of price formation and 
production side reactions, based on the following assumptions: 
i) The economic system produces three categories of goods: exportables (x), importables (m), and 
non-tradables (n); ii) Px and Pm designate the prices of exportables and importables respectively; the 
prices of exportables and importables are formed on the international market, whereas price 
determination of non-tradables Pn is subject to the interaction of home supply and demand; iii) The 
ratio (P/xPm) represents the terms of trade  and they are fixed, hence, exportables and importables 
can be pooled into a single amalgamated traded good (t) with price Pt; Consumption is either 
directly related to locally produced importables, or not directly by manufacture of exportables then 
exchanged for imported consumer goods of the same price; iv) Exportables are not used internally; 
importables and non-tradables are just for final consumption; and, v) Markets (factor and product) 
are characterised by perfect competition with the economy producing  at the production frontier. It 
is assumed that labour is fully mobile in the short run – it reallocates between sectors depending on 
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the state of the market, whereas capital has sector-specific properties in the short run and is only 
alterable in the long-run.  
Figure 38, below, depicts an equilibrium position as a preparatory point of the analysis. Horizontal 
and vertical axes show the quantity of tradable (t) and non-tradable goods (n) produced and 
consumed in a given economic system. The BC curve corresponds to the production transformation 
curve; representing the locus of points of all potential mixtures of tradable and non-tradable goods 
that could be produced in a given economic system, subject to resources, factors of production and 
technologies available. It portrays, as well the production frontier, i.e., the line tracing the 
combination of maximum production output at full employment and full utilisation of productive 
resources. 
Figure 38: Macroeconomic equilibrium in the Salter-Swan Model 
If the entire productive resources were committed to producing non-tradables, the economy would 
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end up with output of quantity B; if only tradables were to be produced, the output C can be 
reached. If resources are committed to producing both types of goods, then any mixture given by n 
and t as shown on the arc BC, (e.g., the combination of t1 and n1, determining point A) can be 
attained. In the cases where the point lays within the curve BC – the production resources are 
underutilised and the economy is producing below its potential. In the short-run the curve is fixed, 
whereas in the long run it can shift in both directions due to changes in technology or endowments 
of resources. All notation is in real terms. 
 
The diagram contains a sample from an indefinite number of indifference curves – from I to In 
though for presentational purposes we do not go beyond I’’. Here the indifference curve depicts 
consumer’s preferences among tradables and non-tradables for a given utility level. I'' indicates a 
superior satisfaction level than I, and I' indicate a lower level of utility. The indifference curves are 
convex based on the concept of diminishing marginal utility. Rational economic behaviour entails 
that consumers will try to achieve the uppermost potential level of utility within the budget 
constraint (DE); the DE line stands for the mixture of both goods -- tradable and non-tradable 
obtainable, and its slope is given by the relative price of traded goods in terms of non-traded goods 
v, i.e. v=Pt/Pn. If the entire expenditure were committed to non-tradables, the magnitude D could be 
bought at the given prices, i.e., quantity E, if the entire income is spent on tradables. This is not 
possible, as the maximum quantity of non-tradables produced is given by the point B, and the 
maximum amount of tradables is given by the point C. 
 
Only at a single point (A) does the budget line touch the production possibility frontier, determining 
the n1 quantity of non-tradable goods and t1 quantity of tradables, whereby realising the maximum 
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level of welfare with the given level of income. In short, point A represents a theoretical optimum, 
where: i) demand for tradables (t) and non-tradables (n) equals supply; ii) welfare is maximised for 
a given income; iii) the factors of production are fully employed; iv) foreign exchange rate is in 
equilibrium; v) demand for tradables equals output, and imports equal exports; and, vi) the demand 
for non-tradables equals their supply. 
 
Macroeconomic imbalances and adjustment to equilibrium 
 
Suppose that an increase in government spending brings about a budget deficit, financed by 
monetary expansion, extending aggregate demand to point F (see Figure 39, below). Hence, 
demand exceeds output of both (t2-t1), i.e., tradables and (n2-n1), i.e., non-tradables. Thus, the line 
GH is the relevant new expenditure line, drawn parallel to the DE line.  At each point to the right of 
point A there would be excess demand for non-tradables; at each point to the left of A an excess 
demand for tradables will exist. As a result of this domestic prices tend to go up. Surplus demand 
would drive prices of non-tradables and tradables up albeit through different transmission 
mechanisms (direct demand-pull effect and indirect effect working through the increased demand 
for foreign currency in a floating exchange rate setting). The new equilibrium would be re-
established through increases in nominal demand and nominal income, while total output remains 
the same. In terms of the chart the expenditure curve reverts to its initial location.  
 
If the composition of demand for tradables and non-tradables is altered due to, say expansionary 
fiscal/monetary policy, comparative prices would change (inflation rates of tradables and non-
tradables would be different) and bring about an evolution in the structure of production in the 
direction to the commodities with relatively higher prices. If excess demand for non-tradables 
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materialises, the budget line would revolve clockwise at point H until the IH line is depicted, with 
the new equilibrium point at A', where extra non-tradables and fewer tradables are produced in 
comparison to point A. If excess demand for tradables is experienced, the budget line would rotate 
counter clockwise in point G to line JG, establishing the new equilibrium point at A'', changing 
production activities from non-tradables to tradables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Macroeconomic change due to excess demand 
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Macroeconomic disequilibrium due to large transfers of resources from abroad 
 
 
Figure 40: Departing from macroeconomic equilibrium – the Dutch disease 
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non-tradables the expenditure line H revolves to the location DH. The aggregate demand is at the 
equilibrium point F' where a certain quantity of non-tradables (n3) and tradables (t3) are sold. 
 
As a result of the relative prices correction, up for non-tradables in relative terms, output of non-
tradables expands from n1 to n3 and reaches equilibrium with the demand for non-tradables. 
Regarding tradables, demand moves from t1 to t3, although production experiences a reduction from 
t1 to t4. At such state the demand for tradables (F') exceeds production by (t3-t4), followed by a 
subsequent corresponding deficit in the current account. Hence, the short-run effects of high 
resource income are subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate -- a higher relative price of 
non-traded goods (Pn) in relation to traded goods (Pt) – with a decline of the tradables and a 
simultaneous extension of the non-tradables segments. A higher relative price of non-traded goods 
Pn sets in upward motion the price of the marginal product of labour in the non-traded sector; thus 
employment in the traded sector must go down in order to drive up the marginal product of labour 
in the traded sector. Labour shifts from the exposed to the sheltered sectors. This increases 
consumption expenditure and output growth of non-traded goods. F' can only be supported and 
possibly sustained – only in the short run – by the provision of foreign exchange reserves.  
 
This analysis could also be conducted in terms of the supply side and the demand side of the 
(resource) economy combined. Below (Figure 41) we show the combinations of expenditure levels 
and relative prices (adjustment) following the transfer of resources from abroad. 
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Figure 41: BB-NN Model 
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  NN -- Yn(v) = Dn(v, E);  schedule along which there is non-traded goods market  
    equilibrium. The schedule is drawn with a negative slope   
    assuming that the substitution effects dominate the income effects 
The diagram shows that when the equilibrium price of non-traded goods rises (i.e., v declines), this 
translates into real exchange rate appreciation. The rise of the price of the non-traded goods creates 
excess supply that has to be compensated by an increase in spending to maintain equilibrium in the 
market. 
 
Conclusions from the Dutch disease model analysis 
 
The model provides a framework for undertaking analysis of the major factors causing structural 
imbalances and the appropriate application of macro-economic policies in mitigating the dynamics 
of macro-economic disequilibrium. Despite the conclusions which the model provides, critical 
analysis and judgement need to be applied -- as always -- before using it for policy formulation. The 
factors that should be considered include: 
 
 Why might the prices of tradables and non-tradables not behave as assumed in the model? 
Several possible reasons: economies of scale in export and import, trade barriers, effects of 
coincident correction of prices and / or quantities by a group of countries, imperfect market 
information; 
 The outputs of different economic sectors are neither completely tradable, nor entirely  non-
tradable, they just have different degrees of tradability; 
 The level of tradability varies over time, on the basis of the degree of price differences; 
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 Imported goods have a quantity of local value-added ingredient in their final consumer 
price, and non-tradable goods have some imported components;  
 Market monopolies in export and import sectors involve particular price formation; to 
remain competitive an importer may accept a reduction in his monopoly margin and increase 
the price less than expectations just based on the level of currency appreciation. Then again, 
an exporter may retain a share of the extra profit accruing from currency devaluation and not 
pass it on; 
 The setting of the model is comparative static, and does not allow for dynamic mechanisms 
or phenomena, such as the alteration of capital and price; and, 
 The analysis is partial equilibrium in another sense: the size of the country is assumed to be 
small, but international repercussions may follow. 
 
 
Real Exchange Rates Determination -- Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) -- 
and Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis 
The PPP was the simple idea, apparently easy to figure out and easier to spread, articulated by the 
Swedish economist Gustav Cassel (fundamentally developed by David Ricardo37). The modern 
form of the PPP appeared just at the time, when it was needed; after the world currencies were 
debased from gold (following the World War I) a mechanism was needed to determine their 
(previously gold content based) exchange rates. The suggested straightforward definition would 
sound like this: the exchange rate between two currencies is determined by the ratio of their 
purchasing powers (command over goods and services) in their respective country. “I propose to 
call this parity “the purchasing power parity”. As long as anything like free movement of 
                                            
37 Keynes (1923) 
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merchandise and a somewhat comprehensive trade between two countries take place, the actual rate 
of exchange cannot deviate very much from this purchasing power parity (Cassel, 1918).” 
 
Three corollary points to be made: 
 
 PPP implies convergence between market rates of exchange (MER) and PPPs; what 
converges to what? This question should be treated very carefully. While it is easy to reply 
that the market rate of exchange should be moving towards the “equilibrium” (PPP) 
exchange rate, this would confuse the names and the substances of these concepts. In fact 
the PPP is time-varying; hence adjustment towards “equilibrium” can be attained by changes 
in MER, PPP or mutually38. 
 PPP depends on the law of one price, which derives from the expected work of market 
forces driven by arbitrage, i.e., if the PPP and MER are too far from each other there would 
exist a profit opportunity, which will be covered by international trade.   
 Cassel’s PPP hypothesis and the widely used technical conversion factors – PPPs – for 
comparative analysis among countries are different concepts. The former is a theoretical 
paradigm and the latter is a statistical index providing a general basis for comparison of the 
strength of two monetary units in common currency. 
 
                                            
38 Discussing PPP Keynes observes: “At first sight this theory appears to be one of great practical utility; and many 
persons have endeavoured to draw important practical conclusions about the future course of the exchanges from charts 
exhibiting the divergences between the market rate of exchange and the purchasing power parities, -- undeterred by the 
perplexity whether an existing divergence from equilibrium, will be remedied by a movement of the exchanges or of the 
purchasing power parity or of both.” (Keynes, 1923) 
  
128 
 
However, empirically the evidence fails to sustain the PPP hypothesis. The large empirical literature 
endeavouring to deal with these issues reaches diverse conclusions. Rogoff (1996) provides a useful 
overview of the extensive research in this area and gives the name of “purchasing power parity 
puzzle” to the frustrating empirical results obtained regularly (“remarkable consensus”) when 
testing the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) doctrine. These results imply a too long time -- three to 
five years (HL: half-life) -- needed for convergence despite the high volatility of real exchange 
rates. This is to say that, at most, the real exchange rates very slowly tend to return to their means. 
Moreover, recent research (e.g., Lopez et al, 2013 and Gadea and Mayoral, 2013) questions if this 
estimated very long adjustment period is not indeed too low “The probability that the HL lies in the 
so-called Rogoff's puzzle interval (3-5 years) is quite small (around 21%).” (Gadea and Mayoral, 
2013) In fact Gadea and Mayoral using a dataset for 20 countries for the period of 1850 to 2004 
find that the median values for the HL are larger than 10 years for 10 countries and the probability 
that the HL is less than 10 years in the entire sample is 55 per cent. One potential (and well 
exploited) road to finding a solution to this puzzle is the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. 
 
The Balassa and Samuelson hypothesis -- BS -- (Balassa, 1964, Samuelson, 1964) offers in general 
a theoretical justification of the long run trends in real exchange rates in relation to productivities 
and prices. Their natural point of departure is the Salter-Swan (dependent economy) model, i.e., 
taking into consideration the important real world feature of having both tradable and non-tradable 
goods. BS states that if a given country’s productivity in producing tradable goods compared to its 
productivity in making non-tradable goods and services rises more rapidly than in a (certain) 
foreign country, then the home country real exchange rate will experience appreciation. Thus if the 
productivity of factors of production grows faster in the home country tradable sector, then the 
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relative price in the non-tradable sector should rise. Evidently, this would cause a faster rate of 
domestic inflation relative to the country with the slower rate of productivity growth and as a result 
the real exchange rate would appreciate. Or seen from the perspective of the income terms of trade 
approach the booming sector (e.g., high oil premiums) originates larger spending on both tradable 
and non-tradable goods and services. Given that the tradable products are linked to the international 
market by the price taker (small country) supposition, the increased demand would generate higher 
imports. However, the prices of the non-traded goods would have to rise as they are determined by 
the interaction of domestic supply and demand, resulting in higher inflation. Consequently, the real 
exchange rate of the country under consideration would appreciate. 
 
The existence of the BS effect is corroborated by substantial empirical support, though its strength 
is commonly found to be quite small in comparison to the theoretically expected one. While 
notionally, it may well be expected that the magnitude of the effect of relative productivity might be 
similar (at least) to the share of non-tradables in the GDP (generally found to be higher than 0.5), 
Ricci et al (2008), using a sample of 48 countries (containing both industrialised and emerging 
markets countries) over the period 1980-2004 estimate a coefficient of domestic productivity of 0.2 
“[o]n the low side with respect to the theory, but in line with other studies.”  
 
The net barter terms of trade (included as well into their regression analysis) is estimated to have a 
significant, positive effect of about 0.55, enhancing the BS effect. This represents an 
uncharacteristic result, as the standard outcome in the international macroeconomics literature tends 
to advocate that increase in the productivity of domestic tradable goods is expected to lead to a 
decline of the terms of trade, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). As well, Nahuis and Geurts (2004) -
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- using a sample of 25 OECD countries covering the 1971-2002 timespan -- provide support for the 
existence of such a negative effect from productivity expansion via competition forces to lower 
prices39. However, other studies, e.g., Corsetti et al. (2005) support this (reverse) conclusion: 
“Following a shock that increases permanently U.S. labour productivity in manufacturing (our 
measure of tradables) relative to the rest of the world, U.S. relative output and consumption 
increase, while the real exchange rate appreciates. Second, the same increase in productivity 
improves the terms of trade, as suggested by our model under the negative transmission.” 
 
Still, a further recent study by Bordo et al (2014) after solving a version of the conventional BS 
model for 14 countries over more than a 100 year period (1880-1997) and distinguishing “[f]our 
sub-periods representing different regimes: 1880-1913 (the classical gold standard), 1914-1945 (the 
wars and interwar), 1946-1971 (BrettonWoods), and 1972-1997 (managed floating)”, obtain (the 
usual) values for the productivity differential (over the entire sample) in the range of 0.13 to 0.22. 
However, “Estimates of the coefficients for the subsamples show considerable variation across 
periods and are even harder to explain by the conventional Balassa-Samuelson model. Estimated 
values are positive but small (below 0.25) in the gold standard period; are negative (between -0.17 
and -0.42) in the interwar period; have an ambiguous sign (range from -0.33 to 0.12) in the Bretton-
Woods period; and are positive, and on average, larger (within a wide range from 0.2 to 1.18) in the 
post Bretton-Woods period. The conventional model or its modification does not suggest an 
explanation of why the productivity coefficient would be negative in some periods and why it 
should differ so much from one period to another.” In trying to find a solution, they offer an 
                                            
39 “Growth of productivity has a significant effect on relative export prices. Within a year, about a quarter of 
productivity growth in a country is translated into lower export prices.  In a 4 year period one per cent growth in 
productivity is associated with 0.59 per cent deterioration in the terms of trade (Nahuis and Geurts, 2004).” 
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interesting calibrating exercise by “correcting” the productivity effect for the elasticity of 
substitution of home and foreign tradables (Armington elasticity) and for home bias (share of home 
goods in the domestically traded goods basket, minus the share of the home goods in the foreign 
goods basket of traded goods). Substituting for values of the Armington elasticity in-between 1 and 
2; home bias values ranging from 0.4 to 0.8; and the share of nontraded goods in GDP of 0.65 they 
“[a]re capable of accounting for not only large negative values of the productivity coefficient 
estimated for the interwar period, but also large positive values generally estimated for the post 
Bretton Woods period.” Hence, they conclude that “The Balassa-Samuelson theory modified to 
account for the terms of trade effect has the potential to explain the observed variation in the 
productivity effect over a long period.” 
 
Another proposed solution is sought in a combination of the three factors: TFP differential; real 
interest rate differential and, the real price of gold, “[r]epresenting real shocks, monetary shocks, 
and shocks to the global financial system (Kakkar and Yan, 2014). Collecting data for 15 OECD 
countries plus China, they utilise cointegration procedures and conclude that “Taken together, the 
evidence […] is quite favourable to the augmented Balassa-Samuelson model.  […] The visual 
evidence […] shows a close link between actual and fitted values of the real exchange rates for 
most countries…” 
 
These are general theoretical observations and they should be examined carefully within any 
historic and country context. Hence, we are going to implement empirical analysis for Azerbaijan 
based on the Balassa – Samuelson model to try to find practical support for or against the symptoms 
of the Dutch Disease. 
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Empirical Assessment of the Real Exchange Rate of Azerbaijan 
Among other indicators real exchange rate misalignments play a prominent role in defining 
competitiveness or the potential ability of Azerbaijan to produce goods and services of international 
quality standards at least as effectively as its trading partners. 
 
The derivations of the Balassa–Samuelson effect endure different logical and empirical 
specifications that may have important economic implications. One essential issue associated with 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) doctrine is the question of causality. In general, all economic 
variables are mutually dependent, so it is difficult to establish unilateral causation. Still for practical 
purposes, it is feasible to argue and empirically determine the prevailing causation, i.e., that prices 
determine exchange rates or that exchange rates determine prices (P   ER; ER  P). This is an 
essential but difficult question to answer. 
 
Given that the exchange rate moves because of differential inflation in two countries -- causality 
from P to E -- we have arrived at a theory of exchange rate determination. In this case, home and 
foreign prices are the driving force. If home prices are changing due to exchange rate 
“undervaluation” or “overvaluation” -- causality from E to P -- we have a theory of price 
determination. In this case, the independent behaviour of the exchange rate is the cause and the 
inflation or deflation is the result. 
 
The two alternatives have very different policy implications. Under the first option, the exchange 
rate is an adjusting variable and its movement is accepted as an equilibrating force. If the second 
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view dominates, the exchange rate movement would be seen conventionally as a destabilizing factor 
for the domestic economy. This passive movement of domestic prices in response to an exchange 
rate shock is called the "pass-through" effect. 
 
In large and relatively balanced national economies, pass-through may be rather small, e.g., Powers 
and Riker, (2013), estimate median pass-trough for the US economy import prices of 0.44); hence 
domestic inflation is no more than affected by exchange rate movement. But for small open 
economies, in particularly with fixed exchange rates, it may be quite high. Beirne and Bijsterbosch, 
(2009) utilising monthly data (January 1995 to April 2008) for the (then) nine central and eastern 
European EU members and applying both cointegrated VAR and impulse responses based on 
VECM conclude that the exchange rate pass-through is around 0.6 on average based on 
cointegrated VAR and around 0.5 based on the impulse response. More interestingly their 
cointegration results on exchange rates pass-through illustrate that “[f]or the four fixed exchange 
rate regime countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) it averages 0.758. Moreover, for 
each of these countries, a hypothesis test for full pass-through cannot be rejected.”  
 
The pass-through effect is in the main larger for primary commodities, e.g., oil and minerals, than 
for manufactured products. Also, pass-through is smaller for regulated goods and countries with 
various trade restrictions than for free trade products and open economies. 
 
Furthermore, there is a certain confusion within the realm of exchange rates and relative prices 
interrelations which could be illustrated by the following assertions: 
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Higher inflation countries should experience a high rate of real exchange rate depreciation -- so, 
under (the absolute form of) PPP the real exchange rate is one (or constant under the relative 
version). Thus any differences in inflation rates would not affect real exchange rates, but would be 
precisely matched by corresponding changes in the nominal exchange rate (through arbitrage). This 
to say: 
eq. 28  
1* 
p
epPPP
 
eq. 29  p
epRER *
 
  where,  *p -- foreign currency price level 
   p   -- domestic currency price level 
   e    -- nominal exchange rate 
   RER – Real exchange rate (in terms of domestic price of foreign currency) 
 
 A higher general price level relative to other countries, ceteris paribus, means an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate – yes, under the BS hypothesis. This to say: 
 
--Poorer countries have a lower price level; 
  
--Improvements in productivity in the tradable sector relative to the foreign country appreciate the 
RER; and,  
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--Improvements in productivity in the non-tradable sector relative to the foreign country depreciate 
the RER. 
 
But the subtle nature of this theory has been well understood and fully acknowledged by both 
authors credited with its formulation. As Balassa (1964) points out “Interest in the doctrine arose 
whenever existing exchange rates were considered unrealistic and the search began for the elusive 
concept of equilibrium rates.” Additional clarification is provided by the statement of Samuelson 
(1964) “PPP is a misleading, pretentious doctrine, promising us what is rare in economics, detailed, 
numerical predictions.” 
 
Before we begin the empirical analysis we look into the various sources of the real exchange rates 
(PPPs) data in particular.  
 
The real exchange rate (RER) is calculated as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative price 
movements. Different alternatives for calculating RER are available, depending on which prices are 
being used – consumer prices, product prices, wholesale prices or unit labour costs – and also 
depending on whether bilateral or multilateral measures are used. The most widely used measure of 
RER is the CPI based one. 
 
Figure 42, below depicts the data series available from various sources, including: the three 
different editions of the Penn World Tables (PWT 61; 71; and, 80), one from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank), and one based on direct estimates by the author. Plus, 
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we present the partial, but important data of the real effective exchange rate (REER) provided by an 
IMF analysis40 to inform our judgement. 
 
It is obvious that while there is a distinct difference between the three versions of the PWTs and the 
WDI, these series seem to exhibit a more or less common profile, but all of them diverge 
significantly from the direct estimate and the IMF REER. The difficulties with the quality of data 
and its availability for the former centrally planned economies, especially during the earlier years of 
transition is well known. On the positive side, it appears that from the year 2008 onwards all data 
sources begin to move on the whole in parallel. 
 
 
Figure 42: Azerbaijan, nominal and PPPs exchange rates data 
 
 
                                            
40 IMF Country Report No. 14/159, Republic of Azerbaijan, June 2014 
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In continuing our analysis, first we are going to test whether exchange rates and productivities are 
co-integrated, this is to say share the same trend. 
 
Problems related to spurious regression could arise from potentially mixed order of integration of 
the employed series and from the lack of long run stable relationships among the variables of the 
model. Hence, stationarity of variables is a major concern in time series analysis since non-
stationary variables are not mean preserving leading to invalid standard errors and related problems 
with hypothesis testing and other standard inferential techniques. We use the unit root test – The 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) – to check the data generating process statistically for trend 
stationarity against difference stationarity. The test (ADF) when performed as follows is a simple t-
test but with different critical values from the standard normal distribution: 
eq. 30  
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The lagged first difference terms are added to remove any serial correlation in the error term. First 
we test the real exchange rate series (RERSM). The test cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root. The ADF statistic in absolute value is below its 95 per cent critical values of -3.2197 for up to 
the third order of augmentation. The values are reported in Table 20 below. Three of the model 
selection criteria (AIC, SBC, and HQC) suggest that the correct order of the ADF regression is 
around one, with the maximum log-likelihood (LL) selecting a higher order. 
 
Next we test for a unit root in the first-difference of same time series (differencing a non-stationary 
variable is commonly expected to result in a stationary variable). However, all values of the ADF 
  
138 
 
statistics are below the 95 per cent critical value. The model selection criteria suggest that the 
proper order of the regression is between two and three. Based on the outcome of the test, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the first difference of the real exchange rate between the US Dollar 
and the Manat has a unit root. Simultaneously the ADF test seems to suggest that RERSM is neither 
level nor first difference stationary, in other words, the order of integration is not an integer, 
signifying that the “standard” choice between unit root I(1) and level stationary I(0) process is in 
doubt.  
Table 20: Unit root test for the variable real exchange rate (RERSM) and for the first 
difference of the variable real exchange rate (DRERSM) 
 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend        
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 10 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.                 
 Sample period from 1999 to 2008                                                
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
          Test Statistic      LL           AIC           SBC           HQC        
 DF             .48060        4.2381        2.2381        1.9355        2.5700     
 ADF(1)       -.96710        9.4388        6.4388        5.9849        6.9367     
 ADF(2)       -.53537        9.4892        5.4892        4.8840        6.1531     
 ADF(3)        -.36369        9.4907        4.4907        3.7342        5.3205     
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.2197 
LL – Maximized log-likelihood  AIC – Akaike Information Criterion 
SBC – Schwarz Bayesian Criterion             HQC – Hannan-Quinn Criterion   
             
 
DRERSM -- The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend        
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 9 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.                  
 Sample period from 2000 to 2008                                                
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
          Test Statistic      LL           AIC           SBC           HQC        
 DF          -.13622       16.9574       14.9574       14.7602       15.3830     
 ADF(1)       .96637       18.8029       15.8029       15.5070       16.4413     
 ADF(2)       2.7331       23.0605       19.0605       18.6660       19.9117     
 ADF(3)        2.2835       23.2794       18.2794       17.7863       19.3434     
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.2698 
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 Next we test for unit roots in relative productivity time-series (RPR), i.e. the ratio between GDP 
and employment of Azerbaijan and United States. The null hypothesis that this variable is 
difference stationary (unit root) against the alternative that it is trend stationary cannot be rejected 
for all orders of expansion. All model selection criteria are suggesting that the suitable order of 
augmentation is between one and three. Further we test for unit roots in the first difference of RPR. 
In this case for all orders of augmentation (three) the absolute values of the ADF statistics are well 
below the 95 per cent critical value of the test and thus the hypothesis (unit root) cannot be rejected 
again.  
 
Table 21: Unit root test for the level (RPR) and first difference (DRPR) of the variable 
relative productivity   
                      
      RPR -- The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend        
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 10 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.                 
 Sample period from 1999 to 2008                                                
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
          Test Statistic      LL           AIC           SBC           HQC        
 DF           2.3104        4.3893        2.3893        2.0868        2.7213     
 ADF(1)       .22155        4.7960        1.7960        1.3421        2.2939     
 ADF(2)       1.3145        6.6338        2.6338        2.0287        3.2977     
 ADF(3)       1.3535        7.0685        2.0685        1.3121        2.8984     
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.2197 
 
     DRPR -- The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend        
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 9 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions.                  
 Sample period from 2000 to 2008                                                
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
          Test Statistic      LL           AIC           SBC           HQC        
 DF          -1.3488        4.6388        2.6388        2.4415        3.0644     
 ADF(1)      -2.3593        6.6854        3.6854        3.3896        4.3238     
 ADF(2)      -2.3554        7.7212        3.7212        3.3268        4.5724     
 ADF(3)      -1.6575        7.8370        2.8370        2.3440        3.9011 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.2698        
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In the following section we discuss the theoretical basis of our modelling approach. 
 
Above we discerned two main factors relating to real exchange rates, prices and productivities. The 
first relates to the PPP concept and characterises RER dynamics as a mean reverting, stationary 
process where shocks and cyclical movements do not have a strong permanent effect. Consequently 
the RER must tend to revert to its long run equilibrium level rather quickly. The second is 
associated with the notion of the Balassa-Samuelson effect, claiming that productivity fluctuations 
have rather permanent effects on the RER and, therefore RER could appropriately be characterized 
as a non-stationary, long memory, non mean reverting process. It should be borne in mind that it 
can be problematic to distinguish small trends from "spurious" local trends as a stationary time 
series under strong dependence can easily look a lot like the former but be essentially the latter and 
vice versa.  
 
As a result the discussion concerning the subtleties of distinguishing between a mean reverting and 
“hysteresis-type” process is difficult to bring to a close in any definite way. Importantly, decisions 
on the order of integration of the series imply certain behaviour about the variable of interest. If 
stationarity were accepted, it would imply an equilibrium that remains constant despite short-term 
shocks and government policy. On the other hand, if nonstationarity is assumed, no point of 
equilibrium will exist. One possible way out, although not without its problems, could be to assume 
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that PPP is shifting with time. This would suggest that the series under consideration may be non-
stationary but also mean reverting, i.e., possibly fractionally integrated of the order I(d)41. 
To accommodate the characteristics of the series in statistical terms and investigate whether a 
relationship exists between them we need to leave the linear stationary framework and test for 
cointegration.    
Essentially the evidence strongly suggests that the variables are mean reverting, nonstationary: their 
order of integration is not an integer. To inspect the relationship (and its nature) between the real 
exchange rate and relative productivity, therefore, we need to address the general problem of 
defining a cointegrating relationship between series that have different, non-integer order of 
integration.  
 
The concept of fractional integration is de facto introduced by Granger (1986), but not directly put 
into practical use. Granger (1987) study generalised cointegration class of processes where the 
fractional cointegration process (i.e., the order of integration of given time series in not an integer) 
under consideration belongs. 
 
Thus cointegration analysis makes it possible to test for a long-run relationship without putting 
stringent restrictions on short-term dynamics. From economic point of view fractional cointegration 
entails the existence of a long-run equilibrium relation, where errors from equilibrium are persistent 
by mean-reverting. 
 
                                            
41 That is, a fractionally integrated series will have characteristics of both stationary and non-stationary series and have 
long, rather than short or perfect, memory. They will be mean reverting but only over a much longer period than with a 
stationary series. 
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Motivation for using fractional cointegration framework includes: i)The conventional 
(dichotomous) choice between unit root I(1) and level stationarity I(0) is overly restrictive – many 
economic time series show sign of being neither I(0) nor I(1); ii) Much more general and flexible 
apparatus than the traditional approach; iii) Important for modelling wide range of macroeconomic 
relationships; and iv) The standard practice of taking first differences may still lead to series with a 
component of long memory behaviour. 
 
If the cointegrating residual has a lower order of integration than the constituent variables the series 
are said to be fractionally cointegrated. This is to say that two series Yt and Xt, integrated of order d 
and b respectively, are said to be fractionally cointegrated of order (d,b) if the error correction term 
represented by the linear combination Zt=Yt-BXt is fractionally integrated of order d-b, where 
0<b< d and d>1/2. 
 
The standard cointegration tests (e.g., Johansen's ML) are inappropriate as the ADF tests for 
stationarity indicate that the variables are characterised by different orders of integration. Therefore, 
we turn towards the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) testing and estimating procedure 
developed in Pesaran and Shin (1995) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). This approach allows 
the regressors to be I(1), I(0), or even fractionally integrated, testing in fact for the existence of a 
long-run relation between the variables under investigation irrespective of the order of their 
integration. 
The null hypothesis of non-cointegration is tested against the existence of a long-run relationship by 
computing the statistics (F-statistics) for the joint significance of the lagged levels of the variables 
in the ARDL model. The asymptotic distribution of this F-statistics is non-standard, but the critical 
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value bounds are tabulated by Pesaran et al. (1996). If the estimated F-statistic exceeds the upper 
bound of the critical value band, we can reject the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship 
between the real exchange rate (RERSM) and the ratio of the respective countries’ productivity 
(RPR). 
 
 
The test for a long-run relationship between RERSM and RPR is performed using the following 
version of the ARDL model: 
 
eq. 31 
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The null hypothesis of "no long-run relationship" is defined by 0: 210  H  
against, 0,0: 211  H  where the relevant statistic is the F-statistic for the joint significance of   
λ1 and λ2.  We estimate (eq. 31) by OLS and then calculate the F-statistic for the joint null 
hypothesis that the level variables coefficients are all equal to zero. 
 
The results are reported in Table 22 below. Following the Pesaran et al. (2001) bounds testing 
approach, and given that our sample test statistic exceeds the associated upper critical value (at the 
99 per cent level the values are 5.020 and 6.006 respectively) we reject the null in favour of the 
alternative that there exists a long-run relationship between RERSM and RPR. Theory tells us that 
the least square estimator of a cointegrating regression is "super” consistent, i.e., converging faster 
to the true parameter than the least square estimator converges in the common case where the 
variables are not cointegrated 
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Table 22: Variable addition test (OLS case)  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Dependent variable is DRERSM                                                   
 List of the variables added to the regression:                                 
 RERSM(-1)       RPR(-1)                                                        
 10 observations used for estimation from 1999 to 2008                         
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Regressor               Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio [Prob]  
 
 DRERSM(-1)                .080277            .22002              .36486 [.750]  
 DRERSM(-2)                -.21859             .33477             -.65294 [.581]  
 DRERSM(-3)                 .24296             .19991              1.2154  [.348]  
 DRPR(-1)                      -.19379             .18563             -1.0440  [.406]  
 DRPR(-2)                       .032049           .16916              .18946  [.867]  
 DRPR(-3)                      -.14217             .28697             -.49543  [.669]  
 RERSM(-1)                   -.40990             .083967           -4.8817  [.039]  
 RPR(-1)                          .34164             .087640             3.8982 [.060] 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
 Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 2) =     9.4381[.009]                     
 Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 2) =   28.7909[.000]                     
 F statistic                                          F(2,  2) =  16.7980[.056]                            
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In what follows we estimate the coefficient based as obtainable by the equation (31) above. The 
long-run coefficients and error correction model (ECM) are estimated by the ARDL specification, 
where the ECM is estimated by OLS and the lag structure for the ARDL specification of the short-
run dynamics is determined by the AIC, SBC, and HQC information criteria. 
 
Table 23: Autoregressive distributes lag estimates (ARDL (2,0) selected based on the Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable is RERSM                                                    
11 observations used for estimation from 1998 to 2008                         
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob]  
 RERSM(-1)                  1.2293             .19730             6.2308[.000]  
 RERSM(-2)                 -.41254             .17501            -2.3572[.046]  
 RPR                               .13583              .027407             4.9560[.001] 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 R-Squared                       .95826    R-Bar-Squared                        .94782 
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 S.E. of Regression             .061084    F-stat.    F(  2,   8)     91.8206[.000]  
 Mean of Dependent Variable     1.2736    S.D. of Dependent Variable       .26741  
 Residual Sum of Squares        .029850    Equation Log-likelihood        16.8938  
 Akaike Info. Criterion         13.8938    Schwarz Bayesian Criterion   13.2969  
 DW-statistic                    2.7124                                           
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
We begin by choosing the maximum order of lags present in the ARDL model to be three, allowing 
for lags between RERSM and RPR. The Akaike and the Schwartz Bayesian information criteria 
select the ARDL(2,0), while the Hannan-Quin criterion selects ARDL(2,3). The estimated long-run 
coefficients from the two models selected on the bases of the above criteria are given in the table 
below. 
Table 24: Estimates of the long-run coefficients -- ARDL approach 
 
 
The point estimates are comparable, though the standard errors obtained using the model selected 
by AIC / SBC are considerably smaller than those obtained using the model selected by HQC. 
 
The coefficients of mutual determination are very high suggesting that the regressor explains most 
of the variation in the dependent variable. Further to obtain an approximation of the speed of 
convergence to equilibrium we estimate the error correction model associated with the long-run 
estimate.  
 
1995-2008
Model Selection Criteria AIC and SBC- ARDL(2,0) HQC--ARDL(2,3)
Long-run Coefficient -- RPR 0.74143 0.82482
t-statistics [12.0092]  [3.3612]
R-Bar-Squared 0.94782 0.85586
F-satistics 91.8206 30.6877
Estimation results
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Table 25: Error correction representation for the selected ARDL model  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 Dependent variable is dRERSM                                                   
 11 observations used for estimation from 1998 to 2008                          
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob]  
 dRERSM1                .41254             .17501               2.3572[.046]  
 dRPR                       .13583              .027407             4.9560[.001]  
 ecm(-1)                   -.18320              .042087            -4.3529[.002] 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 List of additional temporary variables created:                                
 dRERSM = RERSM-RERSM(-1)                                                       
 dRERSM1 = RERSM(-1)-RERSM(-2)                                                  
 dRPR = RPR-RPR(-1)                                                             
 ecm = RERSM   -.74143*RPR                                                      
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 R-Squared                       .88469    R-Bar-Squared                          .85586  
 S.E. of Regression             .061084    F-stat.                    F( 2,  8)   30.6877[.000]  
 Mean of Dependent Variable    .036364    S.D. of Dependent Variable      .16089  
 Residual Sum of Squares         .029850    Equation Log-likelihood        16.8938  
 Akaike Info. Criterion                13.8938    Schwarz Bayesian Criterion   13.2969  
 DW-statistic                    2.7124                                           
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The error correction coefficient (AIC and SBC, based model), estimated at -0.18320, has the correct 
sign, is highly statistically significant and suggests that the economy's half-life return to equilibrium 
would take around 3.4 years. This is to say that around 18% of the gap between the long-run values 
of the variables is closed every year. Consequently, it would take a long time for the equation to 
return to its equilibrium once it has been shocked. Our finding confirms the validity of the B-S 
effect for Azerbaijan: i) poorer countries have lower price levels; and, ii) improvement in 
productivity in the tradable sector (relative to foreign country) appreciates the exchange rate. 
 
As Azerbaijan’s economic growth (and, it appears, productivity) is largely driven by the value of oil 
exports our results are a clear sign of Dutch Disease -- huge oil revenues cause swift real exchange 
rate appreciation, leaving the non-oil tradable sector (including manufacturing) unable to compete, 
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consequently its output (as a share of GDP) declines and the country is de facto on the path to 
deindustrialisation. 
 
If we are to examine the terms of trade developments in Azerbaijan (in comparison with other CCE 
countries) over the recent past (see Figure 43, below), in fact, they clearly strengthen the 
productivity effect. 
 
Figure 43: Net barter terms of trade of selected CCE countries (2000-2011) 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that: i) the changes in the terms of trade diverge significantly across 
CCE countries; ii) This difference depends to a great extent on the product composition of their 
respective exports and imports; and, iii) the difference in the impact of the terms of trade changes 
on the evolution of the purchasing power of exports depends on the speed of export volume growth. 
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Concluding remarks 
Clearly the entire subject of what creates a “curse” rather than a “blessing” and how to bring about 
the second and avoid the former is a particularly complex area for discussion. The literature is 
divided on both causes and cures although there is a growing understanding that it has a great deal 
in common with the quality of governance and the answer is most likely to be found within the 
intersection area of macroeconomic analysis and political economy. 
 
This chapter advances the following perspective: i) the literature on the “resource curse” provides 
substantial evidence that natural resource abundance is associated with a range of negative 
development outcomes, though this evidence is not conclusive; ii) current explanations of the 
“resource curse” do not sufficiently account for the role of the internal socio-economic forces and 
the external political and economic background; iii) recommendations for counteractive policy 
measures in alleviating / preventing the resource curse have not taken genuinely into account the 
issue of political feasibility; and, iv) academics have been too mechanistic in their approaches to the 
“resource curse” issues, while the attention needs to be centred on understanding the subtleties and 
specificities related to the variety of resource abundant countries and the connected policy lessons. 
E.g., the currently (Dec, 2010) unfolding political and humanitarian crises show that the appearance 
of political and economic stability in some Middle-East countries, made possible in part by rising 
government expenses on their own security forces, provision of significant subsidies on energy to 
final consumers, enhanced welfare payments, expanded public employment and reduced taxes, 
failed to mask a significant failure to diversify their economies, alleviate increasing income 
inequality, and circumvent the discontent (civil uprising) of their citizens. 
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Avoiding the resource curse – theory and practice 
 
Attaining sustainable resource-led economic growth is not an easy task and inevitably involves 
competent industrial and trade policies. Collier and Goderis (2007) find that although resource 
dependent economies tend to suffer from a decline in production in the non-resource sector, it is 
avoidable. Trade and well developed financial and institutional governance can help dissolve the 
potential ‘resource curse” impact on growth. “We find strong evidence of a resource curse. 
Commodity booms have positive short-term effects on output, but adverse long-term effects. The 
long-term effects are confined to “high-rent”, non-agricultural commodities. Within this group, we 
find that the resource curse is avoided by countries with sufficiently good institutions.” “These 
findings are consistent with recent theory that point at inefficient redistribution in return for political 
support as the root of the curse but also lend some support to the large Dutch disease literature. In 
addition, the results support the more general idea that commodity booms lead countries away from 
productive activities and provide incentives for non-productive activities, such as rent-seeking, 
lobbying, or public sector employment." 
 
Lewis (2011), illustrates the case of resource rich Botswana, where as a result of good governance 
its resource rents were invested into modern infrastructure and human capital, therefore preparing 
the ground for diversifying its economy and turning the potential curse into a prospective blessing – 
demonstrating that resource dependence is having a negative impact on economic growth only 
when the quality of institutions is worse than a given critical level. Di John (2011) “[a]lso identifies  
some decisive factors that  help determine the blessing threshold-below which the risk of a resource 
curse may be very high-in mineral  and fuel abundant  developing countries.“ In fact, “Countries 
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rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners. We have shown that the 
quality of institutions determines whether countries avoid the resource curse or not. The 
combination of grabber friendly institutions and resource abundance leads to low growth. Producer 
friendly institutions, however, help countries to take full advantage of their natural resources 
(Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006).” Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007) claim that countries where 
open and liberal policies are pursued can reduce the shock of the resource curse: “We do find that 
trade policies directed toward more openness can make the resource curse less severe and may even 
turn it into a blessing. ... our results are robust to the use of various indicators of institutional quality 
such as the risk of expropriation or the degree of corruption. If we use natural resource abundance 
rather than dependence, we also find evidence of a natural resource curse after controlling for 
geography, institutions, and openness. Furthermore, we find that this resource curse is attenuated if 
countries pursue more liberal trade policies.” 
 
Moreover, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2008) put forward the argument that “The key to a turn-
around for many resource-rich countries is financial development, ensuring openness and mitigating 
the effect of being landlocked, because the indirect negative effect of resource dependence on 
growth, via volatility, is much larger than any direct positive effect.” This is to say that a well 
developed financial system can also help to accomplish the identical result. Avendano et al. (2008) 
investigating the macro management of resource exporting countries in Africa and Latin America 
assert: “Commodity-exporting countries have realised clear benefits from the current boom. It has 
raised net export receipts and broadened exporters’ client bases, enabling them to retire costly debt, 
improve their credit profiles, increase foreign exchange reserves to reduce vulnerability to future 
speculative attacks, finance infrastructure for future growth and build nest eggs abroad and at home 
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for leaner times.” However, it should be borne in mind that this was a result of a rather peculiar 
situation – the top of the boom prior to the beginning of the Great Depression Mark II, starting in 
autumn 2008. 
 
Next we compile a classification of various policy measures available as a tools of the policy 
makers who wish to stop the potential pressure of a given resource impact turning into a “curse". 
 
Industrial policy / diversification 
In general an important issue related to economic diversification and restructuring of the economy 
is the extent to which it should be left to the free market; whereas, diversification may be an 
obvious solution it is proven to be an extremely elusive one to achieve. Since the early 1970s oil-
exporting countries have given formal approval to the diversification of their economies away from 
dependence on crude oil exports. Despite this, the absolute record is very adverse with a vast 
amount of public funds being wasted on inefficient and uncompetitive industries (Stevens, 2003). 
This is at least partly due to the following two factors: i) as a result of the Dutch disease not only 
does the current traded resource sector experience severe contraction, but also the potential growth 
of new tradable sectors is excluded; and, ii) in most cases, the diversification strategy consists of 
government attempts to pick winners. However, it is accepted the governments may be ineffective 
in picking winners. This is not just because most selected companies are usually in the public 
sector, but because they do not face competition requirements. In addition, since they are 
government projects, it is likely that they will be subsidized and protected, which ultimately limits 
their development. 
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The only really effective diversification comes from private sector investment, although 
governments can play an important facilitating role in this process, a point made clear from the 
experience of the Asian tigers. This suggests that one of the solutions to the problem of 
diversification is to maximize the resource revenue flow to the private rather than the public sector. 
Of course this then raises the important issues of income distribution (efficiency versus equity) and 
private economic power leading to concentration of political power (stability versus social conflict). 
In this regard Di John (2011) makes an important contribution, suggesting the implementation of a 
dual-track growth-strategy as the most practicable transition policy. He notes: “In this context, the 
introduction of a dual-track growth strategy may be promising. The basic idea of this strategy is to 
promote an emerging dynamic sector (Track 1) where competition and risk taking are promoted 
while continuing to protect and subsidize a vast array of politically powerful but 
uncompetitive/inefficient producers in manufacturing and agriculture with the aim of reducing 
social tensions and maintaining political stability (Track 2). Examples of Track 1 strategies are 
export processing zones and industrial parks. Such a dual-track strategy postpones confrontation 
with established rent seekers while the dynamic sector drives competitive diversification of the 
economy and also builds a pro-reform political constituency. The main challenge of this strategy is 
to insulate or ring-fence the Track 1 sector from political and clientelist predation and capture. In 
general, this strategy can be seen as a transitional path to more growth-enhancing institutional 
reforms.” 
 
Admittedly, as pointed out by Rodrik (2008): "The debate on industrial policy remains in an 
impoverished state -- still hung up on the question "should we or should we not? The way to move 
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forward is to understand that industrial policy is not that special: it is just another government task 
that can vary from routine to urgent depending on the nature of growth constraints a country faces. 
Once this point is grasped, it becomes   easier   to   contemplate the   institutional   experimentation 
that its successful implementation will necessarily entail." 
 
Investment 
The investment policy implemented by the government of any resource-abundant country is 
destined to play a crucial role both in helping to avoid many of the macroeconomic pitfalls 
characteristic for such socio-economic systems and in encouraging the process of economic 
diversification by generating different sources of -- non-rent based -- value added sector of the 
economy. While in any particular case a specific, suitable solution needs to be found and 
implemented in a skilful way, serious considerations always should be taken first regarding the 
absorptive capacity of the economy, including available factors of production and their quality, 
existing infrastructure, and markets development. "Gradual scaling-up strikes a balance between 
promoting growth through investment and ensuring economic stability through a stabilization 
buffer. By scaling-up public investment slowly at first, this approach could allow a country with 
low capacity and limited buffers to shore up its stabilization fund and also mitigate any Dutch 
disease impact on traded goods production (Richmond et. al., 2013)." 
 
The simple version of the Dutch Disease model, takes technology as predetermined; hence 
supplementary foreign exchange reserves are of no importance from the point of view of economic 
growth. Still, when a lagging behind developing country faces a technological gap, extra export 
  
154 
 
revenues, when channelled by a suitable industrial policy, can play an important part in accelerating 
the process of utilising advanced technology. If such a policy promotes ‘learning’, additional 
revenues can accelerate further the growth process. The government could promote industrialisation 
through protection, subsidies, financial incentives and investments in infrastructure. 
 
 
Sterilisation policy and currency devaluation 
There is general agreement that trying to stabilize spending to ensure steady and reasonable growth 
is an important part of proper macroeconomic management. Sterilisation is a policy tool that has 
been usually used for avoiding the expansionary effects of capital inflows and export revenue 
booms on the monetary base, and thus on the exchange rate and inflation. 
One common factor in the case of those countries which have avoided the “curse” – Botswana, 
Chile, Indonesia and Malaysia – is that all four experienced significant depreciation of the real 
exchange rate as a result of explicit policy choices (Usui, 1997). In fact, the successful management 
of resource wealth in Botswana has been partly attributed to recurrent currency devaluation in order 
to maintain external competitiveness and offset, to the extent possible, the appreciation of its 
currency towards its main trading partner South Africa. However, if the devaluation is perceived as 
a necessary adjustment due to balance of payment difficulties, instead of as a strategic policy choice 
undertaken in the presence of a strong balance of payment position, it could affect the expectations 
of the economic agents in a negative way thereby triggering capital flight. Still, the effect of such a 
"[p]olicy action would be to prevent a significant appreciation of the real exchange rate. The central 
bank could require the export revenue windfall to be sold directly to the central bank, or the central 
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bank could purchase foreign exchange on the exchange market to prevent an increase in the 
nominal exchange value of the domestic currency (Mikesell, 1997)." 
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Another possible intervention is through the mechanism of some form of Sovereign Wealth Fund. 
Many resource-rich countries have established special funds for depositing the revenues accrued 
from natural resources extraction. The potential usage of such funds includes: stabilising revenue 
streams by offsetting commodity price volatility; providing an intergenerational saving mechanism; 
avoiding Dutch disease effects by sterilizing the impact of foreign exchange inflows; and, ensuring 
transparency. 
The positive role of such funds is not straightforward. In fact the causality may rather run the other 
way around -- a representative, prudent, and transparent government is likely to institute such a 
fund; however the establishment of a sovereign wealth fund is very unlikely to change the way an 
autocratic government works. 
 
The (inconclusive) empirical evidence includes Devlin and Lewin, (2002) using a panel data for 71 
countries, for the 1970 to 2000 period; they illustrate that the existence of wealth funds is correlated 
with reduced government spending and a higher share of investments. Another empirical study, 
comparing countries with and without wealth funds, implies that the interrelation between 
government expenditure and changes in non-resource exports is weaker in the group of countries 
having funds. Another finding is that the formation of a fund had no effect on spending by the 
government; Davis et al. (2001). 
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Wealth funds are no warranty for a proper fiscal stance and in reality cannot act as a replacement 
for sound fiscal and macroeconomic management. "The credibility and transparency of the fiscal 
policy framework can be supported by a well-designed resource fund, but the latter cannot be a 
substitute for an appropriate policy framework nor a panacea that obviates the need to strengthen 
overall fiscal management capacity. Funds need to be fully integrated with the budget and the fiscal 
framework (Baunsgaard, et al., 2012)." 
 
Political Reforms 
Why do some resource-rich countries continually follow wise policies while others don’t? This 
question has to deal with the political economy of economic policy in resource-abundant countries. 
As briefly discussed above, the political dimension of the Dutch disease is what makes the 
therapeutic process such a complex task that can barely be achieved using only standard economic 
tools. The political aspect is the principal force behind economic policy making. One obvious 
solution is to develop democracy. However, as previously discussed, while this may well be highly 
advantageous for many reasons, it appears not to be a necessary condition for successful economic 
performance. 
 
Another one is to remove corruption and contain rent seeking. It is in this context that new 
international initiatives on the management of resource wealth have emphasised transparency and 
responsibility of mineral revenues management. Most notably such initiatives include the IMF’s 
Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency; the Open Society Initiative’s (OSI) Follow the Money: 
a Guide to Monitoring Budgets and Oil and Gas Revenue, OECD Anti-Corruption Network for 
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Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ACN) and the British Government’s initiative on Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  
 
More practically, the legitimacy of government derives from its ability to deliver development 
simply defined as achieving better standards of living for the entire society. A greedy government 
by contrast lacks the linkages into the population or any other constraint that prevents the elite from 
plundering the economy. Securing an alignment of interests is crucial. The great danger is that 
“[r]ulers usually have had no concept of a wider national interest, beyond that of their immediate 
circle, and certainly no concept of economic growth as a legitimate social objective (Booth, 1995).” 
In contrast Indonesia succeeded as the government was “[a]ble to insulate themselves from 
pressures from powerful vested interests and pursue policies which have given top priority to the 
achievement of rapid rates of growth (Booth, 1995)” 
 
Furthermore, attaining a better political structure and sustaining genuine economic growth and 
development, rather than being absorbed in rent-seeking activities, would benefit the oil exporting 
countries by possibly promoting trust and dependability among themselves. Such potential real 
cooperation between the oil-exporting countries would allow them not to fall victims to the 
prisoner’s dilemma game’s worst possible outcome. 
 
In introducing the prisoner’s – oil producer’s -- dilemma we draw heavily on Bratvold and Koch 
(2011). One of the key basic and best known game theoretic approaches, where two players alone 
choose between two potential options and the reward for each participant depends on the decision 
made by both of them is the prisoner’s dilemma. Here we cast the dynamics of the game as an oil 
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producer’s dilemma by introducing two countries producing oil of the amount which each 
participant trusts will result in maximising their respective oil income. Assuming that the relevant 
countries supply a major proportion of the world’s total production, thus determining the 
international price of oil, we move to illustrate the possible price and revenue outcomes. 
 
Table 26: Oil production stability – a game theoretic approach 
Potential outputs, prices and profits  
Country B 
10 barrels 20 barrels 
Country A 
10 barrels 
USD 1,400 USD 1,500 
USD 1,400 USD 750 
 
20 barrels 
USD 750 USD 800 
USD 1,500 USD 800 
 
Source:  Bratvold and Koch, 2011. 
 
We assume that each of the two countries can choose to produce either 10 or 20 barrels of oil. If 
both countries agree to extract only 10 barrels each (and maintain the oil price high) both would be 
motivated to breach the contract by extracting 20 barrels. The judgment goes as follows: each 
country realizes that the other country can break their contract. Country A discern that if country B 
respects the contract and limits its production to 10 barrels, country A would gain USD 1,500 by 
extracting 20 barrels, i.e., 20 barrels x USD 75. If instead country A sticks to the agreement and 
restrict its production to 10 barrels, the upper limit of its earnings is USD 1,400 subject to country B 
respecting their contract. However, in case of country B breaking the deal, country A would get just 
USD 750 by acting in accordance with the agreement, while it would obtain USD 800 by breaking 
the agreement. The equivalent logic applies for country B.  
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Each country protects its own interest, and irrespective of what the other country chooses (to stick 
to the deal or to break it) the best option is to break the deal. This brings into “life” the dilemma. If 
the countries stick to the deal they would earn revenue of USD 1,400 and be at an advantage, rather  
than if both break the contract. The complexity is that neither one benefits from taking the risk, 
knowing that it is, at all times, in the other country’s interest not to follow the terms of the contract. 
Therefore, despite the mutual contract, neither of the countries can expect the other to respect its 
commitment (to extract no more than 10 barrels) without some supplementary contractual or 
enforcement process. 
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Chapter	 III:	Excessive	Debt	or	Excess	Savings	 ‐‐	Fiscal	and	
Monetary	Policy	Coordination	in	Transition	Countries	(CEE	
and	CCA)	‐‐	Sovereign	Bond	Spread	Assessment 
 
Introduction 
A range of academic studies have analysed the determinants of the difference between the 
sovereign’s emerging market debt securities and US Treasury bonds and/or German bunds of 
similar maturities. Still, while there have been a number of papers dealing with yield spreads on 
Eurozone government bonds (e.g., Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003), Pagano and Von Thadden 
(2005), Mody (2009), and Klepsch (2011)) there have not been many methodical studies on the 
price determination of sovereign bonds (risk of default) in emerging markets; particularly in the 
group of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) countries. One 
early (partial exception) is the paper of Eichengreen and Mody (1998) examining launch spreads 
based on data for a mixed group of 55 emerging market countries over the period 1991 to 1996. 
They collect information on altogether 1,033 bonds split as follows: 670 from Latin America; 233 
from East Asia; and 81 from Eastern Europe. Regressing spreads on various potential determinants 
they detect: “But the same explanatory variables have different effects in the principal debt issuing 
regions (Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe).” 
It is interesting to compare the coefficients of regression on the variables Debt/GNP and GDP 
growth between the combined group of Latin America and East Asia countries with the Eastern 
Europe bond issues. While for the former group the coefficient on Debt/GNP is relatively small, has 
positive sign (0.437) and is significant (t-stat 2.054), for Eastern Europe its value is big, negative (-
1.255) and it is insignificant (t-stat -1.367). In the same vein the coefficient on GDP growth for 
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Latin America and East Asia is positive sizable (2.253) though insignificant (t-stat 0.616) and the 
equivalent coefficient for Eastern Europe is negative, vast (-14.250) and significant (t-stat -1.954). 
Furthermore, the coefficient of mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom for the Latin 
America and East Asia estimated model is close to 0.6, while it is only about 0.09 for Eastern 
Europe. These OLS results suggest that about 60 per cent of the variation in spreads is explained for 
Latin America and East Asia and just about 9 per cent for Eastern Europe, anticipating the authors’ 
statement: “And when it comes to changes in spreads over time, we find that these are explained 
mainly by shifts in market sentiment rather than by shifts in fundamentals.” 
McGuire and Schrijvers (2003), relying on data from August 1999 to June 2003, analyse the 
emerging market for debt at a higher stage of development. In their own words “The market for 
emerging market debt has matured considerably in recent years. Market liquidity and transparency 
have been enhanced as the investor base has broadened. In 1998, hedge funds accounted for 30% of 
all activity in this market, while high-grade or “real money” investors (e.g., pension funds and other 
institutional investors) constituted only 9%. By 2002, the share of hedge funds had declined to 10%, 
while that of high-grade investors had risen to 32%. Furthermore, an increasing number of countries 
are now able to issue longer maturity bonds (e.g., 10-year maturity), which is beneficial for issuers 
trying to reduce interest rate sensitivity, and for investors looking for higher-duration investment 
opportunities.” Still, and despite the continued development and apparent integration of emerging 
markets into the international economic structures, their results “[s]uggests that the common 
variation in emerging market debt spreads is largely explained by changes in attitudes towards risk 
within the international investment community.” Also they affirm “we find that a single common 
factor explains approximately 80% of the common variation.” 
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Arezki and Bruckner (2010), use a dataset for 30 emerging market economies including five 
transition economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine). They construct an 
individual international commodity price index per country that allows them to confine revenue 
windfalls from rising prices of exported commodities and in addition exploit two measures of 
political institutions. Their main findings are: i) “[p]ositive international commodity price shocks 
lead on average to a significant reduction in commodity exporting countries’ spread on sovereign 
bonds.”; ii) allowing for cross-country differences in political institutions entails that for 
democracies “[a] positive commodity price shock of size 1 standard deviation significantly reduced 
the spread on sovereign bonds by over 0.4 standard deviation. On the other hand [...] autocracies a 
shock of similar magnitude was associated with a significant increase in the spread on sovereign 
bonds by 0.3 standard deviations.”; and, iii) “[i]n democracies [...] windfalls from international 
commodity price shocks were significantly positively associated with real per capita GDP growth, 
in autocracies they were associated with a significant decrease in real per capita GDP.” 
Belhochine and Dell’Erba (2013), applying spread regression to a panel of 26 emerging economies 
(including 7 transition economies: Bulgaria, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, Serbia, and 
Ukraine) and bringing in the difference between the debt stabilising primary balance and the factual 
primary balance as a measure of debt sustainability, they find “[t]hat debt sustainability is a major 
determinant of spreads with an elasticity of about 25 basis points for each 1 percentage point 
departure of the primary balance from its debt stabilizing level.” Furthermore they claim “[t]hat the 
sensitivity of spreads to debt sustainability doubles as public debt increases above 45 percent of 
GDP.” 
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Overall the research papers have uncovered certain empirical regularities and plausible 
interconnections, but the established state of knowledge in this area is as yet by no means sufficient 
to resolve the question of what are the major determinants of sovereign bond spreads.  
These common features include: lack of a domestic (or foreign) market for debt denominated in 
local currencies, moreover, such local home-currency denominated debt (if there may be one) for 
credibility reasons will be very short term; also, lack of sufficiently developed domestic institutions 
(e.g., pension funds) that would potentially demand such instruments. 
In the field of fiscal policy and debt management -- as a constituent part of fiscal policy for any 
indebted country -- it is necessary to delineate the particular features of developing/transition 
economies and to specify the possible points of inconsistency between the implementation of fiscal 
policy and the achievement of debt management objectives. The government should know the 
sources of potential divergence in order to undertake measures to maintain a stance of fiscal policy 
which is conducive to successful debt management operations. 
There are a number of differences between developed and developing countries, which create 
diverse conditions for fiscal policy and debt management implementation. These differences are 
due to two of the most important characteristics of a developing economy – the low income level 
and the fragile confidence in policy commitments and their implementation. Hence, a conclusion 
might be drawn that a developing country is more prone to maintain fiscal deficits and opt for debt-
financing (external) in order to alleviate current social problems and to improve economic growth. 
However, the outcome might be a high level of indebtedness and a heavy burden of debt service, 
which tends to extract a constantly growing amount of domestic resources. 
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Careful considerations of the patterns of fiscal policy in a developing economy and their relation to 
debt dynamics seem to reveal an asymmetry in Government’s preferences – its unwillingness / 
inability to raise taxes and readiness to satisfy an expanding range of social needs. Due to this 
asymmetry a promise of an indebted developing country’s Government to balance the budget in 
order to guarantee future debt payments may be taken as lacking credibility. The lack of confidence 
is embedded in the risk premium on government debt required by the investors. A growing risk 
premium may provoke an acceleration of debt accumulation. 
It is important to try to explain the interrelation between fiscal policy measures and the 
effectiveness of debt management. Emerging economies are more predisposed to debt financing due 
to weaknesses of their institutions, the high share of poverty and weakness of the private sector. An 
indebted country should build up the capacity for effective debt management, but, prior to getting 
involved in any debt operations, it should assess the investors’ perceptions. 
Identifying the potential answers to the subsequent questions is of paramount importance: i) What 
are the dynamics of the government debt – rising, stable or declining?; ii) What are the dynamics of 
the risk premium on debt – rising, stable or declining?; iii) What are the dynamics of the primary 
balance?; iv) How has fiscal policy influenced the debt and risk premium dynamics in the past? v) 
Is economic growth – high/low?, rising/falling?, steady/volatile? 
If the answers to the above questions reveal that the government is still in a phase of debt 
accumulation it should know that even if it tightens the fiscal stance and makes the necessary 
adjustments the debt may continue growing, though at a decelerating rate. After a certain period of 
time the debt-to-GDP ratio may stabilize and only after that the risk premium may start to decline. 
If the government is on the threshold of entering another phase of debt accumulation it has to 
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undertake severe adjustments in its fiscal policy in order to prevent the default on debt. Again long 
after the debt-to-GDP ratio stabilizes, the risk on government debt may remain high. Reducing the 
risk premium implies very tight fiscal policy for a long time. 
However, even if eventually the country reaches the stage of a low debt environment – there are 
reasons why -- it is useful to still have developed a sovereign debt market. This subject was 
discussed, rather extensively, some years ago when budget surpluses used to be projected for a 
number of countries.  
The reasons for having the government debt market include: i) sovereign debt plays the role of the 
risk-free asset; ii) government debt is seen as a safe haven instrument; iii) provides a yield curve to 
the markets; iv) foreign investors might not want to invest if there is no government market debt; v) 
the Central Bank can provide liquidity to the market through open market operations; and, vi) it 
contributes to the wider development of financial markets, 
 
Literature review 
The empirical research on the determinants of government bonds spreads in advanced economies is 
vast, whilst the existence of similar analytical papers dealing with the emerging markets economies 
is more restricted. Still, both have recently enlarged, in particular since the beginning of the -- 
financial and economic -- crisis from 2008. 
The main focus is: macroeconomic fundamentals determining sovereign risk; external shocks 
related to global liquidity; risk aversion / appetite; state of development of domestic financial 
markets; and, quality of governance indicators. 
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Contributions about the influence of macroeconomic variables on sovereign spreads, include Min 
(199842), Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Kamin and von Kleist (1999), and Hilscher and Nosbusch 
(2010). In general, these studies find considerable association with macroeconomic fundamentals 
and evidence that sovereign spreads in the 1990s declined more than country fundamentals’ 
changes could account for. Baek et al (2005), among others, offer a possible explanation: they 
“[p]ostulate that the market-assessed country risk premium is determined not only by economic 
fundamentals of a sovereign but also by non-country-specific factors, especially the market’s 
attitude towards risk.” In their analysis they propose an indicator by which to quantify investor’s 
appetite towards risk -- Risk Appetite Index (RAI). Using quarterly data over the period 1992 to 
1997 for five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, and Venezuela) and choosing as 
dependent variable the Brady bond stripped yield spread (BBY), they conclude: “BBY is the most 
sensitive to changes in RAI, in comparison to changes in the other economic variables. A one 
standard deviation change in RAI changes the bond yield spread by 0.208 standard deviations, 
which far outweighs the effect of comparable changes in liquidity, solvency or economic stability 
variables. This demonstrates that quarterly yield spreads, while responding to changes in economic 
fundamentals, are driven largely by changes in the market’s attitude towards risk.” Similarly, 
utilising principal component analysis, McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) recognize a single universal 
factor interconnected to investors’ risk sensitivity that explains about eighty per cent of the common 
spread variations. This finding is supported by the conclusion of Jaramillo and Weber (2013) that 
                                            
42 “This study identifies several groups of important explanatory variables for the cross country differences in bond 
spreads. First of all, liquidity and solvency variables are found to be significant for the yield spread determination. 
Specifically, these are debt-to-GDP ratio, the international reserves-to-GDP-ratio, the debt service ratio and export and 
import growth rates. Second, some of the macroeconomic fundamentals are found to be significant for the bond spread 
determination. These include the domestic inflation rate, net foreign assets as measured by the cumulative current 
account, the terms of trade and real exchange rate.” 
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“[d]omestic bond yields in emerging economies are heavily influenced by two international factors: 
global risk appetite and global liquidity.” Other studies, such as Arora and Cerisola (2001), Ferrucci 
(2003), and Baldacci and Kumar (2010) while confirming the influence of macroeconomic 
fundamentals, focus rather on the important effect of global financial markets spillovers on 
sovereign spreads.  
Discussing the outcomes of their model, Arora and Cerisola (2001) record that “Specifically, in the 
cases of Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Mexico, the Philippines, and Poland, the model fails to fully 
account for the sharp narrowing of spreads that took place during the period leading up to the Asian 
crisis. The narrowing of sovereign spreads between the first half of 1996 and mid-1997 was 
particularly pronounced in these countries, and may have been associated more with changes in 
market access and with global portfolio shifts by institutional investors than with country-specific 
fundamentals. These results seem to suggest that some form of “contagion” may have also 
contributed to narrowing rather than widening sovereign spreads for a group of developing 
countries during this period.” 
Kashiwase and Kodres (2005), Hartelius, Kashiwase and Kodres (2008), and Gonzalez-Rozada and 
Levy-Yeyati (2008) find that macroeconomic fundamentals, global market liquidity and risk 
sensitivity mutually comprise the key causes of sovereign spread changes. 
Similar conclusions are established by Favero, Pagano and Von Thadden (2008), who analysed the 
sovereign spreads of European Union countries. Mody (2009) examines the interrelations linking 
sovereign bond spreads in the euro area countries and financial exposure and finds that financial 
exposure (calculated as a ratio of an equity index for the relevant country’s  financial sector to the 
equity index taken as a whole) is strongly correlated with spread changes.    
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Caceres et al. (2010) – inspect the stages through which the swap spreads of the EU countries have 
passed and the driving forces behind these movements. They trace four distinctive periods: 
“(i) [f]inancial crisis build-up, between July 2007 and September 2008. [...] In general, 
fundamentals were supportive of sovereign bonds, as both the deficit and the debt were still 
improving at this stage; (ii) [s]ystemic outbreak, between October 2008 and March 2009, as 
sovereigns stepped in and supported financial institutions, government bond yields rose relative to 
swap yields across the board, on contagion from countries more directly involved in the financial 
crisis and fundamentals, which had started deteriorating;  (iii) [s]ystemic response phase, between 
April 2009 and September 2009, all government bond yields fell back towards swaps, as lower 
probability of distress in some countries was favourably affecting others; (iv) [t]he sovereign risk 
phase, since October 2009, swap spreads have started to be driven by country-specific 
developments. They have been broadly unchanged for most countries, but tightening substantially 
for Greece and Portugal where bond yields have surged well above swap yields on further 
weakening in fundamentals and intense risk of contagion.” They conclude “[t]hat earlier in the 
crisis, the surge in global risk aversion was a significant factor influencing sovereign spreads, while 
recently country-specific factors have started playing a more important role.” 
Dell’Erba and Sola (2011) – estimate the effect of the monetary and fiscal policy stance on both 
long-term interest rates and sovereign spreads by constructing a semi-annual dataset of 
macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts for 17 OECD countries over the period 1989-2009.  They find 
“[t]hat in general two unobserved factors can explain more than 60% of the variance in the data, 
both for bond yields and for sovereign spreads. We identified these factors to be the aggregate 
monetary policy and the aggregate fiscal policy stances. In addition, sovereign spreads depend also 
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on global risk aversion, which accounts for about 12% of the panel variance.” Furthermore, they 
“[f]ind that global supply of funds, represented by global monetary and fiscal policy stances plays a 
relevant role in affecting long-term interest rates. The effects of the global fiscal stance are by far 
quantitatively more important than domestic fiscal policy alone, and are significantly heterogeneous 
across countries.” 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2005) consider and closely examine the important question of 
procyclical versus countercyclical capital flows and monetary and fiscal policies depending on the 
country’s level of economic development. They use a sample of 104 countries for the period 1960-
2004.  Their major findings are: 
“1. Net capital inflows are procyclical in most OECD and developing countries. 
2. Fiscal policy is procyclical for most developing countries and markedly so in middle-high 
income countries. 
3. Though highly preliminary, we find some evidence of monetary policy procyclicality in 
developing countries, particularly for the middle-high-income countries. There is also some 
evidence of countercyclical monetary policy for the OECD countries. 
4. For developing countries -- and particularly for middle-high-income countries -- the capital flow 
cycle and the macroeconomic cycle reinforce each other (the when-it-rains-it-pours syndrome). 
Taken from a policy view point, the implications of our findings appear to be of great practical 
importance. While macroeconomic policies in OECD countries seem to be aimed mostly at 
stabilizing the business cycle (or, at the very least, remaining neutral), macroeconomic policies in 
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developing countries seem mostly to reinforce the business cycle, turning sunny days into scorching 
infernos and rainy days into torrential downpours.” 
What's more, fiscal policies are incorporated as powerful forces of sovereign spread determination 
in European Union countries by Bernoth, Von Hagen and Schuknecht (2004); Afonso and Strauch 
(2004); and, Hallerberg and Wolff (2006). Hallerberg and Wolff (2006) after controlling for 
institutional changes, conclude that fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of the risk 
premium. According to them superior institutions are coupled with a lower risk premium. Moreover 
deficits and surpluses matter less for the risk premium in countries with better institutions. 
Apparently this reflects the market view that proper institutions will be able to deal with fiscal 
problems and make the monitoring of annual developments less important. The results are robust to 
controlling for country fixed effects and different estimation methodologies. 
 
Maltriz (2012), embark upon the subject-matter with Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA)43. In his 
study the author applies BMA “[t]o identify the best models and assess the quality of potential 
regressors.” They “[c]onfirm some important findings of the literature, doubt others and provide 
mixed evidence to a third group of variables.” They [f]ind that the most important drivers of default 
risk in the Eurozone are government debt to GDP, budget balance to GDP and terms of trade. For 
economic growth, export growth, import growth and the US interest rate the likelihood is between 
10 and 50%, whereas for some variables found to be significant in the literature, as interest rate 
costs, capital formation and inflation, this likelihood is below 10%.” Furthermore, he maintains: 
“Our results indicate that the key variables, budget balance (deficit) to GDP and the debt to GDP, 
                                            
43 Bayesian model averaging (BMA) offers a coherent systematic mechanism for accounting for model specification 
uncertainty and inspection of the robustness of results to alternative model specifications. 
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that are included in the Maastricht treaty, in fact, are the most important risk drivers of default risk, 
whereas other, maybe more long-term oriented, variables like capital formation and economic 
growth and also inflation could not prove to be important. Thus, avoiding defaults – and maybe 
even the surviving of the EMU – crucially depends on the successful budget consolidation of the 
member states and the reduction of debt to GDP. The success seems to be partly influenced by 
favourable conditions in the external sector, in particular, by favourable terms of trade, which seems 
to be more important than the financing conditions and interest rate costs.” 
 
Gibson, Hall, and Tavlas (2011), concentrating on a single country – Greece – and macroeconomic 
variables shaping spreads, “[a]rgue that during the period 2001-2009 the Greek economy was 
marked by growing, unsustainable fiscal and external imbalances. [...] the sharp reduction in 
interest-rate spreads that occurred during much of this period did not adequately reflect these 
imbalances. [...] empirical results provide some evidence for this view. [...] also provide evidence 
that the sharp, upward reversal of spreads following the outbreak of the Greek financial crisis also 
did not fully reflect fundamental factors. Thus, both undershooting and overshooting of spreads 
have occurred.” 
 
This analysis is confirmed and extended additionally in space and time, and causality by De Grauwe 
and Ji (2012) who “[f]ind evidence that a significant part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS 
countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in the eurozone during 2010-11 was disconnected 
from underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables, but rather was the 
result of negative self-fulfilling market sentiments that became very strong starting at the end of 
2010.”  
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De Grauwe and Ji assert that the account of spreads widening “[i]s also a story of self-fulfilling debt 
crises, which in turn lead to multiple equilibria.” They suppose that given the state of affairs: 
liquidity crisis, imposed austerity measures (presumably leading the country to recession), plus high 
interest rates on government securities could result in a solvency crisis. According to their model 
investors try to factor in the costs and benefits to the government from defaulting. “A major insight 
of the model is that the benefit of a default depends on whether this default is expected or not.” If 
investors expect a default, a default would occur, if they do not, no such would take place. 
Furthermore, they consider that if a country is not a member of the Eurozone, “This makes it 
possible for the country to always avoid outright default because the central bank can be forced to 
provide all the liquidity that is necessary to avoid such an outcome.” 
 
While this argument may add up within its settings, one should not forget that investors may lose 
their confidence in the ability of the government of the “stand-alone country” to sustain its currency 
and take flight to safety by promptly exchanging the domestic currency denominated debt for cash – 
Euro or/and USD. Thus the self-fulfilling prophecy (or speculative crisis) may well become true – 
the country would rapidly lose foreign reserves; in time it would have no choice but to devaluate its 
currency; the level of the external debt would increase in local currency units; this would lead 
eventually to monetisation of the debt; this state of affairs brings forth new speculative attacks. 
Hence, just being a “stand-alone country” is not likely to be sufficient to insulate you from self-
fulfilling expectations or speculative attacks. 
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Focusing on emerging economies, the analysis performed by Akitoby and Stratmann (2006) 
emphasises the importance of sustainable fiscal policy and high fiscal adjustment, where reduction 
in current expenditures proves to be more effective on spread reduction than tax increases. The 
shaping power of liberalisation of the capital account, the currency convertibility risk premium, and 
the rule of law are investigated by Bacha, Holland and Gongalves (2008) as determinants of the 
local interest rates of emerging economies. Whereas, Edwards (2005), by means of the bidirectional 
interrelation between interest rates and capital account liberalisation shows that the degree of 
convergence of domestic and international interest rates could be used to assess the real degree of 
openness of the capital account.  
 
A connected subject matter that has received considerable attention is the relationship between 
sovereign spreads and default risk. Favero and Missale (2011) “[f]ind that default risk is the main 
driver of yield spreads, suggesting small gains from greater liquidity. Fiscal fundamentals matter in 
the pricing of default risk but only as they interact with other countries’ yield spreads; that is, with 
the global risk that the market perceives. More importantly, the impact of this global risk variable is 
not constant over time, a clear sign of contagion driven by shifts in market.” 
 
Hischer and Nosbusch (2010), using a sample of 31 emerging market countries and based on daily 
data for the period 1998-2007 investigate spread determinants and “[p]ay special attention to the 
volatility of fundamentals.” They “[f]ind that the volatility of the terms of trade is both statistically 
and economically significant in explaining spread variation. A one standard deviation increase in 
the volatility of terms of trade is associated with an increase of 164 basis points in spreads, which 
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corresponds to around half of the standard deviation of observed spreads.” The authors assert as 
well that the terms of trade volatility is a significant predictor of country default. However, an 
important restriction of their conclusions is the regional and economic divergence of the countries 
included in their sample (Latin America 12, Africa 5, Eastern Europe 6, and Middle East and Asia 
9) for which (time-invariant factors) no controls are provided. 
Another important area of research is the detection of short-term and long-term factors determining 
the sovereign bond spreads. Bellas, D., M. Papaioannou, and I. Petrova (2010) results indicate that 
in the long run, fundamentals are considerable determinants of emerging market sovereign bond 
spreads, while in the short run, financial volatility is rather the substantial determinant of spreads 
than the fundamentals aggregates. Furthermore, researchers have also distinguished between the 
determinants of sovereign bond spreads during normal and crisis periods. Ebner (2009) highlights a 
noteworthy distinction in government bond spreads in Central and Eastern Europe throughout crisis 
and non-crisis periods. He provides evidence that market volatility, political instability and global 
causes gain in importance and predominantly explain the increase in spreads during crisis periods, 
while macroeconomic aggregates become less important. 
In addition, another approach in the literature deals with the interrelations between debt levels and 
their impact on economic growth (trough implicit transmission mechanisms) within the framework 
of a threshold model, where the behaviour of the variables is expected to change distinctly, when 
certain – threshold – levels are reached. The most influential paper in this respect has been (until 
very recently) the one published by Reinhart and Rogoff in 2010 (Growth in a Time of Debt). There 
the authors claim to have identified a key stylized fact: a burden of public debt larger than ninety 
percent of GDP notably and consistently reduces GDP growth. Examining public debt and GDP 
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growth among twenty advanced economies in the period after the second world war, they determine 
that the average real GDP growth rate for countries having a public-debt-to-GDP ratio of over 
ninety per cent is, in fact, negative, amounting to -0.1 per cent.  
However, Herndon Th., M. Ash and R. Pollin (2013) have replicated Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
and were able to establish that coding errors, biased exclusion of available data, and unconventional 
weighting of summary statistics have led to miscalculations that provide a misleading picture of the 
relationship between public debt and GDP growth. They reveal that when accurately calculated, the 
annual average real GDP growth for national economies with a public-debt-to-GDP ratio of over 
ninety per cent is actually 2.2 percent, not -0.1 percent as stated in Reinhart and Rogoff. That is to 
say, that average GDP growth, when public debt/GDP ratios are in excess of ninety per cent is not 
significantly different from the average GDP growth when debt/GDP ratios are lower. 
Emerging Markets Bond Indices 
Figure 44 (below) depicts the developments in sovereign stripped spreads for selected CEE and 
Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) countries over the period of 1994 to 2012. Over the period 
starting from the end of 2005 to around the first quarter of 2007, sovereign spreads clustered closely 
together, reaching their historically lowest point of below 200 basis points. Given that, undoubtedly, 
there were significant differences in the creditworthiness of the borrowers in the index -- this state 
of affairs at that time might suggest that investors did not differentiate adequately among borrowers. 
This situation was followed eventually by the Bear Sterns alarm in March 2008, which led to the 
increased discrimination in spreads across countries. Furthermore, the spreads widened extensively 
after September 2008, following the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers. 
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Hence, the key question is: was the narrowing of the spreads and their compression a result of an 
improvement of CEECCA country sovereigns’ macroeconomic policy, implemented after 2002, or 
was it due to global excess liquidity provision? If better domestic macroeconomic policy efforts and 
solid reforms implemented in this period have led to: i) improvement in sovereign debt management 
e.g., by increasing the average debt portfolio duration and reducing the stock of FOREX debt; ii) 
development of domestic financial markets with enlargement of the investor’s base and 
enhancement of the risk management techniques; iii) continuing financial liberalization; iv) 
sustainable fiscal adjustment, reserve accumulation and price stability; and v) adoption of the 
institutional structure most conductive to prosperity, then it would be expected that any tighter 
monetary policy environment in the developed economies should only have a tiny effect on spreads. 
Figure 44: The Emerging Markets Bond Indices (EMBI) Sovereign Stripped Spread, Daily 
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Credit default swaps (CDS) 
Credit default swaps are normally used as a measure of risk assessments on government debt. The 
spreads in Figure 46 are for five-year contracts on CDSs with the spreads measured in basis points -
- each basis point is equal to USD 1,000. Seemingly comparable to an insurance contract, buyers of 
a CDS pay for insurance against a credit event on the underlying sovereign debt. For the Ukraine 
five-year CDS, the insurance premium is the annual insurance payment relative to the amount of 
debt. For example in March 2009, these CDSs reached a spread of more than 3,800 basis points 
(with even more extreme values on a daily basis, as can be seen at chart 3, below), meaning that the 
buyer pays an insurance premium of about 38 percent per year of the value of the securities (i.e., 
USD 3,800,000 on $10,000,000 worth of debt). The credit default swap seller collects the premiums 
and pays out if a credit event occurs. A credit event takes place when there is a substantial, 
identifiable loss. Credit events applicable to governments are failure to pay on the debt or 
restructuring of the debt. Generally speaking, a restructuring involves reduced payments or 
payments that are extended over time with no compensation. The occurrence of a credit event gives 
the insured the right to deliver certain government securities to the seller; and the seller of the 
insurance has the obligation to pay the face value of the debt, instead of the lower market value, to 
the buyer. 
These CDS spreads can be interpreted as a measure of the perceived risk that a government will 
restructure or default on its debt. CDS spreads in April 2012 imply that the perceived probability of 
the Ukraine government defaulting is substantially higher than it was one year earlier, but lower 
than in 2009. 
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Figure 45: Emerging Markets Credit Default Swaps, Monthly 
 
Figure 46: Emerging Markets Credit Default Swaps, Daily 
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Figures 45 and 46 (above) show the levels of spreads on credit default swaps (CDSs) for selected 
CEECCA sovereign debt (the spread is the premium that a buyer pays for the CDS). These charts 
contain two industrialized countries (with low spreads), USA and Germany for comparison 
purposes. Three countries stand out with higher spreads at present (Nov 2012): Ukraine, Hungary, 
and Serbia (all above 300bp). These countries have extensive economic problems and hence, 
profiles of government deficits, characterised with poor prospective for achieving sustainable 
budget position. 
It is important to note that “Credit default swaps (CDS) continue to be controversial, with concern 
that trades in them could drive prices of government debt down. A major concern recently has been 
whether CDS spreads on government debt reflect assessement of the probability of restructuring or 
default or instead represent “speculative attacks” with little or no basis in the governments' situation 
(Dwyer and Flavin, 2010).” Hence, do CDSs mirror risk or they are driven by other forces? 
In May 2010 the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) put into operation a 
complete ban on taking naked sovereign CDS positions.44 On March 14, 2012, the European 
Commission adopted a proposal for regulating short selling and certain aspects of credit default 
swaps, de facto permitting the use of CDS only for the purpose of hedging long positions already 
held by investors.45 As the Commission points out, there are resemblances between short selling 
                                            
44 General Decree of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) on the prohibition of naked short-selling 
transactions in debt securities of Member States of the EU whose legal currency is the euro of 18 May 2010 (revoked 
with effect from 27 July 2010) 
45(14) Buying credit default swaps without having a long position in underlying sovereign debt or any assets, 
portfolio of assets, financial obligations or financial contracts the value of which is correlated to the value of 
the sovereign debt, can be, economically speaking, equivalent to taking a short position on the underlying debt 
instrument. The calculation of a net short position in relation to sovereign debt should therefore include credit 
default swaps relating to an obligation of a sovereign debt issuer. The credit default swap position should be 
taken into account both for the purposes of determining whether a natural or legal person has a significant net 
short position relating to sovereign debt that needs to be notified to a competent authority and where a 
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stocks that one does not own and buying CDSs on assets that one does not have. These positions are 
such that speculators profit from adverse developments in the underlying security, and the positions 
could contribute to a decline in prices in the underlying assets, e.g., prices of government debt. 
Economic theory is yet to provide an unambiguous answer to the long standing question about 
whether speculation in general and in derivative markets in particular is proving predominantly 
stabilizing or rather destabilizing to any given economic system. For example Portes (2010) 
concludes: “Banning naked CDS will require common action in the US and in the EU, but the 
political environment is right. We should not lose this opportunity.”At the same time, Duffie (2010) 
argues that “Regulations that severely restrict speculation in credit default swap markets could have 
the unintended consequences of reducing market liquidity, which raises trading execution costs for 
investors who are not speculating, and lowering the quality of information provided by credit 
default swap rates regarding the credit qualities of bond issuers. Regulations that severely restrict 
speculation in credit default swap markets could, as a result, increase sovereign borrowing costs 
somewhat.” 
More obviously sovereign CDS spreads can have a potentially important functional role in the 
process of price discovery. Still, empirical results concerning who leads the price discovery – the 
sovereign CDS market or the government bond market are mixed and imprecise. These divergences 
may be partly related to the different time periods, sampling frequency, methodology and a choice 
of data. What conclusions have the empirical studies revealed: 
                                                                                                                                                 
competent authority suspends restrictions on uncovered credit default swap transactions for the purposes of 
determining the significant uncovered position in a credit default swap relating to a sovereign debt issuer that 
needs to be notified to the competent authority. 
REGULATION (EU) No 236/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL  
of 14 March 2012  on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps 
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A number of papers provide support for the dominance of the government bond market, while 
others claim to have verified the primacy of CDS market. Gyntelberg et. al. (2013) utilising a vector 
error correction model for France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain over the 
period October 2008 to May 2011 and using intraday (30 minutes) price data find  “[t]hat for most 
countries the CDS market leads the bond market in terms of credit risk price discovery. In other 
words, CDS prices tend to move first in response to news, and bond prices tend to adjust towards 
the pricing in the CDS market. Hence, credit spreads in the two markets tend to converge over time 
as suggested by theory. […] [d]eviations do not persist for long. The estimated half lives of a shock 
to the basis range from around half a day to 12 days across the countries […].” Palladini and Portes 
(2011) using data for six EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal) 
covering the time span of 30 January 2004 to 11 March 2011 find that CDS market spreads in 
general lead bond markets; they find that the adjustment towards equilibrium is sluggish. Fontana 
and Scheicher (2010) examine ten euro sovereigns (January 2006 – June 2010) and find that price 
discovery is uniformly divided between CDS and bond markets. O'Kane (2012) presents 
comparable results; by means of Granger-Causality tests on a daily data for six industrialized 
countries covering the period of January 2008 to September 2011; he concludes that for France and 
Italy the bond markets lead the process of price discovery; for Spain and Greece, CDS markets 
Granger cause the bond market changes, whereas for Ireland and Portugal, causality is running both 
ways. The author acknowledges that”[w]hile a negative test would rule out the hypothesis of true 
causality, a positive test tells us that we cannot currently reject such a hypothesis.” 
Aktug et al. (2012) study thirty emerging markets from January 2001 to November 2007 using 
monthly sampling frequency. They point up that bond markets lead CDS markets largely, but not 
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always. Support for the bond markets leading role is also found in Ammer and Cai (2011). They 
analyse nine emerging economies for the period February 2001 to March 2005, finding a long-term 
relationship between CDS and bond markets for the majority of countries. Overall tentatively they 
conclude that the bond market leads the CDS market more often. Giannikos et al. (2013) inspect the 
links of price discovery via, daily CDS spreads; bond spreads and stock prices over the period 
2005-2008 for ten US financial firms. They find that throughout the sample period, CDS and bond 
spreads are evidently cointegrated -- the CDS market dominating in price discovery. Examining 18 
industrial and emerging economies from January 2007 to March 2010, Coudert and Gex (2013) 
conclude that bonds appear to lead for “low-yield countries” (developed) European economies, 
while the derivative market tend to be the direction-finder for “high-yield” emerging economies.  
Thus the evidence on price discovery presented above is, at any rate, adequate to challenge the 
conviction that the relatively small CDS market cannot influence bond spreads in sovereign debt 
markets as its net exposure is just a few per cent of the total government bond stock. Typically the 
proponents’ justification of this view may go like this: “Profitable manipulation through price 
impact is difficult. Putting aside the difficulty of profiting from manipulation, achieving a sizable 
price impact would require CDS manipulators to take positions that are large relative to the amount 
of debt outstanding. In the case of the financially weaker Eurozone sovereigns, Portugal, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy and Greece, the aggregate net CDS positions […] represent small fractions of their 
respective amounts of debt outstanding. With Greece, for example, the aggregate of the net CDS 
positions held in the entire market has remained well under 3% of the total amount of Greek debt 
outstanding. […] That is, even if all CDS protection buyers in the market were manipulators, and 
had conspired to drive up CDS rates, they would have had only a marginal impact on the total 
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amount of sovereign credit risk borne by bond owners and sellers of protection. Supply and demand 
for the sovereign's credit would cross at a new price that is relatively close to the “fair-market” 
(unmanipulated) price (Duffie, 2010).” 
A crisp competent answer – with which we completely concur -- is provided by Portes (2010), “We 
are told [...] that because net CDS exposures are only a few percent of the stock of outstanding 
government bonds, ‘the tail can’t wag the dog’, so the CDS market can’t be responsible for the 
rising spreads on the bonds. This of course contradicts the argument that the CDS market leads in 
price discovery because of its superior liquidity. More important, it is nonsense. Over a period of 
several days in September 1992, George Soros bet around $ 10 billion against sterling, and most 
observers believe that significantly affected the market – and the outcome. But daily foreign 
exchange trading in sterling then before serious speculation began was somewhat over $100 billion. 
The issue is how CDS prices affect market sentiment, whether they serve as a coordinating device 
for speculation.” Furthermore, strong empirical support is provided from Shim and Zhu (2010). The 
authors analyse the time period of January 2003 to June 2009, covering (de facto) seven Asian 
economies (Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore) and using 
data amalgamated at three levels -- bond, company, and country level. Among other things they 
conclude: “[t]hat at the peak of the financial crisis the CDS market contributed to higher spreads in 
the bond market. Given that the CDS market played the role of shock amplifier during the crisis, it 
is important to make sure that policymakers introduce measures to mitigate the negative spillover 
effect from the CDS market to the bond market.” 
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Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) -- Global Risk Aversion Proxy 
VIX, was first initiated by the CBOE in 1993 (data series commencing in January 1986), as a 
weighted measure of the implicit volatility of eight S&P 100 at-the-money options (both put and 
call). In ten years time, it has been extended to exploit options based on the broader index (S&P 
500), offering more precise scrutiny of investors' expectations on future market volatility. Thus VIX 
is a commonly used measure of market risk and is often referred to as the "investor fear gauge". 
VIX values bigger than 30 are normally associated with a large amount of volatility due to 
investor’s fear or insecurity, whereas values under 20 in general correspond to tranquil periods in 
the markets. When VIX reaches excessively high levels, this tends to imply that economic agents 
have bought puts as insurance against a falling market (the explanation is following on 
Investopedia.com, “VIX - CBOE volatility Index”). 
Figure 47: Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) – Global Risk Aversion  
                Proxy, daily 
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We believe that VIX is an appropriate index to use in our analysis as: I) it is widely accepted to 
represent investor’s expectations of future market volatility of S&P 500; ii) it has high frequency, 
long period time-series; and iii) it adequately represents the directions of investors’ sentiments. 
 
The higher is the interest rate on debt, determined to a great extent by the risk premium, the higher 
will be the speed of debt accumulation. Under the conditions of low incomes, a low savings rate and 
underdeveloped capital markets, and particularly when the government borrowing requirements are 
high, the domestic commercial banks might become the single buyer of government debt. Given the 
settings of open movement of capital, the distinction between domestic and external debt becomes 
irrelevant and domestic commercial banks set their interest rates on government debt based on risk 
– rate of return considerations and arbitraging between domestic and foreign assets 
Securities issued by an emerging market’s government compared to other domestic financial assets 
have the property of a relatively low risk and low cost of acquisition asset. However, compared to 
developed countries’ government debt, they are risky assets. The size of the risk premium implicit 
in the required interest rates on developing country’s government debt depends on the credibility of 
the economic policy commitments and the probability of them being implemented. 
The speed of debt accumulation may be assessed as moderate if the risk premium remains stable 
and relatively low. It may be interpreted also in terms of expectations of future fiscal policy – 
expectations that the government may easily adjust the primary balance and it may keep control 
over the debt accumulation process maintain the risk premium at a relatively low and stable level. 
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If investors perceive that the indebted government follows an unsustainable fiscal policy they may 
indicate their concerns by shortening the accepted maturity of government debt and raising the risk 
premium. Debt management operations under the conditions of fast debt growth – measured by the 
proximity to the sustainable level -- will be inefficient and will increase the future costs of debt 
service. The high speed of debt accumulation narrows the scope of debt management operations 
and, essentially, in this case the sustainable debt level will be much lower than the possible level if 
debt accumulated at a moderate speed. 
Only when the government becomes able to inspire confidence in its future commitments might the 
risk premium on debt switch to a decline and the government may then gain from opportunities to 
implement debt management operations. 
 
 
Sovereign Bond Spread Determinants 
 
Sovereign bond spreads, financial markets determinants – spread 
regressions by country 
 
The dataset 
We use daily data obtained directly from Bloomberg and ThompsonReuters. In general the data set 
for each country starts around mid-2006 and ends at mid-2012, comprising about 1600 observation 
per country. Technically the estimation is executed in Microfit 4.1 and EViews 6. 
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The model and methodological issues 
A potential default is often mostly associated with an increase in yield spreads. To examine the 
determinants of sovereign bond spreads we estimate an equation for the sovereign bond spread (as 
dependent variable) determined by a range of exogenous variables.  
Furthermore we assess the long-term determinants and short-run dynamics (error-correction model) 
of the sovereign bond spreads of Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, Serbia, 
and Ukraine – these are the relevant countries for which we have managed to obtain meaningful 
data, both statistically and economically. Likewise, we gain some additional understanding of the 
convergence process. Based on this specification we may be able to illustrate quantitatively the 
impact improved investors’ confidence may have upon financing conditions as depicted by 
government bond spreads. 
 
Sampling frequency – daily 
Estimated equation: 
 eq. 32  ࡿࡿࡱࡹ࡮ࡵ࢚ ൌ ࢻ ൅ ࢼࢂࡵࢄ࢚ ൅ ࢽ࡯ࡰࡿ࢚ ൅ ࢿ࢚	
  where: 
  SSEMBI--Stripped Spread JPM EMBI GLOBAL 
  VIX – Volatility Index (proxy for global risk aversion) 
  CDS – Credit Default Swap (perceived individual country risk) 
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Estimation of the model 
We start with estimating the model on an individual basis -- country by country -- and then we 
move to panel data (cross-sectional-time-series) estimation.  
Our motivation for using a framework allowing for fractionally integrated variables (ARDL) is 
based on various factors, including:  
 The conventional (dichotomous) choice between unit root I(1) and level stationarity I(0) is 
overly restrictive – many economic time series show signs of being neither I(0) nor I(1) 
 Much more general and flexible apparatus than the traditional approach 
 Important for modelling a wide range of macroeconomic relationships 
 The standard practice of taking first differences may still lead to series with a component of 
long memory behaviour 
 
Many researchers are accustomed to think in terms of the stationarity of any time series used in the 
construction of whichever econometric model is being developed. As the assumption of stationarity 
is an important one, non-stationary time series are commonly transformed to stationary ones by 
differencing. This would suggest that a model specified in differences of economic time series 
should be favoured for finding estimates of parameters. But one of the important notions in 
macroeconomics is the concept of the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. 
Theoretically in steady-state equilibrium economic variables remain unchanged, until the system is 
shocked. Therefore, if such an equilibrium relationship is specified in first differences, the steady-
state differences would be zero and there is no solution.  
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Hence, in what follows we apply the (Autoregressive Distributed Lag) ARDL procedure developed 
by Pesaran and Shin (Pesaran and Shin 1995). A detailed, step by step, account of this procedure 
was provided in Chapter II of the thesis. 
Table 27: Sovereign bond yield spreads, financial markets determinants: June 2006 – June   
      2012, daily 
 
  Bulgaria 
eq. 33  SSEMBI = -77.4299 INPT + 0.38379 CDS + 9.9309 VIX - 0.044895 ECM (-1) 
             (-6.2919)          (7.9586)             (13.6259)        (-8.3508) 
  No. obs: 1667 
  Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
   Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 3) =  27.2769[.000]                     
   Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 3) =  27.5043[.000]                     
   F Statistic                                   F(3,1614) =     9.0212[.000] 
  R-bar-squared: 0.2137 
  DW-statistics: 2.0085 
 
 
The results of the F-statistic for the joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional 
variables for Bulgaria reject the null hypothesis in favour of the existence of long-run relationship 
between SSEMBI, CDS and VIX. We estimate eq.32 and get the long-run coefficient; then we 
obtain the estimates of the error correction model associated with these long-run estimates and 
report the outcome as eq.33 above. All the explanatory variables are strongly significant (t-ratios 
shown in parenthesis) and with the expected sign. One point increase in the Bulgaria’s risk 
(approximated by the CDS) would lead to increase of about 0.38 basis points in the dependent 
variable SSEMBI (Bulgaria’s bond’s spread) ceteris paribus. If the global risk aversion (proxied by 
VIX) goes up by one point an increase of about 9.9 basis points in SSEMBI would be induced 
everything else remaining the same. The error correction coefficient of about -0.045 implies just 
less than 15 working days half-life to equilibrium of the Bulgarian bond spread. The coefficient for 
mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom equals 0.2137 suggesting that about 21 per 
cent of variability in the dependent variable is explained. 
 
 
 
  Croatia 
        Non-stationary variables, and the lack of a cointegrating relationship, is not rejected 
  by the joint test for zero restrictions on the coefficients of the lagged level variables 
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  Hungary 
 
eq. 34  SSEMBI = -24.369 INPT + 0.82123 CDS + 3.9391 VIX - 0.0416385 ECM (-1) 
                      (-1.3285)           (18.3975)            (4.8582)          (-6.3525) 
 
  No. obs: 1662 
  Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
   Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 3) = 158.6390[.000]                     
   Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 3) = 166.8028[.000]                     
   F Statistic                                   F(3,1608) =    57.0919[.000]                   
  R-bar-squared: 0.0675 
  DW-statistics: 1.8846 
 
 
The results of the F-statistic for the joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional 
variables for Hungary reject the null hypothesis in favour of the existence of long-run relationship 
between SSEMBI, CDS and VIX. We estimate eq.32 and get the long-run coefficient; then we 
obtain the estimates of the error correction model associated with these long-run estimates and 
report the outcome as eq.34 above. All the explanatory variables are strongly significant (t-ratios 
shown in parenthesis) and with the expected sign. One point increase in the Hungary’s risk 
(approximated by the CDS) would lead to increase of about 0.82 basis points in the dependent 
variable SSEMBI (Hungary’s bond’s spread) ceteris paribus. If the global risk aversion (proxied by 
VIX) goes up by one point an increase of about 3.9 basis points in SSEMBI would be induced 
everything else remaining the same. The error correction coefficient of about -0.042 implies just 
less than 17 working days half-life to equilibrium of the Hungarian bond spread. The coefficient for 
mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom equals 0.0675 suggesting that just less than 
1 per cent of variability in the dependent variable is explained. 
 
 
   Poland 
 
eq. 35  SSEMBI = -35.8277 INPT + 0.007321 CDS + 8.3595 VIX - 0.0151 ECM (-1)  
                    (-1.1903)             (0.3946)            (6.8532)          (-4.9359) 
                       
  No. obs: 1664 
  Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
   Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 3) =  13.5771[.004]                     
  Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 3) =  13.6332[.003]                     
   F Statistic                                   F( 3,1611) =    4.4527[.004]                     
  R-bar-squared: 0.0329 
  DW-statistics: 2.0014 
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The results of the F-statistic for the joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional 
variables for Poland reject the null hypothesis in favour of the existence of long-run relationship 
between SSEMBI, CDS and VIX. We estimate eq.32 and get the long-run coefficient; then we 
obtain the estimates of the error correction model associated with these long-run estimates and 
report the outcome as eq.35 above. The explanatory variable VIX and the ECM term are strongly 
significant (t-ratios shown in parenthesis) and with the expected sign. However, the increase in the 
Polands’s risk effect is too small and not statistically significantly different from zero. If the global 
risk aversion (proxied by VIX) goes up by one point an increase of about 8.4 basis points in 
SSEMBI would be induced everything else remaining the same. The error correction coefficient of 
about -0.015 implies about 45 working days half-life to equilibrium of the Poland bond spread. The 
coefficient for mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom equals 0.0329 suggesting that 
just less than 1 per cent of variability in the dependent variable is explained. 
 
 
 
   Russia 
 
eq. 36  SSEMBI = -3.3664 INPT + 0.6300 CDS + 6.0133 VIX - 0.0417 ECM (-1) 
         (-0.1722)             (8.7187)            (4.6800)          (-6.5702) 
   
  No. obs: 1642 
  Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
   Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 3) =  31.6218[.000]                     
   Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 3) =  31.9328[.000]                     
  F Statistic                                   F(3,1589) =  10.4853[.000]                     
  R-bar-squared: 0.4946 
  DW-statistics: 1.9889 
 
 
The results of the F-statistic for the joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional 
variables for Russia reject the null hypothesis in favour of the existence of long-run relationship 
between SSEMBI, CDS and VIX. We estimate eq.32 and get the long-run coefficient; then we 
obtain the estimates of the error correction model associated with these long-run estimates and 
report the outcome as eq.36 above. All the explanatory variables are strongly significant (t-ratios 
shown in parenthesis) and with the expected sign. One point increase in the Russia’s risk 
(approximated by the CDS) would lead to increase of about 0.63 basis points in the dependent 
variable SSEMBI (Russia’s bond’s spread) ceteris paribus. If the global risk aversion (proxied by 
VIX) goes up by one point an increase of about 6.0 basis points in SSEMBI would be induced 
everything else remaining the same. The error correction coefficient of about -0.042 implies just 
about 17 working days half-life to equilibrium of the Russian bond spread. The coefficient for 
mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom equals 0.4946 suggesting that almost exactly 
50 per cent of variability in the dependent variable is explained. 
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   Ukraine 
 
eq. 37  SSEMBI = 8280.6 INPT + 8.0964 CDS - 604.8879 VIX - 0.0008373 ECM (-1)  
                              (0.15186)           (0.16603)          (-0.15024)          (0.15269) 
 
  No. obs: 1641 
  Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
   Lagrange Multiplier Statistic      CHSQ( 3) =  21.5655[.000]                     
  Likelihood Ratio Statistic         CHSQ( 3) =  21.7096[.000]                     
  F Statistic                        F(  3,1588) =  7.1060[.000]                     
  R-bar-squared: 0.23489 
  DW-statistics: 2.0134 
 
 
 
The results of the F-statistic for the joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional 
variables for Ukraine reject the null hypothesis in favour of the existence of long-run relationship 
between SSEMBI, CDS and VIX. We estimate eq.32 and get the long-run coefficient; then we 
obtain the estimates of the error correction model associated with these long-run estimates and 
report the outcome as eq.37 above. All the explanatory variables turn out to be statistically 
insignificant (t-ratios shown in parenthesis) and VIX is with the “wrong” sign. The error correction 
coefficient of about -0.0008 implies about 866 working days half-life to equilibrium of the Ukraine 
bond spread, but is statistically insignificant. The coefficient for mutual determination corrected for 
degrees of freedom equals 0.2348 suggesting that about 23 per cent of variability in the dependent 
variable is explained. All the explanatory variables being insignificant only in the specific case of 
Ukraine tend to suggest that the bond spread of the country is driven by other forces, possibly 
including low quality of governance, corruption and heavy speculation. 
 
 
    
   Serbia 
 
eq. 38  SSEMBI = -198.8189INPT + 0.47910CDS + 21.0931VIX - 0.020865ECM (-1) 
                   (-3.3529)            (2.7677)            (11.5718)           (-5.8916) 
   
  No. obs: 1592 
  Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
  Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 3) =  50.9643[.000]                     
  Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 3) =  51.8049[.000]                     
  F Statistic                                   F(3,1539) =  17.1100[.000]   
  R-bar-squared: 0.1965 
  DW-statistics: 2.0069 
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The results of the F-statistic for the joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional 
variables for Serbia reject the null hypothesis in favour of the existence of long-run relationship 
between SSEMBI, CDS and VIX. We estimate eq.32 and get the long-run coefficient; then we 
obtain the estimates of the error correction model associated with these long-run estimates and 
report the outcome as eq.38 above. All the explanatory variables are strongly significant (t-ratios 
shown in parenthesis) and with the expected sign. One point increase in the Serbia’s risk 
(approximated by the CDS) would lead to increase of about 0.48 basis points in the dependent 
variable SSEMBI (Hungary’s bond’s spread) ceteris paribus. If the global risk aversion (proxied by 
VIX) goes up by one point an increase of about 21 basis points in SSEMBI would be induced 
everything else remaining the same. The error correction coefficient of about -0.020 implies just 
about 34 working days half-life to equilibrium of the Serbian bond spread. The coefficient for 
mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom equals 0.1965 suggesting that just around 20 
per cent of variability in the dependent variable is explained. 
 
 
 
   Kazakhstan 
 
eq. 39 SSEMBI = -173.21 INPT + 0.3261 CDS + 20.9384 VIX - 0.0417 ECM (-1)   
                  (-2.5738)             (3.3923)            (7.3869)          (-5.1551) 
 
   No. obs: 1292 
   Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
    Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 3) =  18.0163[.000]                     
    Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 3) =  18.1444[.000]                     
    F Statistic                                   F(3,1239) =     5.9007[.001]       
   R-bar-squared: 0.2903 
   DW-statistics: 1.9953  
 
 
The results of the F-statistic for the joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional 
variables for Kazakhstan reject the null hypothesis in favour of the existence of long-run 
relationship between SSEMBI, CDS and VIX. We estimate eq.32 and get the long-run coefficient; 
then we obtain the estimates of the error correction model associated with these long-run estimates 
and report the outcome as eq.39 above. All the explanatory variables are strongly significant (t-
ratios shown in parenthesis) and with the expected sign. One point increase in the Kazakhstan’s risk 
(approximated by the CDS) would lead to increase of about 0.33 basis points in the dependent 
variable SSEMBI (Kazakhstan’s bond’s spread) ceteris paribus. If the global risk aversion (proxied 
by VIX) goes up by one point an increase of about 21 basis points in SSEMBI would be induced 
everything else remaining the same. The error correction coefficient of about -0.042 implies just 
about 16 working days half-life to equilibrium of the Kazakhstan bond spread. The coefficient for 
mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom equals 0.2903 suggesting that about 29 per 
cent of variability in the dependent variable is explained. 
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Sovereign bond spreads, financial markets determinants: cross sectional 
time series estimate – pooled least squares 
The cross-sectional-time-series (CSTS) data contains valuable information about both: i) changes 
between the subjects (cross-sectional information); and, ii) changes within the subjects (time-series 
information). 
Turning to the panel data model (see Table 30, below), first we perform series of unit-root tests, on 
the basis of which, we are not able to reject the presence of unit roots in the data. Next we perform 
panel cointegration tests, all of which reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Hence, given 
that our variables are cointegrated we proceed with estimating both fixed and random effects 
(cointegrated panels) models. To simplify and in general, the fixed effects model assumes that each 
country differs in its intercept term, while the random effects model assumes that each country 
differs in its error term. 
 
Table 28: Unit root tests 
a) Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)   
Series: SSBGN, SSHUN, SSPOL, SSRUS, SSSER, SSUKR   
Date: 01/13/15   Time: 20:12     
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
Automatic selection of maximum lags    
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 6   
Total number of observations: 9533    
Cross-sections included: 6     
Method    Statistic  Prob.**
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   
-
0.23493   0.4071
** Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality  
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b) Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series: SSBGN, SSHUN, SSPOL, SSRUS, SSSER, SSUKR 
Date: 01/13/15   Time: 20:15   
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 6 
Total number of observations: 9533  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Method  Statistic Prob.** 
ADmnjjjF - Fisher Chi-square  9.11905  0.6927 
ADF - Choi Z-stat -0.11368  0.4547 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
     
c) Null Hypothesis: Unit root (common unit root process)   
Series: SSBGN, SSHUN, SSPOL, SSRUS, SSSER, SSUKR   
Date: 01/13/15   Time: 20:14     
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
Automatic selection of maximum lags     
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 6   
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel   
Total number of observations: 9533     
Cross-sections included: 6     
Method   Statistic  Prob.**  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  
 0.2360
1   0.5933  
** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
 
 
d) Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)   
Series: CDSBGN, CDSHUN, CDSPOL, CDSRUS, CDSSER, CDSUKR  
Date: 01/14/15   Time: 18:22     
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
Automatic selection of maximum lags    
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 19   
Total number of observations: 9501    
Cross-sections included: 6     
Method    Statistic  Prob.**
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   
-
2.77327   0.0028
** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
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e) Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series: CDSBGN, CDSHUN, CDSPOL, CDSRUS, CDSSER, CDSUKR 
Date: 01/14/15   Time: 18:26   
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 19 
Total number of observations: 9501  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Method  Statistic Prob.** 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  54.2077  0.0000 
ADF - Choi Z-stat -2.57448  0.0050 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
f) Null Hypothesis: Unit root (common unit root process)   
Series: CDSBGN, CDSHUN, CDSPOL, CDSRUS, CDSSER, CDSUKR  
Date: 01/14/15   Time: 18:24     
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
Automatic selection of maximum lags     
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 19   
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel   
Total number of observations: 9501     
Cross-sections included: 6     
Method   Statistic  Prob.**  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*   0.66475   0.7469  
** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
 
 
g) Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)   
Series: VIXBGN, VIXHUN, VIXPOL, VIXRUS, VIXSER, VIXUKR  
Date: 01/14/15   Time: 18:33     
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
Automatic selection of maximum lags    
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 2   
Total number of observations: 9530    
Cross-sections included: 6     
Method    Statistic  Prob.**
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   
-
4.86102   0.0000
** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
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h) Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process)  
Series: VIXBGN, VIXHUN, VIXPOL, VIXRUS, VIXSER, VIXUKR 
Date: 01/14/15   Time: 18:34   
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 2  
Total number of observations: 9530  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Method  Statistic Prob.** 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  48.1221  0.0000 
ADF - Choi Z-stat -5.12922  0.0000 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
i) Null Hypothesis: Unit root (common unit root process)   
Series: VIXBGN, VIXHUN, VIXPOL, VIXRUS, VIXSER, VIXUKR  
Date: 01/14/15   Time: 18:34     
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012     
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
Automatic selection of maximum lags     
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 2    
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel   
Total number of observations: 9530     
Cross-sections included: 6     
Method   Statistic  Prob.**  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  
-
2.81335   0.0025  
** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
 
 
 
Table 29: Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test   
Series: SS? CDS? VIX?     
Date: 01/13/15   Time: 20:00   
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012   
Included observations: 1592   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration   
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
Lag selection: fixed at 1   
Newey-West bandwidth selection with Bartlett kernel  
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
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  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  28.64915  0.0000  11.19017  0.0000 
Panel rho-Statistic -28.67736  0.0000 -17.61534  0.0000 
Panel PP-Statistic -12.43802  0.0000 -8.880309  0.0000 
Panel ADF-Statistic -9.136756  0.0000 -7.728234  0.0000 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic -26.71138  0.0000   
Group PP-Statistic -13.06744  0.0000   
Group ADF-Statistic -10.82616  0.0000   
      
Cross section specific results   
Phillips-Peron results (non-parametric)  
      
Cross ID AR(1) Variance HAC  Bandwidth Obs
BGN 0.926 251.0947 215.8437 1.00 1591
HUN 0.946 239.8555 269.1306 10.00 1589
POL 0.965 250.6194 167.3063 25.00 1591
RUS 0.920 238.9687 222.7708 11.00 1591
SER 0.961 1121.054 677.9342 7.00 1591
UKR 0.896 3735.864 3511.652 15.00 1591
      
Augmented Dickey-Fuller results (parametric)  
      
Cross ID AR(1) Variance Lag Max lag Obs
BGN 0.937 245.4598 1 -- 1590
HUN 0.946 239.5916 1 -- 1587
POL 0.974 233.7010 1 -- 1590
RUS 0.928 236.6343 1 -- 1590
SER 0.968 1089.322 1 -- 1590
UKR 0.927 3429.777 1 -- 1590
 
 
Table 30: Kao Residual Cointegration Test 
 
Kao Residual Cointegration Test  
Series: SS? CDS? VIX?    
hyDate: 01/13/15   Time: 20:06   
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012   
Included observations: 1592   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
Lag selection: fixed at 1   
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
   t-Statistic Prob. 
ADF   -21.36444  0.0000 
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Residual variance  277.8210  
HAC variance   500.8972  
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(RESID?)   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 01/13/15   Time: 20:06   
Sample (adjusted): 5/08/2006 6/08/2012  
Included observations: 1590 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 9537  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
RESID?(-1) -0.181642 0.007573 -23.98541 0.0000
D(RESID?(-1)) -0.502852 0.008854 -56.79385 0.0000
R-squared 0.389329    Mean dependent var 0.070368
Adjusted R-squared 0.389265    S.D. dependent var 144.8971
S.E. of regression 113.2364    Akaike info criterion 12.29704
Sum squared resid 1.22E+08    Schwarz criterion 12.29854
Log likelihood -58636.45    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.29755
Durbin-Watson stat 2.171898    
 
Hence, we proceed to estimate a fixed effect (FE) model (Table 31, below) 
 
Table 31: Pooled Least Squares Fixed Effects Model, Estimation Results 
 
Dependent Variable: SS?   
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Date: 01/14/15   Time: 13:35   
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012   
Included observations: 1591   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 9546  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -31.91908 4.139766 -7.710360 0.0000
CDS? 0.424554 0.004007 105.9562 0.0000
VIX? 10.13878 0.169247 59.90516 0.0000
Fixed Effects (Cross)     
BGN--C -62.44306    
HUN--C -51.47301    
POL--C -118.8528    
RUS--C -32.03785    
SER--C 99.14332    
UKR--C 165.6634    
 Effects Specification   
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Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.780282    Mean dependent var 342.4605
Adjusted R-squared 0.780121    S.D. dependent var 361.3367
S.E. of regression 169.4354    Akaike info criterion 13.10366
Sum squared resid 2.74E+08    Schwarz criterion 13.10966
Log likelihood -62535.76    Hannan-Quinn criter. 13.10570
F-statistic 4838.884    Durbin-Watson stat 0.731852
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
The fixed effects coefficients differ in sign and size. Consequently, we test for (unobserved) 
heterogeneity. The test applied is the standard (in EViews) Redundant Fixed Effects Tests, where 
the null hypothesis is that the fixed effects are all equal to each other. 
 
Table 32:  Redundant fixed effects test 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Pool: POOL01    
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects Test Statistic  d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 559.253226 (5,9538) 0.0000
Cross-section Chi-square 2454.252098 5 0.0000
 
The p-values related to the F-statistic and the Chi-square statistics are both very small, (see Table 
32, above) providing strong evidence against the null hypothesis and suggesting the existence of 
heterogeneity. 
 
Table 33: Residual Correlation Matrix 
 
 BGN HUN POL RUS SER UKR 
BGN  1.000000  0.616180  0.111101  0.833714  0.378806  0.010543 
HUN  0.616180  1.000000  0.204054  0.742839  0.179843 -0.015597 
POL  0.111101  0.204054  1.000000  0.146597 -0.060416 -0.075385 
RUS  0.833714  0.742839  0.146597  1.000000  0.458929  0.097838 
SER  0.378806  0.179843 -0.060416  0.458929  1.000000  0.761338 
UKR  0.010543 -0.015597 -0.075385  0.097838  0.761338  1.000000 
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The correlation matrix indicates that there certainly is correlation observed among cross-sections. 
Interestingly, Ukraine displays negative correlations with Poland and Hungary, and between Serbia 
and Poland: an “anti-contagion” effect. 
Table 34: Residual Covariance Matrix 
 BGN HUN POL RUS SER UKR 
BGN  2906.718  3412.749  1702.920  2866.242  2700.845  134.8261 
HUN  3412.749  10553.35  5959.585  4866.135  2443.262 -380.0592 
POL  1702.920  5959.585  80826.37  2657.636 -2271.468 -5083.698 
RUS  2866.242  4866.135  2657.636  4066.196  3870.088  1479.853 
SER  2700.845  2443.262 -2271.468  3870.088  17488.88  23882.24 
UKR  134.8261 -380.0592 -5083.698  1479.853  23882.24  56264.30 
 
The diagonal demonstrates the variances of the residuals for each cross-section in bold; the 
remaining numbers of the matrix show the covariance of the residuals across cross-sectional units. 
Based on the results from tables 34 and 35, above, we explore the opportunity to obtain an efficient 
estimator (using EGLS with SUR weights) by utilising the correlations between the residuals. The 
results of the re-estimated model are presented below. 
Table 35: Fixed effects model using estimated generalized least squares (EGLS) with 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) weights 
Dependent Variable: SS?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 01/14/15   Time: 13:46   
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012   
Included observations: 1591   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 9546  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 14.87775 2.999460 4.960143 0.0000 
CDS? 0.417642 0.002665 156.7225 0.0000 
VIX? 8.265180 0.123106 67.13875 0.0000 
Fixed Effects (Cross)     
BGN--C -63.15626    
HUN--C -51.96075    
POL--C -119.9469    
RUS--C -32.85247    
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SER--C 98.86306    
UKR--C 169.0533    
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.844508     Mean dependent var 1.607103 
Adjusted R-squared 0.844394     S.D. dependent var 2.841986 
S.E. of regression 0.983804     Sum squared resid 9231.543 
F-statistic 7400.421     Durbin-Watson stat 0.343481 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.776572     Mean dependent var 342.4605 
Sum squared resid 2.78E+08     Durbin-Watson stat 0.691820 
 
The estimates of CDS and VIX are to some extent smaller, but as the heteroscedasticity EGLS is 
more efficient than OLS estimator the standard error of CDS and VIX are less significant. 
Next we experiment with estimating a random effects (RE) model (Table 36, below) 
Table 36: Random Effects Model, Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: SS?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 01/14/15   Time: 15:25   
Sample: 5/04/2006 6/08/2012   
Included observations: 1591   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 9546  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -31.80419 12.44861 -2.554839 0.0106
CDS? 0.426632 0.003996 106.7746 0.0000
VIX? 10.10665 0.169184 59.73777 0.0000
Random Effects (Cross)     
BGN--C -60.89944    
HUN--C -50.22998    
POL--C -115.9926    
RUS--C -31.11365    
SER--C 97.10691    
UKR--C 161.1287    
 Effects Specification   
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   S.D.  Rho  
Cross-section random 28.75731 0.0280
Idiosyncratic random 169.4354 0.9720
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.702054    Mean dependent var 50.04312
Adjusted R-squared 0.701992    S.D. dependent var 311.4249
S.E. of regression 170.0072    Sum squared resid 2.76E+08
F-statistic 11243.17    Durbin-Watson stat 0.733375
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
While the regression coefficients obtained are practically identical to those of the fixed effects 
model, the random effects model presumes that the random effects are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables – if not the estimators would be rendered inconsistent (endogeneity problem). 
We apply the Hausman test (Correlated Random Effects) to test this hypothesis. 
Table 37: Correlated random effects – Hausman test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Pool: POOL01    
Test cross-section random effects  
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 66.519114 2 0.0000
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
CDS? 0.424554 0.426632 0.000000 0.0000
VIX? 10.138775 10.106654 0.000021 0.0000
 
The test (Table 37, above) rejects the null hypothesis at all conventional levels of confidence. 
Hence, the assumption that the random effects are uncorrelated to the explanatory variables is not 
acceptable, not allowing us to continue further with this approach. 
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Sovereign bond spreads, macroeconomic determinants – spread regressions 
by country 
 
 
In what follows we move to quarterly data frequency and try to assess the effect of the 
macroeconomic variables listed below as determinants of the sovereign bond spreads. We continue 
by applying the ARDL procedure.  
 
 SSEMBI -- Stripped Spread JPM EMBI GLOBAL 
 VIX -- Volatility Index (proxy for global risk aversion) 
 PDGDP -- Government debt as per cent of GDP (Bulgaria, Croatia and Hungary) 
 RGDPG -- Real GDP growth 
 INFL -- Relative change in CPI  
 CHTOT – Change in the Terms of Trade (only for Hungary and Poland) 
 CHOILP – Change in Oil Prices  (only for Russia) 
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Figure 48: Sovereign bond yield spreads, potential macroeconomic determinants: Bulgaria, 
    Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Russia 
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To test the existence of a long-run relationship between variables we estimate the error correction 
depiction of an underlying ARDL for four countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, and Poland) for 
which there are data (to a degree) available over the period 2002Q2 to 2011Q4. 
For Bulgaria and Croatia the ARDL model is: 
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We test the null hypothesis of the non-existence of a long-run relationship, i.e.,  
 ܪ଴:		ߨଵ ൌ ߨଶ ൌ ߨଷ ൌ ߨସ ൌ ߨହ ൌ 0 
versus 
            ܪଵ:	ߨଵ ് 0, 	ߨଶ 	് 0, ߨଷ 	് 0, ߨସ 	് 0, ߨହ 	് 0 
 
 
 Bulgaria 
 
Comparing the F-statistic (2.0662) obtained (below) with the critical value bounds determined by 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996), the critical values at the 90 per cent level are specified as 2.425 to 
3.574. Since the F-statistics is below the lower bound of the critical range, we cannot reject the null 
of no long-run relationship independent of the order of integration of the respective variables. 
 
 No. obs: 39 
 Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
  Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 5) =  17.2694[.004]                     
  Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 5) =  22.8087[.000]                     
 F Statistic                                     F(5,  13) =     2.0662[.135]                     
 R-bar-squared: 0.6154 
 DW-statistic:  1.756                                                                 
 
Still only for illustrative purposes we estimate the long-run coefficients and their levels of 
significance (t-statistics): 
 
eq. 40 SSEMBI = -.19174*INPT + 1.7028*VIX + .15018*PDGDP - .92055*RGDPG +.053177*INFL -.44284*ECM(-1)                
                         (-0.2468)             (2.8587)             (0.8537)                 (-0.7010)                  (1.7650)            (5.7035) 
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Croatia 
Following the same procedure we obtain: 
  
 No. obs: 39 
 Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
  Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 5) =  14.7731[.011]                     
  Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 5) =  18.5678[.002]                     
  F Statistic                                      F(5,  28) =    3.4148[.016]                     
 R-bar-squared: 0.47318 
 DW-statistic:  1.8718 
 
The value of the F-statistic (3.4148) obtained (above) falls within the critical value band (at the 90 
per cent level) specified by 2.425 to 3.574. Hence, the results are inconclusive. 
Again, only for illustrative purposes we estimate the long-run coefficients and their levels of 
significance (t-statistics): 
 
eq. 41 SSEMBI=   -1.4081*INPT + 1.3656*VIX + 2.2858*PDGDP - .3836*RGDPG   +.20194*INFL -.4093*ECM(-1)     
                                   (-0.9671)             (4.8073)          (3.1512)           (-3.8066)            (-2.5435)      (-4.1130) 
    
   
Next we extend slightly the model to include the change in the terms of trade variable (CHTOT), 
below, and apply it for Hungary and Poland 
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ସ
௜ୀଵ
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ߨଶܸܫܺ௧ିଵ
൅ ߨଷܲܦܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߨସܴܩܦܲܩ௧ିଵ ൅ ߨହܫܰܨܮ௧ିଵ ൅ ߨ଺ܥܪܱܶ ௧ܶିଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
 
We test the null hypothesis of the non-existence of a long-run relationship, i.e.,  
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 ܪ଴:	ߨଵ ൌ ߨଶ ൌ ߨଷ ൌ ߨସ ൌ ߨହ ൌ ߨ଺ ൌ 0 
versus 
            ܪଵ:	ߨଵ ് 0, 	ߨଶ 	് 0, ߨଷ 	് 0, ߨସ 	് 0, ߨହ 	് 0, ߨ଺ 	് 0 
 
 
 Hungary: 
 
 No. obs: 39 
 Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
  Lagrange Multiplier Statistic      CHSQ( 6) =   33.4248[.000]                     
  Likelihood Ratio Statistic         CHSQ( 6) = 108.5336[.000]                     
 F Statistic                         F( 6,   4) =   14.1462[.011]                     
 R-bar-squared: 0.3526 
 DW-statistic: 2.2134 
 
We compare the F-statistic (14.1462) with the critical value bounds determined by Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith (1996). The critical values at the 99 per cent level are specified by 3.516 to 4.781. Since 
the F-statistics is above the upper bound of the critical value, we reject the null of no long-run 
relationship unconnected of the order of integration of the respective variables. 
Then based on the Schwartz Bayesian information criteria (SBC) we select the ARDL(1,0,1,0,0,0) 
model specification and estimate the long-run coefficients; subsequently we estimate the error 
correction model related to these long-run coefficients and we get: 
 
eq. 42 SSEMBI = -3.4149*INPT + .93477*VIX + 1.7531*PDGDP - 3.1682*RGDPG + 2.2919*INFL - 24.6521*CHTOT - .59845*ECM(- 1)               
                         (-2.1494)           (2.8587)          (4.7103)                   (-0.6100)          (-0.4263)             (-2.5381)                   (-4.2383)  
                          
Not including RGDPG and INFL all other coefficients are statistically significant and with the 
expected sign. It is interesting to observe that for Hungary the CHTOT is exercising the most 
substantial effect on SSEMBI, i.e., one unit increase in the terms of trade would lead to an almost 
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25 basis points reduction in the spread (SSEMBI). The error correction coefficient is strongly 
significant, has the correct sign and implies a half-life to convergence of about 50 working days. 
 Poland 
The value of the F-statistic (3.6998) attained (below) is just above the higher critical value bound 
(at the 90 per cent level) specified by 2.425 to 3.574. Hence, at this level, we can reject the null 
hypothesis of no long run relationship. 
 No. obs: 39 
 Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
 Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 5) =  17.0314[.004]                     
 Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 5) =  25.6654[.000]                     
 F Statistic                                      F(5,  13) =   3.6998[.027]                                                                    
 R-bar-squared: 0.67176 
 DW-statistic: 2.2495 
 
Next, on the basis of the SBC we select the ARDL(1,2,1,1,0) model specification, then estimate the 
long-run coefficients and the error-correction model related to them. 
 
eq. 43 SSEMBI=  -1.9125*INPT + .96280*VIX  -  7.0988*RGDPG  +.17453*INFL  + 1.1700*CHTOT -.7010*ECM(-1) 
                                  (3.1198)             (5.4058)          (-2.5313)              (2.6459)            (0.8464)              (4.4196) 
                                   
With the exception of CHTOT all coefficients are statistically significant and with the expected 
sign. We observe that for Poland the RGDPG is having the most important effect on SSEMBI, i.e., 
one unit increase in the terms of trade would lead to about seven basis points reduction in the spread 
(SSEMBI). The error correction coefficient is strongly significant, has the correct sign and implies a 
half-life to convergence of about 38 working days. 
 
  
212 
 
Finally, we amend somewhat the model to include the change in oil prices variable (CHOILP), and 
remove the PDGDP (public debt as per cent of GDP – for which we do not have data) below, and 
apply it for Russia 
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൅ ߨଷܲܦܩܦ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߨସܴܩܦܲܩ௧ିଵ ൅ ߨହܫܰܨܮ௧ିଵ ൅ ߨ଺ܥܪܱܫܮ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߝ௧ 
 
We test the null hypothesis of the non-existence of a long-run relationship, i.e.,  
 ܪ଴:	ߨଵ ൌ ߨଶ ൌ ߨଷ ൌ ߨସ ൌ ߨହ ൌ ߨ଺ ൌ 0 
versus 
            ܪଵ:	ߨଵ ് 0, 	ߨଶ 	് 0, ߨଷ 	് 0, ߨସ 	് 0, ߨହ 	് 0, ߨ଺ 	് 0 
 
 Russia 
The value of the F-statistic (3.8821) attained (below) is above the upper critical value bound (at the 
90 per cent level) specified by 2.425 to 3.574. Hence, at this level, we can reject the null hypothesis 
of no long run relationship. 
 No. obs: 41 
 Joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of additional variables:   
  Lagrange Multiplier Statistic     CHSQ( 5) =  17.9200[.003]                     
  Likelihood Ratio Statistic          CHSQ( 5) =  23.5588[.000]                     
  F Statistic                                      F(5, 25) =   3.8821[.010]                                                                    
  R-bar-squared: 0.62109 
  DW-statistic: 2.0471 
 
Next, on the basis of the SBC we select the ARDL(1,1,0,0,0) model specification, then estimate the 
long-run coefficients and the error-correction model related to them. 
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eq. 44      SSEMBI = -2.7018*INPT + 2.5998*VIX + .090291*RGDPG -.016650*INFL + 0.00552*CHOILP -.19191*ECM(-1)     
                                               (0.98488)             (2.7383)              (1.4145)                    (-0.27910)              (0.8464)                    (2.0286) 
                                       
With the exception of VIX all coefficients are not statistically significant and with the “wrong” 
sign. Interestingly, one of these coefficnts is CHOILP. The error correction coefficient is significant 
and has the correct sign. However, it implies quite a long half-life to convergence of about 215 
working days. 
 
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
First we analyse the financial markets (variables) explanatory power (using proxies for change in 
market sentiment (VIX) and for adjustment in country’s risk (CDS)) over the emerging market bond 
index spread on a country by country basis. 
Using the F-statistic test for joint significance of zero restrictions on the lagged levels of the 
additional variables (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1996) we cannot reject at conventional significance 
levels the null hypothesis that sovereign bond spreads are cointegrated with the VIX and the 
country specific CDS46.  
                                            
46 With the single exception of Croatia. 
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On examination most of the explanatory variables are strongly significant (t-ratios in parenthesis) 
and have the expected signs. The underlying ARDL equations also pass the diagnostic tests in the 
majority of cases.  
Studying the range of the estimated values we observe that a one point increase in the country’s risk 
(as measured by the CDS) would induce an increase in the region of about half a basis point 
(ranging from about 0.33 to 0.82) in the dependent variable SSEMBI (bond’s spread), everything 
else remaining the same. If VIX (the proxy for global risk aversion) goes up by one point, this will 
induce on average about an 11 basis points increase (displaying values from about 3.9 to just above 
21) in the country’s spread.  
The error correction coefficient estimates are within the cluster of –0.015 to -0.044 suggesting a 
reasonable speed of convergence to equilibrium, with a half-life reporting from fewer than 15 
working days to about 45 working days. Hence, in just about two-thirds of a quarter the spread 
(SSEMBI) should return to its equilibrium. Interestingly, the error correction coefficients and hence 
the speed of convergence for most of the countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Russia, and Kazakhstan) is 
almost one and the same (in the vicinity of –0.042 to -0.044). Therefore it is evident that 
hypothetically they would converge back to their respective equilibrium values for the SSEMBI 
more than three times as fast as Serbia and Poland. 
The coefficients for mutual determination corrected for degrees of freedom are generally in-
between 0.2 to 0.5 suggesting that about 20 to 50 per cent of the variability in the dependent 
variable (SSEMBI) has been explained. The exceptions are Hungary and Poland, where just about 
five per cent (on average) of the variability of the respective dependent variable is explained. 
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Furthermore, for Serbia the tests (for joint significance) suggest that the variables CDS and VIX can 
be treated as the long-run forcing variables for the dependent variable SSEMBI. Interestingly while 
this is valid for Serbia, for Poland, Russia and Ukraine our results suggest a bidirectional 
relationship between CDS (as potential dependent variable) and SSEMBI and VIX, and non-
rejection of the null hypothesis that the lagged level variables CDS and SSEMBI do not enter 
significantly in the potential determination (potential equation) of VIX.  In the case of Kazakhstan 
the null hypothesis that the lagged values of SSEMBI and VIX do not enter significantly in the 
determination of CDS cannot be rejected, but there is an apparent relationship between VIX and 
CDS and SSEMBI. Regarding Bulgaria and Hungary we observe complete bidirectional 
interrelations among all three variables. 
In our analysis we estimate separate equations / data generation processes for the various (former 
centrally planned) economies and find statistically significant and economically perceivable 
coefficients. The data shortage precluded any potential experimentation with different specifications 
or another dataset. Hence, if the coefficients tend to be homogenous, pooled panel estimation would 
be suitable to use. 
For this reason we estimate cointegrated pooled panel models. The results from the fixed effects and 
random effects pooled panel data models are practically identical and are consistent with our 
previous findings from the individual equation estimates. Concretely, a one point increase in CDS 
(proxy for country risk) would add about 0.42 basis points to the variable SSEMBI, ceteris paribus; 
whereas a one unit increase of VIX (stand-in for global risk aversion) would bring about an 8.3 
basis points increase in SSEMBI. The coefficient of mutual determination corrected for degrees of 
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freedom is very high, suggesting that about 84 per cent of the variability of the dependent variable 
(sovereign bond spreads) is explained. 
Next we examine the effect of a change in macroeconomic fundamentals on changes of spreads. A 
relatively noteworthy proportion of fluctuations in transition economies market spreads may be 
attributed to be driven by country-specific fundamentals. The results imply that improved 
macroeconomic fundamentals, such as lower ratios of debt to GDP, higher rates of real GDP 
growth, and low inflation help in reducing sovereign spreads.  
For example, reduced indebtedness seems to contribute positively to sovereign spreads in Hungary; 
one may expect the same to be valid for Poland, but in the case of Poland, the model did not include 
any measure of indebtedness due to the lack of a time series from (at least) 2001Q1. 
It is interesting that in the cases of Bulgaria and Russia we find four insignificant independent 
variables, whereas these are significant for some of the other countries. This seems to be a possible 
indication of institutional weakness, limiting the effect of the stance of the macroeconomic 
aggregates and making their impact trivial. This result is in agreement with Hallerberg and Wolff 
(2006). 
Still, macroeconomic aggregates play a certain role in determining bond spreads, but mostly 
through the channel of global risk aversion / appetite corroborating Favero and Missale (2011) for 
our specific set of (CEE and CCA) countries. Hence, it is rather expected that, the only variable 
which appears in both financial market reaction and macroeconomic fundamentals equations and 
works strongly and consistently in the same direction is VIX. This may suggest that the levels of 
spreads may be subject to significant alteration from the impact of financial market volatility (as 
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measured by VIX) and could potentially be pushed up or down in ways that have little to do with 
their respective macroeconomic fundamentals. 
The error correction coefficients suggest a return to equilibrium (with half-life) in the range of 
about 38 to 50 working days47 – a very similar order of magnitude to that derived in the financial 
market high frequency data sample equations.  
Understanding all the critical factors that have a significant influence on the variation in spreads is 
of the upmost importance. If in reality worldwide factors are principally responsible for the time-
series alteration, then any kind of government intervention to bring down spreads may prove 
ineffective, unless strongly determined and unfalteringly pre-coordinated. On the other hand, if the 
drivers of market spread fluctuations are country specific then such issues should be taken into 
account in monitoring macroeconomic developments and trying to assess investors’ perception of 
country specific risks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
47 With the exception of Russia where the half-life is about 215 working days 
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Chapter	IV:	Qualifications	and	Conclusions	
Data availability and data integrity  
Using data from transition economies necessitate careful discussion of its quality and consistency. 
These data may sometimes be characterised from pointless, through distorted, to completely 
inaccurate. Statistical and book-keeping standards under the socialist economic system have been 
very different from those commonly accepted in Western Europe. It has taken time to learn and 
understand it and to switch to the accepted international statistical standards.  
Much of the necessary fundamental data are still to be composed and / or disclosed and made easily 
available to the public. We hope to provide an impetus to serious data collection and complete 
disclosure for all transition economies for enabling deep economic analysis and informing 
consistent policy-making (all data files compiled by us will be made available at the eThesis 
Repository). The situation on the statistical front is made even more complex by the supranational 
economic institutions (e.g., IMF and WB) practice not to distribute all the data they have (see 
Annex 2) and to avoid publishing the data they hand out in high frequencies48 (quarterly and 
monthly). Moreover, the data published in the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) formats may and do differ, with access to the full database available 
only to internal IMF staff. 
Tables 38 to 40 including (below) illustrate the data availability for the group of countries we 
examine. 
 
                                            
48 The data frequency used may have potentially significant effects on empirical results. Of course there are pros and 
cons – if low frequency data is used it may not be able to grasp the dynamic changes/variability in the data generation 
process, whereas if daily or weekly data is analysed, it may lead to an incorrect association of bond spreads and CDS 
observations, particularly at a time when market activity is low and trades take place infrequently. 
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Table 38: Macroeconomic aggregates, Quarterly – Data Availability 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF eLibrary (accessed December 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Gross 
Domestic 
Product, 
Nominal, 
National 
currency, 
millions
Gross 
Domestic 
Product, 
Deflator, Index, 
2010=100
Consumer 
Prices, All 
items, Index, 
2010=100
Consumer 
Prices, All 
items; Percent 
Change over 
Corresponding 
Period of 
Previous Year
General Govt. 
Public Sector 
Debt (PSDGG)
Cash 
surplus/deficit, 
Cash (Budg. 
Cen. Govt.) 
National 
Currency 
Millions
Saving, Gross, 
Nominal, 
National 
Currency, 
millions
Import Prices, 
All 
Commodities, 
Index 2010=100
Export Prices, 
All 
Commodities, 
Index 2010=100
National 
Currency per 
U.S. Dollar, 
period average
Gross capital 
outflows 
(portfolio 
investment 
assets+ direct 
investment 
assets+ other 
investment 
assets)
Official 
reserves
1 Albania 2009Q1-13Q3 -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- 2009Q3-14Q2 -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
2 Armenia 2000Q1-14Q2 -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-08Q4 -- --
3 Azerbaijan 2001Q1-13Q4 -- -- 2000Q1-14Q2 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
4 Belarus 2000Q1-14Q1 -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
5 BiH -- -- 2006Q1-13Q4 -- -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
6 Bulgaria 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-13Q4 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2008Q1-14Q1 -- 2000Q1-13Q4 -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
7 Croatia 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 -- 2000Q4-14Q2 -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
8 Czech Republic 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q1 -- 2000Q1-14Q2 -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
9 Estonia 2000Q1-14Q1 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q1 -- 2000Q1-14Q1 -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
10 Georgia 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2009Q3-14Q2 -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
11 Hungary 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q1 -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
12 Kazakhstan 2000Q1-13Q3 -- 2000Q1-14Q1 2000Q1-14Q1 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
13 Kyrgyz Republic 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
14 Latvia 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 -- 2000Q1-14Q2 -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
15 Lithuania 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2005Q1-14Q2 -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
16 Macedonia 2003Q1-13Q4 2004Q1-13Q4 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
17 Moldova 2000Q1-13Q4 -- 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2009Q3-14Q2 -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
18 Montenegro -- -- 2005Q1-14Q1 2006Q1-14Q1 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
19 Poland 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2009Q4-14Q1 -- -- 2000Q1-09Q4 2000Q1-09Q4 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
20 Romania 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-13Q4 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2009Q2-14Q2 -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
21 Russian Federation 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2005Q2-08Q4 -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
22 Serbia 2001Q1-14Q1 2001Q1-14Q1 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
23 Slovakia 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 2006Q4-14Q2 -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
24 Slovenia 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q2 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 -- -- 2000Q1-14Q1 -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
25 Tajikistan -- -- 2000Q2-13Q4 2001Q1-13Q4 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
26 Turkmenistan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
27 Ukraine 2000Q1-14Q2 2001Q1-14Q1 2000Q1-14Q3 2000Q1-14Q3 -- -- -- -- -- 2000Q1-14Q3 -- --
28 Uzbekistan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Table 39: JPM EMBI Global Stripped Spread49, Daily -- Data Availability 
 
Source: DataStream (accessed November 2012) 
Table 40: Credit Default Swaps (CDS USD 5Y), Daily – Data Availability  
  From to obs 
1 Bulgaria 17/10/2005 19/11/2012 1405
2 Poland 25/01/2006 19/11/2012 1339
3 Croatia 02/12/2005 19/11/2012 1374
4 Russia 24/02/2006 19/11/2012 1576
5 Hungary 21/10/2005 19/11/2012 1324
6 Ukraine 27/02/2006 19/11/2012 1508
7 Serbia 04/05/2006 19/11/2012 1065
8 Kazakhstan 03/04/2007 10/10/2012 1243
Source: Bloomberg (accessed November 2012) 
                                            
49 Note: Time until maturity -- Of the issues with at least a current face amount outstanding of US$500 million, only 
those instruments with at least 2½ years until maturity are considered for inclusion. Once added, an instrument may 
remain in the EMBI Global until 12 months before it matures. On the month-end preceding this anniversary, the 
instrument is removed from the EMBI Global (JP Morgan Securities Inc, Introducing the JP Morgan Emerging Markets 
Global (EMBI Global), 1999, New York). 
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While we have only been able to use data at the intersection of the table 38 and table 39 for daily 
frequencies empirical analysis and no more than the data, which overlap in tables 38, 39, and 40 
(for quarterly data estimates), we have been careful not to push our analysis beyond what both 
available and reliable data-series would possibly support.
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Conclusions 
We aim to clarify and possibly resolve some of the controversies related to economic policies in 
transition and to try to envisage the potential future tendencies.  
First: has the transition ended? It is debatable, and an agreement on the appraisal of the results of 
transition is impractical as there are expectations, attitudes and beliefs involved. A number of 
verdicts are on record on this issue and their definitions differ considerably: Kornai, (1999) 
concludes that this would be a position where the communist parties are not in power, and most of 
the GDP is produced by the private sector coordinated by the market. According to this description 
the transition is over (and has been so for the last twenty years); Gelb, (1999) sees the end of 
transition as a state when the problems and the policy issues confronted by today’s transition 
countries resemble those faced by other countries at similar levels of development. From this 
starting point it is also arguable that the transition is over; and Svejnar, (2001) states: “I would 
define the end of transition as a state when these economies replace central planning by a 
functioning market system and when they generate rapid and sustainable rates of economic growth 
that enable them to interact with the more advanced market economies without major forms of 
protection.” 
What would be the appropriate criteria? Obvious cases to look at for constructive suggestions would 
be Japan, South Korea and China. In their cases it seemed to be self-evident: supreme economic 
success guided by the respective government (developmental state). Considering transition (former 
centrally planned) economies; whatever their pros and cons; neither of them matches the 
remarkable economic growth achieved by the previous group. Why might that be? The answer is 
closely linked to the quality of governance, human capital development and corruption, and as a 
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result the level of development of the social knowledge and its practical implementation, i.e., this 
generally is manifested by the stage of development of manufacturing50.  
Transition would then end when the former centrally planned economies find their place in the 
global production process and become equal partners with the industrialised world economies -- to 
become integrated into the international economic framework rather than to be subordinated to it. 
This would depend on their abilities in developing and exploiting knowledge in the contemporary 
exceptionally competitive world economy. Contemporary economic development is related to the 
historical features of people’s ancestors, together with their past knowledge and experience. 
If Government maintains strong incentives to provide public goods and retains motivation for 
wealth creation through the efficient use of capital and labour, as an outcome, the economy would 
remain connected to its comparative advantage, which (for a low-rent country) lies initially in 
labour-intensive manufactured goods. The brief initial dependence on primary product exports (of 
low-rent economies) encourages industrialization at a relatively low per capita income, which is 
therefore labour-intensive and competitive and triggers a beneficial economic advancement. 
Moreover, competitive diversification increases the capacity of the economy to cope with economic 
shocks and reinforces the resilience that arises from sustained high rates of investment. 
Furthermore, “Modern economic growth is a process of continuous technological innovation, 
industrial upgrading and economic diversification. No country in the world has been able to move 
from low- to middle- and high-income status without undergoing the process of industrialization. 
                                            
50 “Does Manufacturing Still Matter? Manufacturing’s share of global value added has declined steadily over the past 
nearly 30 years as the global value added of services has grown. In 1985, manufacturing’s share of global value added 
was 35%. By 2008, it had declined to 27%. Services grew from 59% to 70% over the same period. This trend has 
largely been driven by developed country economies with typically higher wages. According to a recent United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) report, this can be explained by the decrease in relative prices of 
consumption goods, in conjunction with the simultaneous growth of the demand for services. 
An added explanation is the often-cited multiplier effect of manufacturing on services jobs. The US Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis indicates that manufacturing has a higher multiplier effect on the US 
economy than any other sector with US$ 1.40 in additional value added in other sectors for every US$ 1.00 in 
manufacturing value added. If manufacturing is having a multiplier effect on services while simultaneously reducing the 
prices of manufactured goods, services should indeed be growing more rapidly, assuming manufacturing is also 
growing (World Economic Forum Report, 2012)” 
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Structural transformation is always taking place because of changes in technology, in comparative 
advantage, and in the global economy. There is a need for some guiding principles on how “best” 
any society should move its human, capital and financial resources from low- to high-productivity 
sectors. For the process to be efficient, coordination issues and externality issues must be addressed. 
Markets typically do not manage such structural transformations on their own well (Stigltz, Lin and 
Monga, 2013).” Government can enhance the economic performance of firms through direct 
involvement in corporate governance51.  
Second: What do break-ups do to countries? Through our empirical analysis of the economic costs 
and benefits of secession in CEE and CCA countries we endeavour to provide an answer to this 
interesting and important (to economics and beyond) question. We focus our analysis on the Former 
Yugoslavia, and the Former Soviet Union (and their ex-republics and the respective successors’ 
independent states), plus Czechoslovakia. As controls we employ Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and 
Romania. In our estimate the breakup countries experienced deeper and generally shorter economic 
crises (transition period) in comparison with the control countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania). However, they have tended to grow afterwards predominantly faster and have managed 
to add, on average, a similar or higher amount (in 1990 international GK USD per capita) than the 
control countries. Furthermore, the evidence shows that when rich countries leave the former union 
they grow and develop much faster, e.g., Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
Third: What is the prospect for economic convergence; do we observe economic convergence? If 
sigma shows divergence and beta is too slow can we help to reverse the former and speed up the 
latter? 
                                            
51 “Recent years have seen resurgence in the development of industrial policies by governments in the UK and 
overseas. In the UK, industrial policies have been developed in 11 sectors, led in most cases by groups from the public 
and private sectors, with many of these encompassing manufacturing industries. [...] In summary, manufacturing is too 
important to leave to its own devices (Sir Richard Lapthorne, Foresight, 2013).” 
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Our study provided evidence to the effect that: i) poorer CEE and CCA countries are growing faster 
than the relatively richer ones; hence there is absolute convergence; ii) when control variables are 
included into our model larger (negative) coefficients are displayed, supporting the phenomenon of 
conditional convergence.; iii) we estimate the speed of unconditional convergence to the (club’s) 
steady state to be in-between 1.6 to 3.4 per cent, whereas the speed of conditional convergence 
stays in the range of 2.9 to 5.1 per cent; iv) there is no evidence of sigma ( ) convergence, in fact 
there is a significant increase in the dispersion of the levels of income across the economies under 
consideration; v) high recourse abundance (within the setting of this club of countries) is associated 
with high economic growth; vi) high resource abundance within a broader background (including 
the CEE and CCA, plus OECD countries) is associated with an overall negative impact  on 
economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995), however a net negative effect obtains only in countries 
with poor institutional settings (Mehlum et al, 2006); vii) location matters for growth – the nearer a 
country happened to be to Berlin or Stockholm (whichever nearer) the higher the rate of economic 
growth; viii) high quality of governance has a strong positive effect on economic growth, and ix) 
the higher the educational attainment (proxy for quality of human capital), the higher the real GDP 
growth. 
We explore for a first time the issue of convergence in such a complete (28 former centrally 
planned economies) setting and report that these countries are expected to reach half the distance to 
their (unconditional) non-growth steady state in around 50 years, though this may not guarantee 
catch-up with the industrialised countries. The most promising (time-variant) factors would seem to 
be the quality of governance and educational attainment (quality of human capital). The effect from 
enhancing any of these variables would lead to stronger growth and apparently faster convergence 
to the steady state.  
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Fourth: Quality of governance and resource “curse” or “blessing” 
Why might (transition) countries suffer from the “resource curse”. We identify four different 
channels or transmission mechanisms (with various combinations and variations) which endeavour 
to account for the inverse statistical relationship between resource abundance and economic growth: 
i) Decline in terms of trade; ii) Volatility of revenues; iii) Quality of Governance; and, iv) Dutch 
disease.  We provide recommendations for counteractive policy measures in alleviating / preventing 
the resource “curse”, taking into account the concern of political feasibility and avoiding 
mechanistic approaches to the “resource curse” issues, focusing attention on understanding the 
subtleties and specificities related to the variety of resource abundant countries and the connected 
policy lessons. 
This is suggestive of an interesting conclusion: some form of the resource “curse” is expected to be 
observed in any country that extracts natural resource rent. However, a substantial net negative 
effect would obtain with certainty only in (underdeveloped) countries with poor institutional 
structures. As a corollary, we suggest reconciliation between the seminal works of both Mehlum et 
al. (2006) and Sachs and Warner (1995).  While their works cover different sets of countries and 
different time periods, the nexus is unchanged. 
Fifth: Salter-Swan model: 
We note that the “resource movement effect” as a feature of the Dutch disease is highly relevant for 
the transition economies in general and those which are resource-abundant in particular. For the 
process of transition has effectively destroyed the old productive base and a new and private 
tradable sector is still in the process of establishment. 
The model provides a framework for undertaking analysis of the major factors causing structural 
imbalances and the appropriate application of macro-economic policies in mitigating the dynamics 
of macro-economic disequilibrium. Despite the conclusions which the model provides, critical 
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analysis and judgement need to be applied -- as always -- before using it for policy formulation. The 
factors that should be considered cautiously include: i) prices of tradables and non-tradables may 
not behave as assumed in the model due to economies of scale in export and import, trade barriers, 
effects of coincident correction of prices and / or quantities by a group of countries, and imperfect 
market information; ii) outputs of different economic sectors are neither completely tradable, nor 
entirely  non-tradable, they just have different degrees of tradability; iii) levels of tradability varies 
over time, on the basis of the degree of price differences; iv) imported goods have a quantity of 
local value-added ingredient in their final consumer price, and non-tradable goods have some 
imported components; v) market monopolies in export and import sectors involve particular price 
formation; to remain competitive an importer may accept a reduction in his monopoly margin and 
increase the price less than expectations just based on the level of currency appreciation. Then 
again, an exporter may retain a share of the extra profit incurring from currency devaluation and not 
pass it on; vi) the setting of the model is comparative static, and does not allow for dynamic 
adjustment mechanisms or phenomena, such as the alteration of capital and price; and, vii) the 
analysis is partial equilibrium in another sense: the size of the country is stated to be small, but 
international repercussions may follow. 
Sixth: Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis: After careful theoretical analysis we investigate empirically 
the B-S effect for Azerbaijan, confirming its validity: i) poorer countries have lower price levels; 
and, ii) an improvement in productivity in the tradable sector (relative to foreign country) 
appreciates the exchange rate. 
The long-run regression coefficient relating the productivity and the real exchange rate is large 
(between 0.74 and 0.82 depending on the model selection criteria used) and is strongly significant. 
Still, the error correction coefficient suggests that the economy's half-life return to equilibrium 
would take around 3.4 years. This is to say that around 18% of the gap between the long-run values 
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of the variables is closed every year. Consequently, it would take a long time for the equation to 
return to its equilibrium once it has been shocked.  
As Azerbaijan economic growth (and, it appears, productivity) is largely driven by the value of oil 
exports our results are a clear sign of Dutch Disease52 -- huge oil revenues cause swift real 
exchange rate appreciation, leaving the non-oil tradable sector (including manufacturing) unable to 
compete, consequently its output (as a share of GDP) declines and the country is de facto on the 
path to deindustrialisation. 
Here, we advance the following viewpoints: i) the literature on the “resource curse” provides 
substantial evidence that natural resource abundance is associated with a range of negative 
development outcomes, though this evidence is not conclusive; ii) current explanations of the 
“resource curse” do not sufficiently account for the role of the internal socio-economic forces and 
the external political and economic background; iii) recommendations for counteractive policy 
measures in alleviating / preventing the resource curse have not taken genuinely into account the 
issue of political feasibility; and, iv) academics have been too mechanistic in their approaches to the 
“resource curse” issues, while the attention needs to be centred on understanding the subtleties and 
specificities related to the variety of resource abundant countries and the connected policy lessons. 
Seventh: What factors narrow or widen the sovereign bond spreads? 
Macroeconomic aggregates play a certain role in determining bond spreads, but mostly through the 
channel of global risk aversion / appetite, corroborating Favero and Missale (2011) for our specific  
set of (CEE and CCA) countries. The most important variable which appears in both financial 
market reaction and macroeconomic fundamentals equations and works strongly and consistently in 
the same direction is VIX. This may suggest that the levels of spreads may be subject to significant 
alteration by the impact from financial market volatility (as measured by VIX) and could potentially 
                                            
52 IMF Country Report No. 14/159, Republic of Azerbaijan, June 2014 
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be pushed up or down by amounts having little to do with their respective macroeconomic 
fundamentals. 
Understanding all the critical factors that have a significant influence on the variation in spreads is 
of the upmost importance. If in reality worldwide factors are principally responsible for the time-
series alteration, then any kind of government intervention to bring down spreads may prove 
ineffective, unless strongly determined and unfalteringly pre-coordinated. On the other hand, if the 
drivers of market spread fluctuations are country specific then such issues should be taken into 
account in monitoring macroeconomic developments and trying to assess investors’ perception of 
country specific risks. 
Eight: We use extensively the Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) procedure developed by 
Pesaran and Shin (1995). Our motivation for using this framework allowing for fractionally 
integrated variables (ARDL) is based on various factors, including: i)the conventional 
(dichotomous) choice between unit root I(1) and level stationarity I(0) is overly restrictive – many 
economic time series show signs of being neither I(0) nor I(1); ii) it is a much more general and 
flexible apparatus than the traditional approach; iii) important for modelling a wide range of 
macroeconomic relationships; iv) the standard practice of taking first differences may still lead to 
series with a component of long memory behaviour. Many researchers are accustomed to think in 
terms of stationarity of any time series used in the construction of whichever econometric model. 
As the assumption of stationarity is an important one, non-stationary time series are commonly 
transformed to stationarity by differencing. This would suggest that a model specified in differences 
of economic time series should be favoured for finding estimates of parameters. But one of the 
important notions in macroeconomics is the concept of the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship. Theoretically in steady-state equilibrium economic variables remain unchanged, until 
the system is shocked. Therefore, if such an equilibrium relationship is specified in first differences, 
the steady-state differences would be zero and there is no solution.  
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Conceivably the most-important value added of this thesis is that all features of our analysis are 
mutually reinforcing, helping to clarify each other and taken together are able to establish the 
complexity of the transition process in a manner broadly consistent with the facts. This provides a 
reliable framework for analysis and policy intervention. 
Potential major future research areas would include: dynamic interaction of local and international 
developments; absorbing capacity of transition economies; markets in transition economies; and, 
the value of manufacturing for transition economies. Hopefully, the international financial 
institutions would facilitate these promising research areas by taking a more benevolent stance 
towards the way they distribute their internal datasets. 
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Annex	1	
 
Table 41: Price Level and Inflation Estimation Equation of Azerbaijan – ADF Unit Root Test 
 
Null Hypothesis: LOG(CPI_AZ) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=3) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  3.123748  0.9999 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.297073  
 5% level  -3.212696  
 10% level  -2.747676  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 10 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(CPI_AZ))  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/26/10   Time: 16:57   
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2008   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
LOG(CPI_AZ(-1)) 0.738173 0.236310 3.123748 0.0261
D(LOG(CPI_AZ(-1))) -0.435879 0.439019 -0.992848 0.3664
D(LOG(CPI_AZ(-2))) -0.191616 0.372258 -0.514740 0.6287
D(LOG(CPI_AZ(-3))) -0.652118 0.212931 -3.062579 0.0280
C -3.493249 1.127837 -3.097299 0.0269
R-squared 0.884884    Mean dependent var 0.057249
Adjusted R-squared 0.792792    S.D. dependent var 0.078581
S.E. of regression 0.035770    Akaike info criterion -3.516542
Sum squared resid 0.006398    Schwarz criterion -3.365250
Log likelihood 22.58271    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.682510
F-statistic 9.608630    Durbin-Watson stat 1.948433
Prob(F-statistic) 0.014442    
Null Hypothesis: LOG(M2_GDP_AZ_K) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=3) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  1.009813  0.9935 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.057910  
 5% level  -3.119910  
 10% level  -2.701103  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 13 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LOG(M2_GDP_AZ_K))  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/26/10   Time: 16:18   
Sample (adjusted): 1996 2008   
Included observations: 13 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
LOG(M2_GDP_AZ_K(-1)) 0.159515 0.157965 1.009813 0.3343
C -0.028566 0.184208 -0.155074 0.8796
R-squared 0.084837    Mean dependent var 0.143228
Adjusted R-squared 0.001641    S.D. dependent var 0.254909
S.E. of regression 0.254700    Akaike info criterion 0.243178
Sum squared resid 0.713593    Schwarz criterion 0.330093
Log likelihood 0.419343    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.225313
F-statistic 1.019723    Durbin-Watson stat 2.093680
Prob(F-statistic) 0.334282    
Null Hypothesis: CBR_AZ has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=3) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.902233  0.0179 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.297073  
 5% level  -3.212696  
 10% level  -2.747676  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 10 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(CBR_AZ)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 10/26/10   Time: 16:21   
Sample (adjusted): 1999 2008   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
CBR_AZ(-1) -0.605286 0.155113 -3.902233 0.0114
D(CBR_AZ(-1)) 0.460210 0.177491 2.592866 0.0487
D(CBR_AZ(-2)) 0.733295 0.161248 4.547628 0.0061
D(CBR_AZ(-3)) -0.104556 0.019447 -5.376440 0.0030
C 5.843517 1.470657 3.973406 0.0106
R-squared 0.890445    Mean dependent var 0.050000
Adjusted R-squared 0.802800    S.D. dependent var 2.114106
S.E. of regression 0.938815    Akaike info criterion 3.018456
Sum squared resid 4.406865    Schwarz criterion 3.169748
Log likelihood -10.09228    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.852488
F-statistic 10.15975    Durbin-Watson stat 2.740321
Prob(F-statistic) 0.012816    
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Table 42: Current Account Balance -- CCA and CIS -- Countries, per cent of GDP 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, October 2010; 2010-2012 projections 
 
 
Source: Data from database: World Development Indicators; Last Updated: 01/30/2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Armenia -6.2 -6.8 -0.5 -1 -1.8 -6.4 -11.5 -13.8 -14.6 -12.6 -8.1
Azerbaijan -12.3 -27.8 -29.8 1.3 17.6 27.3 35.5 23.6 24.1 22.2 21.1
Belarus -2.3 -2.4 -5.3 1.4 -3.9 -6.7 -8.7 -13.1 -14 -13.9 -9.5
Georgia -6.4 -9.6 -6.9 -11.1 -15.1 -19.7 -22.7 -11.7 -12 -12.5 -8.9
Kazakhstan -4.2 -0.9 0.8 -1.8 -2.5 -8.1 4.6 -3.2 3.2 2 2.5
Kyrgyzstan -4 1.7 4.9 2.8 -3.1 -0.2 -8.1 2.1 -5.4 -9.4 -3.9
Moldova -1.2 -6.6 -1.8 -7.6 -11.4 -15.3 -16.3 -8.1 -11.2 -11.4 -7.5
Tajikistan -3.5 -1.3 -3.9 -2.7 -2.8 -8.6 -7.7 -4.9 -3.6 -5.7 -6.6
Turkmenistan 6.7 2.7 0.6 5.1 15.7 15.5 18.7 -16.1 -4.7 3.4 22.7
Ukraine 7.5 5.8 10.6 2.9 -1.5 -3.7 -7.1 -1.5 -0.4 -1.3 -3.2
Uzbekistan 1.2 5.8 7.2 7.7 9.1 7.3 8.7 2.7 3.8 6.3 2
Russia 8.4 8.2 10.1 11.1 9.5 5.9 6.2 4 4.7 3.7 1.3
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Armenia -2.5 -3.9 -8.5 -15.0 -17.6 -14.2 -11.1 -11.1 -8.0
Azerbaijan 1.3 17.7 27.3 33.7 23.0 28.4 26.0 21.8 16.6
Belarus 1.5 -3.8 -6.7 -8.2 -12.5 -15.0 -8.5 -2.9 -10.7
Georgia -10.8 -15.3 -19.6 -22.0 -10.6 -10.3 -12.7 -11.7 -5.7
Kazakhstan -1.8 -2.5 -8.0 4.7 -3.6 1.0 5.4 0.5 -0.1
Kyrgyz Republic -1.5 -10.1 -6.0 -13.9 -4.3 -6.6 -9.6 -25.4 -23.3
Moldova -7.6 -11.3 -15.2 -16.1 -8.2 -7.5 -11.0 -7.4 -5.0
Tajikistan -0.8 -0.8 -13.3 0.9 -3.6 -6.6 -2.6 -3.2 ..
Turkmenistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ukraine 2.9 -1.5 -3.7 -7.1 -1.5 -2.2 -6.3 -8.1 -9.3
Uzbekistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Russia 11.0 9.3 5.6 6.3 4.1 4.4 5.1 3.5 1.6
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Table 43: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates Former USSR – in levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable INPT T2 T3
AZE
2795.5 
(8.1232)
1233.8 
(1.2086)
2591.6 
(4.5225) 0.22195
BLR
5237.9 
(13.3727)
  1565.4 
(1.3472)
4303.7 
(6.5986) 0.38991
EST
8177.1 
(14.8078)
1502.4 
(0.917161)
7854.9 
(8.5424) 0.52437
GEO
5174.5 
(17.9217)
295.6059 
(0.34513)
-909.2930 
('-1.8025) 0.027415
KAZ
5344.8 
(16.3160)
1395.0 
(1.4355)
2689.1 
(4.6985) 0.24727
KGZ
2925.5 
(36.1008)
213.5121 
(0.88816)
-563.8195 
('-3.9821) 0.21227
LTU
6402.5 
(19.6544)
1112.6 
(1.1513)
1935.0 
(3.3998) 0.13655
LVA
6935.6 
(15.0450)
1131.0 
(0.82708)
3649.6 
(4.5312) 0.23014
MDA
4653.1 
(27.1538)
285.2313 
(0.56111)
-1852.1 
('-6.1860) 0.38895
RUS
5840.5 
(22.4149)
1203.1 
(1.5565)
905.6459 
(1.9893) 0.051783
TJK*
2162.8 
(21.3387)
-566.3082 
('-2.2810)
-903.0328 
('-4.6529) 0.25650
TKM
2676.1 
(20.2103)
599.7619 
(1.5269)
422.6458 
(1.8268) 0.0042765
UKR
4377.5 
(22.9671)
1005.9 
(1.7791)
-607.9964 
('-1.8258) 0.088931
UZB
3469.9 
(29.9595)
477.7725 
(1.3906)
627.1643 
(3.0993) 0.11754
USSRF
5116.9 
(21.7739)
1049.8 
(1.5059)
683.9981 
(1.6659) 0.034754
2
R
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Table 44: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates Former USSR – growth rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable T1 T2 T3
PIAZE
4.8431 
(3.5498)
-10.7393 
(3.5498)
7.0463 
(3.9296) 0.20482
PIBLR
2.6570 
(3.5845)
-4.2540 
('-2.0817)
4.6388 
(4.7616) 0.17436
PIEST
2.2909 
(4.0181)
-5.9908 
(-3.8115)
5.0902 
(6.7931) 0.37991
PIGEO
3.3864 
(3.1526)
-19.1780 
('-6.4764)
5.3100 
(3.4955) 0.47652
PIKAZ
2.8176 
(3.7233)
-5.6290 
('-2.6982)
4.2812 
(4.0004) 0.20891
PIKGZ
1.6315 
(2.3278)
-8.1539 
('-4.2202)
1.2720 
(1.2833) 0.25696
PILTU
2.5083 
(3.5142)
-9.0404 
('-4.5943)
4.4174 
(4.3762) 0.36878
PILVA
3.0722 
(3.6177)
-11.1195 
('-4.7497)
5.9573 
(4.9605) 0.39822
PIMDA
2.3114 
(2.2228)
-10.1128 
('-3.5277)
0.53766 
(0.36561) 0.19348
PIRUS
2.3536 
(3.3087)
-6.0899 
('-3.1055)
2.8847 
(2.8676) 0.2073
PITJK
2.8741 
(3.6047)
-14.8064 
('-8.4106)
4.4908 
(3.4931) 0.60003
PITJKM
2.5483 
(2.7016)
-5.3396 
('-2.0534)
3.1525 
(2.3633) 0.10339
PIUKR
2.6809 
(2.8886)
-7.1020 
('-2.7757)
1.4299 
(1.0894) 0.15189
PIUZB
1.6067 
(3.2891)
-4.4668 
('-3.3169)
2.6342 
(3.8131) 0.25008
PIUSSRF
2.4659 
(3.4049)
-6.7195 
('-3.3656)
2.9086 
(2.8398) 0.22993
2
R
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Annex	2	
Data availability, accessibility and accuracy 
 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/faq.htm#q2b 
Frequently Asked Questions, World Economic Outlook (WEO), Last Updated: March 02, 2015 
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